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The current version of the rules governing admission of good and bad character evidence in 
criminal prosecutions are embodied in the Federal Rules of Evidence, and in their Uniform Rule 
counterparts.  The basic rule is that evidence of the bad character of the accused is inadmissible.1
However, there are exceptions.  First, if the defendant chooses to prove that the defendant is a 
person of good moral character, the prosecution can rebut with evidence of bad moral character.2
Second, if , in a crime of violence, the defendant claims that the defendant acted in self-defense 
due to the propensity of the victim to commit acts of violence, the prosecution can rebut with 
evidence of the defendant’s propensity to engage in violent acts.3  Third, specific instances of the 
defendant’s bad conduct not charged in the indictment are admissible to prove an intermediate 
issue such as motive, intent, knowledge, lack of mistake or accident, plan, preparation or identity 
(the uncharged misconduct rule).4  Fourth, reputation, opinion or specific instances of bad 
conduct may be admitted to prove the defendant habitually committed some act.5  Fifth, if the 
defendant becomes a witness, the defendant’s credibility may be attacked by reputation or 
opinion evidence that the defendant is untruthful or by cross-examination on specific instances of 
2the defendant’s bad conduct that affects credibility.6
These rules serve several ostensible purposes:  e.g., protecting the jury from evidence 
alleged to be of low probative value and great prejudice to the accused, while permitting the 
prosecution at the same time to offer circumstantial proof of the accused’s bad character by proof 
of other acts of uncharged criminal misconduct if that evidence also proves some intermediate 
issue in the case, or the existence of a habit of behavior.7   Almost all evidence gurus and pundits 
approve of the current structure of the character evidence rules, although all admit that evidence 
of prior similar behavior is relevant to predicting whether the defendant will act the same way in 
similar circumstances.  The commentators rely on the presumption of innocence accorded the 
defendant, or the belief that Anglo-American criminal justice is fundamentally culturally 
different from criminal justice on the European continent to justify their conclusion that this 
system is, if not the best system for handling proof of cross-situational stability of human 
conduct in criminal prosecutions.8
The Federal Rules were modified ten years ago by the additional of special rules permitting 
the prosecution to prove that the accused in a sex crime prosecution had a propensity or 
predisposition to commit sex crimes.9  That modification was made  by Congress over objections 
by most of the leading evidence commentators.  A few states, notably New York, have followed 
suit and have adopted special rules admitting other similar criminal acts of alleged sex 
criminals.10  In the view of some commentators, the shift to permit proof of other bad sexual acts 
of the offender in sex crime prosecutions is an anomaly that attacks the constitutionally protected 
3presumption of innocence. New York writers are outraged that the sex offender provisions 
threaten the continued viability of People v. Molineux,11 the case that is most often-cited by the 
remaining common law evidence jurisdictions12  in support of the current uncharged misconduct 
rule.  
This essay examines the original Molineux decision and its influence on present-day 
character evidence.   Part II is a brief summary of the story behind the 1899 trial of Roland 
Molineux for the murder of Katharine Adams, the  trial which was the platform that launched a 
synthetic rule for the admission of uncharged misconduct in criminal prosecutions.13  Part III is 
the story of the first trial.14  Part IV is a summary of the state of the law relating to admissibility 
of evidence of the bad character of the accused prior to 1899.  The courts recognized a general 
exclusionary rule loosely based on the collateral fact rule or the presumption of innocence that 
kept out direct evidence of the bad moral character of the accused, but a network of common law 
decisions allowed evidence of the bad character of the accused to put its nose under the tent in a 
variety of seemingly unrelated situations.15
Part V examines and analyzes the New York Court of Appeals’ Molineux opinion.  The 
majority opinion was a masterpiece written by a judge not noted for his scholarship that 
established a general rule  allowing specific bad acts of the accused that necessarily 
demonstrated the bad moral character of the accused into evidence if an intermediate issue could 
be thought up that the specific bad act could be used to prove.16  The concurring opinion of Chief 
Judge Alton B. Parker would become the basis for section 411 of the 1942 Model Code of 
4Evidence, the precursor of rule 404(b), thanks to a well-written Harvard Law Review article 
advocating Parker’s viewpoint.
Part VI is a very short account of the second Molineux trial in which Roland Molineux was 
acquitted after a 13 minute jury deliberation.  The second trial was conducted in a way that 
completely excluded all the evidence of the killing of Henry Barnet, with predictable results: the 
accused was exonerated.17
Part VII is the story of the development of the Molineux rule into Rule 404(b) of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence.  Molineux became one of most cited decisions in the history of the United 
States.  However, legal scholars did not like Judge Werner’s pigeon-hole formula.  Professor 
Edmund Morgan was reporter for a blue ribbon panel of experts brought together by the 
American Law Institute in 1939  to write a Model Code of Evidence.  Morgan approved of the 
version of the uncharged misconduct rule put together by Prof. Julius Stone in two articles 
published in the HARVARD LAW REVIEW in 1936-38.   Stone, in turn, preferred Chief Judge 
Parker’s version of the uncharged misconduct rule in his concurring opinion.  Rule 411 of the 
1942 Model Code of Evidence was the result of Morgan’s decision to follow Stone. This formula 
became Rule 55 of the 1953 edition of the Model Rules of Evidence  which served as the basis 
for Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules.   Chief Judge Parker’s concurring opinion in Molineux
became Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.18
Part VIII  summarizes the results of this investigation and its implication for future inquiries 
5into the legitimacy of character evidence.  Rule 404(b) is the most litigated rule in the Federal 
Rules of Evidence.  Rule 404(b) was supposed to make admission of uncharged misconduct easy 
and simple.  Instead it has made admission and exclusion more difficult and much more time-
consuming.  Rule 404(b) has taken up far too much judicial time and effort since 1975.  It has 
become an example of insanity: repeatedly trying to do the same thing over and expecting 
different results. Part VIII advocates a character evidence rule that honestly authorizes 
admission of character evidence to prove action in conformity therewith.
II.  THE MOLINEUX AFFAIR
A. BACKGROUND FACTS
 On February 17, 1900, Roland Molineux was convicted of the murder of Mrs. Katharine 
Adams.  During the course of the three month long trial, the prosecution also tried to prove that 
Molineux had murdered Henry C. Barnet using a similar unique criminal modus operandi.  In 
both homicides, the victim was poisoned by ingesting cyanide of mercury that had been 
concealed in a sample of patent medicine.  In all recorded criminal history up to that time, only 
five prior cases of homicide via cyanide of mercury poisoning had been recorded. The patent 
medicine samples in each case had been sent to a private letter box in New York City that had 
been rented by an unidentified man under an assumed name.  The dose of patent medicine laced 
with cyanide of mercury that killed Mrs. Adams, had been mailed to Harry Cornish, an avowed 
enemy of Molineux.  Henry Barnet had dated Molineux’ financé, Blanche Chesbrough in 1899 
when Molineux had broken off his relationship with Chesbrough.
6This trial  set the stage for the appeal that produced the Molineux rule and eventually led to 
Rule 404(b) of the Federal and Uniform Rules of Evidence. It is impossible to understand the 
dynamics of the Molineux case without knowing a great deal about the principal characters.
1  Roland Molineux 
Very few New Yorkers had the eminent social credentials possessed by Roland Molineux.  
The Molineux family was an old armorigenous English family, which meant a great deal in 
Anglophilic late 19th century New York.  His father was a Civil War General and industrialist19
He also continued his military career, being appointed Major General in the New York National 
Guard in 1885.20  Molineux attended Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute and Sedgewick Institue, 
Great Barrington, Massachusetts before finishing his formal education at Cooper Union.21  He 
was an industrial chemist, first with C. T. Raynolds & Co. In New York and beginning in 1893, 
with Morris, Hermann & Co., Newark, New Jersey, a manufacturer of dry paint colors.  
According to detective Arthur Carey who investigated the two homicides, Molineux was 
assigned to the design and production of tinting colors, with access to a variety of chemicals 
including prussic acid.22
Roland was a sportsman, a body builder, and an eligible bachelor.  He was a member of the 
Knickerbocker Athletic Club, one of the city’s elite amateur athletic organizations.  He was also 
a yachtsman, elected to membership in the Atlantic Yacht Club in 1897.23 He was a member of 
the  “house committee” of the Knickerbocker, responsible for overseeing the conduct of the 
managers, including Athletic Director Harry Cornish.  
7In August, 1897, Molineux took a summer cruise on the steam yacht Viator owned by A. J. 
Morgan.24  He met Blanche Chesebrough in Portland, Maine.  Chesebrough was part of another 
group of pleasure sailors aboard the sailing yacht Mohican.25  The two young people were taken 
with one another at once and promised to meet again in New York City.  Chesebrough aspired to 
become an opera singer.  Molineux belonged to an opera club and wanted to help her make an 
entreé into the profession.
2. Blanche Chesebrough
Blanche Chesebrough,26 was a “poor relation.” Her father James Chesbrough, did not fit the 
family mold.27  According to Blanche’s memoirs, he moved frequently to avoid his creditors.  
Blanche was taken in by her older sister, Isia Stearns. 28 After spending a year in Boston, she 
went to live with her parents in New York City.  Both parents died within a year, leaving her 
without a home or financial support.   She wanted to be an opera singer, but did not have a 
source of steady income to support vocal lessons.  Isia Stearns helped her younger sister 
financially, and Blanche was hired to sing in two choirs in New York City.29 Blanche had two 
assets: her voice and her remarkable good looks.
Detective Arthur Carey described Blanche:
Her beauty was remarkable.  People spoke of her as the true Gibson girl, a living 
replica of the Junoesque creation of Charles Dana Gibson’s artistic pen.  Her beauty was 
8the more striking because though one of her eyes was glass, nature had made ample 
compensation for this blemish by accentuating other factors that go to create womanly 
charm.30
Blanche Chesebrough had a room in Mrs. Bell’s house at 251 W. 75th St.  after her return from 
New England in the summer of 1897.31   She saw a great deal of Roland Molineux, who escorted 
her to dinner at the Waldorf-Astoria, and took her to the opera.   During intermission at a 
performance of Gounod’s Faust in November, 1897, Roland introduced her to his chum, Henry 
Barnet, a commodities broker.  Something electric passed between Blanche and Barnet.  As the 
weeks passed, Roland and Blanche had more contact with Barnet, known as “Barney” to his 
friends.  The three dined together at the Knickerbocker Athletic Club.  Barnet escorted Blanche 
to the Knickerbocker Club’s Amateur Circus in which Roland was a performer on the parallel 
bars.  Shortly after the circus, Rolaond proposed to Blanche.  She refused.32
As the relationship between Roland and Blanche cooled, Barney slowly began to take 
Roland’s place in Blanche’s plans for a happy life.  One problem troubled her: Barney was not 
well-to-do.  He owned little more than the clothes on his back and his reputation as a lady’s man.  
According to Jane Pejsa’s recounting of Blanche’s own memoirs, Barney seduced Blanche (a 
willing victim) in a friend’s apartment during an after-opera party of the Opera Club.  Following 
that episode, according to Pejsa, the two started meeting on a more or less regular basis while 
Molineux was out of the country on an extended trip.33  Blanche moved to 257 West End Ave. in 
January, 1898, and rented a room from Mrs. Alice Bellinger.  “Barney” was a frequent visitor to 
9the Bellinger household and spent many evenings in the drawing room with Blanche.34
3. Henry C. Barnet
Henry C. Barnet was a pudgy, umarried 37 year old New York City stockbroker who lived 
at the Knickerbocker Athletic Club. His great friend happened to be Roland Molineux..35 They 
were fellow members of the Knickerbocker Athletic Club and the Atlantic Yacht Club.36
Blanche Chesebrough’s affair with Barnet did not survive her summer trip to the country.  That 
fall, Molineux again asked her to marry him.  Blanche accepted this second proposal and put on 
a mitzpah ring that Roland gave her as a token of affection.37
Late in October, 1898, Barnett fell ill.  Doctor Wendell Phillips, another Knickerbocker 
member, treated Barnet for an unknown illness that caused the sufferer to endure burning pain in 
the throat and in the stomach.  Doctor H. Beaman Douglass, a renouned specialist in diseases of 
the throat, was called in to look at Barnet on October 30, 1898, and concluded he had a very bad 
case of diptheria.38  Douglass took two throat cultures.  Neither culture showed Klebs-Loeffer 
baccili (diptheria).39
Barnet told Dr. Douglass that he had received a free sample of Kutnow Powder  in the mail 
and had fallen ill after using it.  He had not saved the wrapper.40  Doctor Douglass also noted the 
patient had mercurial burns in his mouth.  On November 4, 1898, Douglass delivered the 
Kutnow Powder to chemist Guy Ellison, who smelled the Kutnow Powder box and detected the 
odor of bitter almonds.  The chemist tasted the substance and noted it had a bitter metallic taste.  
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Ellison added hydrochloric acid to a small sample from the box precipitating out some form of 
metallic salt of cyanide.  He added iodide to the precipitate and iodide of mercury formed in his 
test tube. He heated the stuff, which gave off the bitter almond scent and the peculiar crackling 
sound of cyanide of mercury.41   He communicated his findings to Douglass, who knew that 
calomel, which contained mercury, was often used by other physicians to treat diptheria. 
Blanche Chesebrough sent a note to Barnet with a boquet of flowers when she heard he had 
fallen ill:
I am distressed to learn of your illness.  I arrived home Saturday and am exceedingly sorry 
to know you have been so indisposed. Won’t you let me know when you are able to be 
about?  I want so much to see you.  Is it that you do not believe in me?  If you would but 
let me prove to you my sincerity.  Do not be cross any more. And accept, I pray, my best 
wishes.42
Barnet seemed to be recovering from diptheria when he developed congestive heart failure and 
died on the night of November 10, 1898.  Doctor Douglass signed his death certificate and listed 
his cause of death as “cardiac asthenia caused by diptheria poisoning,”43 despite the fact that 
Douglass knew Barnet had mercuric burns on his mouth and mercuric stomatitis, andthe spurious 
box of Kutnow powder contained a mixture of cyanide of mercury and Carlsbad salts..44
C.  Harry Cornish
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Harry S. Cornish was the Athletic Director of the Knickerbocker Athletic Club, and an 
authority on body building, who had studied medicine at Harvard Medical School.45  The 
Knickerbocker Club’s  chief rivals were the athletes of the older New York Athletic Club.  
Molineux and Cornish clashed over Cornish’s attempt to bar Georgetown University track star 
Bernie Wefers from AAU competition in the fall of 1897.  Wefers competed for the rival New 
York Athletic Club.46  The captain of the New York Athletic Club team, attorney Bartwo Weeks, 
was a close friend of Molineux’s.  Weeks defended the challenge to Bernie Wefers’ amateur 
status before the AAU credentials committee in November, 1897.47  Cornish sent a letter to 
Wefers indicating that he had nothing personal against him but “was out to get Weeks.”48 This 
letter was published by the newspapers.49
To make amends, brewer George Ballentine, the owner of the Knickerbocker Athletic 
Club’s clubouse,  scheduled a dinner for  Weeks at the Union League to show the collective 
appreciation of the top management of the Knickerbocker Club for Weeks.   Ballentine 
apologized to Weeks for Cornish’s attack, but the lame apology was not sufficient for Molineux, 
who condemned Cornish’s prosecution of the grievance against Wefers in a letter to a friend as a 
means “for personal advertisement and to get even with gentleman who displease him.50  Cornish 
then told C.C. Hughes, another club member, that Molineux had made his money rum running, 
and followed that accusation up with another disparaging remark that Hughes reported to 
Molineux.  Molineux promptly brought up charges before the House Committee to dismiss 
Cornish as athletic director, but the Committee refused to do so.51
12
Following this defeat, Cornish met Molineux on the steps of the Knickerbocker Athletic 
Club and said” You son of a bitch, you didn’t do it, did you?”52  Molineux said, “No, you win,” 
and passed his adversary.  That night, Molineux resigned from the Knickerbocker Athletic 
Club.53    Within a few weeks, Roland Molineux had been accepted by the New York Athletic 
Club, and was elevated to a position on the Board of Governors of the club.54
On Christmas Eve, 1898, Cornish received a package in the mail addressed to “ Mr. Harry 
Cornish, Knickerbocker Athletic Club, Fourty-fifth (sic) Street and Madison Avenue.”55
The package bore a General Post Office Manhattan post mark.  Cornish opened it and discovered 
a cardboard box containing a sample bottle of Bromo Seltzer and a silver bottle holder.  The box 
also contained a card envelope but no card was found inside the envelope.  Cornish took the box 
home with him, where he showed it to his landlady and cousin, Katherine Adams,  a 52 year old 
New York City widow, and to her daughter, Florence Rogers.   Cornish put the bottle and bottle 
holder on his bureau where it sat unopened for four days.56
B.  THE POISONING OF MRS. ADAMS
On December 28, 1898, Mrs. Adams, awoke with a severe headache.   Cornish mixed her a 
dose of Bromo Seltzer from the  bottle that he had received in the mail Christmas eve.  Mrs. 
Adams doubled over with cramps and fell on the bathroom floor after drinking the mix.57
Cornish then took a taste of her medicine from the same glass she used and became violently ill.  
With acute presence of mind, he had  the hall boy call the nearest doctor , Dr. E. F. Hitchcock.  
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Despite his own severe stomach cramps, Cornish staggered out on 68th Street to the nearest drug
store and showed the druggist the blue bottle.  The druggist said the bottle looked genuine and 
gave Cornish a drink of spirits of ammonia as an antidote.58
Hitchcock was unable to resuscitate Mrs. Adams, but managed to keep Cornish alive by 
insisting that he keep moving until the poison wore off.59   Hitchcock examined Mrs. Adams 
after death and concluded that she had not been the victim of strychnine.  He examined the 
Bromo Seltzer bottle which was dark blue but did not appear to him to be the same as the factory 
bottle because the name of the product had not been blown into the glass.60  Something was 
wrong with the label.  It was soiled and “gave the bottle a second-hand appearance.” 61 He could 
not conclude what substance had been in the bottle.  He then tasted the contents which had the 
odor of almonds and prussic acid.  Hitchcock identified the poison by taste and smell as cyanide 
of mercury, a deadly poison62
The New York City coroner’s physician, Dr. Albert T.Weston, performed an autopsy on 
Mrs. Adams’ remains.  Dr. Weston smelled hydrocyanic acid upon removing the victim’s brain, 
and detected the same odor from the Bromo Seltzer bottle recovered form the scene.63   Mrs. 
Adams’ internal organs were sent out to Dr. Rudolph Witthaus, a toxicologist, for confirmation64
On  January 5, 1899, Dr. Witthaus reported that Mrs. Adams had died from poisoning by cyanide 
of mercury, a compound used in manufacturing dry colors such as Prussian Blue.65
Doctor Weston delivered the blue bottle, and its silver holder to Captain McCluskey of the 
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New York City Police Department, who gave it to Detectives McCafferty and Carey, the 
investigatory team that would develop a case against the prime suspect.   The detectives bought a 
genuine Bromo Seltzer bottle from a nearby pharmacy and compared it to the bottle received by 
Cornish. They discovered that a regulation Bromo Seltzer bottle would not fit the special silver 
holder.  66
Carey and McCluskey interviewed Harry Cornish at the Knickerbocker Athletic Club who 
told them that he received the Bromo Seltzer via a package in his mailbox on Christmas Eve.  
Cornish took the discarded wrapper out of the waste basket at the suggestion of Patrick Finneran, 
his assistant because Finnernan thought that Cornish might be able to identify the mysterious 
gift-giver from the handwriting on the wrapper.  Cornish took the address out of his desk drawer 
and gave it to the detectives.67
Cornish told the detectives that he had no enemies, but he had a disagreement with a number 
of club members about the conduct of club parties in 1897.  There was also a disagreement about 
Cornish’s attack on Bernie Wefers, and Cornish’s letter to Wefers that later made the newspapers 
and precipitated the apology to Bartow Weeks.   Cornish told them the club member who tried to 
get him fired was Roland Molineux.68
The detectives learned that Molineux was a chemist employed by a Newark, New Jersey, 
plant that made painters’ dry colors.  He had access to prussic acid used to make various shades 
of blue tinting colors.  A skilled chemist could turn prussic acid and mercury into cyanide of 
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mercury, 69  Victims of a heavy dose of prussic acid poisoning suffered from nausea, vomiting 
and excessive drooling of saliva, followed or accompanied by anxiety and confusion, even 
vertigo.  Shortness of breath sets in with shallow rapid breathing that gradually slows down.  The 
victim’s eyes become nonreactive to light and death follows unless prompt treatment for the 
poison is administered.  The victim’s breath and vomit smells like bitter almonds.  Mrs. Adams’ 
and Cornish’s symptoms matched that of the victims of cyanide poisoning. 70
The silver toothpick holder had been manufactured by Lebkeucher & Co., a Newark, New 
Jersey, firm.71  The holder was sold by C. J. Hartdegen jewelers in Newark on December 21, 
1898, three days before the package arrived at the Knickerbocker Athletic Club.  The detectives 
questioned Emma Miller, the stenographer and saleswoman who had sold the holder. She 
described the purchaser as a man in his thirties who had a red beard.  The man had asked for a 
silver holder for a Bromo Seltzer bottle.  The store manager suggested that he try a silver 
toothpick holder and the man accepted the alternative.72
McCluskey and Carey also talked to Detective Farrell of the Newark Police department, 
who knew Roland Molineux.  On December 21, he was on duty in downtown Newark near the 
Hartegen Jewelry Store.  Farrel told the New York policemen that he saw Molineux walking up 
from Hartdegen’s store around 2:00 P.M. on the afternoon of  December 21 and spoke to him.73
On  January 2, 1899, the New York Journal ran a banner headline in its morning edition: 
“Police Want Roland Burnham Molinuex in Poisoning Case--Chief McCluskey and Cornish 
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Hunted the City for Him All of Yesterday--He May Be Able to Solve the Mystery--Cyanide of 
Potassium was the Poison Used.”74 Within an hour of the release of the Journal, Roland and his 
father, General Molineux, presented themselves at Captain McCluskey’s doorstep and stated that 
Roland was ready to help the police in any way he could.  Captain McCluskey said that he did 
not want to arrest Roland, and the interview ended.75
Detective Carey concluded that Barnett had been poisoned in the same manner.  Carey made 
a trip to Dr. Douglass’ office to interrogate him. Douglass stuck to his original diagnosis, 
although he admitted Ellison told him that Barnet’s box of Kutnow Powder contained cyanide of 
mercury.  Carey took possession of the Kutnow Powder box and found out that it was a free 
sample from the patent medicine company’s New York home office.76  John Adams, secretary of 
the Knickerbocker Athletic Club, saw a fac-simile of the poison package address in the 
newspapers. Adams believed that the handwriting was that of Roland Molineux.  Adams, pulled 
out Molineux’ letters protesting Harry Cornish’s misdeeds and his resignation letter.  Molineux 
had mis-spelled “Forty” as “Fourty” in his correspondence: the package had been addressed to 
Cornish with “fourty” mis-spelled.77
The New York Journal offered a $5,000.00 award to anyone providing information that 
would lead to the conviction of Mrs. Adams’ killer.  The Journal and the World also offered cash 
premiums for exclusive stories about the Adams homicide.  This attention brought in Nicholas 
Heckman, the owner of a private letter box agency at 257 W. 42nd Street, who began dickering 
with both newspapers for a price for his story: he knew the man that had rented a private letter 
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box from Heckman.  The man had given the name of “H.C. Barnet” to him, then paid for one 
month’s rental.  “Barnet” received free patent medicine samples that included Calthos, an 
impotence remedy, and a box of Kutnow Powder.  Heckman identidied Molineux as the man 
who posed as” Barnet.”78  The World spread the identification across its front page.  Later, the 
Journal demanded that Governor Theodore Roosevelt indict Molineux without waiting for an 
inquest into Mrs. Adams’ death.79
Joseph Koch, proprietor of another private letter box business at 1620 Broadway, came 
forward with a story that a man had rented a private letter box from him using the name “H. 
Cornish” around  December 12 or 17, 1898.  Koch knew Molineux by sight.  He said Molineux 
approached him between the 12th and 17th of December about rental rates.  Molineux told him he 
had a friend who wanted a private box for a small amount of mail.   Koch quoted a price to 
Molinuex and Molineux left without renting a box.  On  December 21, another man, using the 
name “H. Cornish” rented a mail box from Koch.  He received samples of patent medicine which 
he called for on a regular basis.  The samples included Calthos and Kutnow powder.80  Koch 
promptly sold his story to the Journal for $500.00.
New York County Coroner Edward W. Hart started an inquest into Mrs. Adams’ death on 9
February 1899.   Assistant District Attorney James Osborne had been handpicked by District 
Attorney Col. Asa Bird Gardiner to handle the inquest.  He was assisted by John A. McIntyre,  a 
friend of Mrs. Rodgers and of Harry Cornish.81  During the course of the hearing, Roland 
Molineux took the stand on 10 February, after waiving his right to refuse to testify in the 
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proceedings.82  He agreed that he had a number of disputes with Harry Cornish over Cornish’s 
conduct as athletic director, and confirmed Cornish’s story about the Wefers letter.  Osborne was 
much more interested in Molinuex’ relationship with Henry C. Barnet.  He probed into their 
supposed friendship, and suggested that Barnet had been in love with Molineux’ wife.  Molineux 
did not deny that Barnet might have been in love with Blanche Chesebrough.  Osborne also 
suggested that Molineux did not become engaged to Blanche Chesebrough until after Barnet’s 
death.  Molineux insisted that his engagement was known to his parents and brothers well before 
Barnet’s death.  Molineux also  authenticated a number of his letters and handwriting samples for 
the Coroner.83
Finally, the District Attorney brought on the two letter box shop owners, Joseph Koch, and 
Nicholas Heckman.  Koch was  unable to swear that the man posing as “H. Cornish” was 
Molineux.  However,  Heckman identified Molineux as the man who rented a mail box as “H.C. 
Barnet.”   Molineux rose from his seat and called Heckman a liar and Weeks asked for cross-
examination of Heckman because he had offered to sell his identification story to the 
newspapers.  Coroner Hart threatened to cite Weeks for contempt and order was eventually 
restored.84
The District Attorney’s handwriting expert  had compared several examples of Molineux’ 
handwriting provided by John Adams and by Molineux with the address on the poison package 
sent to Cornish and opined that the same person had written all the documents.  The grand jury 
retired after Colonel Gardiner summed up for the People, proclaiming that General Molineux 
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was his friend, nonetheless “. . .  duty made it necessary for me to show that Blanche 
Chesebrough Molineux was the woman for whom Molineux had murdered Barnet.” 85  That 
provoked another outburst from Molineux who insisted that Gardiner refer to his wife as “lady.” 
Gardiner continued his vitriolic attack on Molineux as a degenerate who consorted with Chinese 
opium sellers and the kind of man who was such a degenerate that having been insulted by a 
social inferior, walked away from a manly fight to redeem his honor.86  The grand jury  came 
back with the following verdict:
We find that the said Katherine J. Adams came to her death on the 28th day of December, 
1898, at No. 61 West Eighty-sixth street by poisoning by mercuric cyanide administered 
by Harry S. Cornish to whom said poison had been sent in a bottle of bromo-seltzer in the 
mail by Roland B. Molineux.87
Weeks turned the Coroner’s court room into Bedlam when he noted that the verdict did not 
exonerate Cornish and asked for an arrest warrant for Cornish. One of the jurors jumped up and 
agreed with Weeks that the jury did not intend to let Cornish off.  The jury was dismissed among 
pandemonium in the court room without retiring to straighten out its verdict and Coroner Hart 
issued an arrest warrant for Molineux.  Cornish was discharged by the Coroner.88
C.  THE GRAND JURIES
Although the Coroner had the power to examine a person accused of homicide and 
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determine if there was probable cause to hold the perpetrator, Coroner Hart failed to show up on 
March 1, 1899,  to examine Molineux and instead continued the hearing for two days’ time.  This 
was the opening that the District Attorney’s office needed to present the case to a sitting grand 
jury that promptly indicted Molineux for the murder of Katherine Adams.   Bartow Weeks 
immediately moved to inspect the Grand Jury minutes and was given the right to do so.  He 
moved to quash the indictment on a number of irregularities in the presentation of evidence, 
particularly the use of handwriting samples to identify Molineux as the perpetrator.  The motion 
was granted and Molineux’ case was committed to the next grand jury.89
The presiding Justice, McMahon, was a member of the Military Order of the Loyal Legion 
of the United States and a friend of General Molineux.  The foreman of the second grand jury, 
Colonel William C. Church, was also the General’s friend.   The second Grand Jury refused to 
indict Molineux, but he was re-arrested on an assault charge immediately upon release from 
custody and thrown back into the Tombs.90
General Molineux and his son then decided to fight the case in the newspapers.  Blanche 
Molineux released a statement to the press attacking Assistant District Attorney Osborne 
published in the New York Times on March 25, 1899.  She denied any improper association with 
Barnet and pled with the press not to “print such wicked accusations, which the slightest 
investigation would show to be unfounded.”91
Roland then followed suit with his own statement in which he denied killing Mrs. Adams or 
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Barnet.  He made a point of showing his resentment of the attack that District Attorney Osborne 
had made on his wife’s virtue during the Grand Jury hearing.  He restated his willingness to 
cooperate with the police by giving writing samples for analysis and noted that Joseph Koch 
could not identify Molineux as the man who rented a mail box from him using the name of “H 
Cornish.”92
However, the District Attorney case made a third trip to the grand jury and Molineux was 
again indicted on six counts of first degree murder of Mrs. Adams.93  This time, the indictment 
would withstand Weeks’ procedural attack94 and Molineux’ case was set for trial in the 
Recorder’s Court presided over by Recorder John W. Goff.  
III.  THE TRIAL
A.  THE PROSECUTOR’S OPENING STATEMENT
The New York Tribune covered the opening statement of District Attorney Osborne on  
December 5, 1899:
This defendant is on trial for murder in the first degree on an indictment charging him 
with the murder of Mrs. Kate J. Adams while in the act of committing a felony on the 
person of Harry S. Cornish.  On December 28, 1898, this community was shocked by the 
news that a woman had been poisoned. . . . Mrs. Adams had reached that period where she 
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had left behind her the passions of youth, and knew only her duty. She had not an enemy 
on the face of the earth.  No human being had the slightest motive for removing her. . .95
Osborne retraced the Adams killing step-by- step, starting with the purchase of the silver 
toothpick holder and working forward through the mixing of the poison and its mailing to 
Cornish.  Osborne announced that only a chemist would have access to and be able to mix 
cyanide of mercury with Bromo Seltzer.96  He said:
You must look for a chemist to find the sender of the cyanide of mercury, and 
furthermore you must look for a chemist in working with dry colors, the business of the 
defendant.
* * * * *
You must not look for a man with an all-consuming hatred for Cornish, but for a man 
whose hatred for Cornish is strong and never ceasing, one that lasts all a man’s life.”97
Osborne then poisoned the well by calling up the death of Henry C. Barnet in November.  
Over virulent objection from Weeks, overruled by Recorder Goff, Osborne recited how the same 
physician that had treated Cornish had also treated Barnet. That physician knew Cornish was 
poisoned by cyanide of mercury because he had identified the poison that killed Barnet a month 
earlier.98
Osborne then went through a detailed explanation of the identification of the person who 
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wrote the “Barnet” and “Cornish” letters from the known samples of Molineux’ handwriting, 
preparing the jury for the handwriting experts’ testimony that one person had written all the 
letters and addresses, including the address on the package sent to Cornish.  Osborne also 
cunningly referred to the physical description given by “H.C. Barnet” in response to a patent 
medicine request for diagnostic information for an impotence cure.  Osborne showed that the 
physical measurements listed on that blank were the defendant’s, not those of the rotund 
Barnet.99
Osborne wound up his opening statement in a blaze of passion:
Everything tends to show that Roland B. Molineux loved a woman and contemplated 
matrimony. Suppose he should fear there should come a break between himself and this 
woman.  Suppose he should go to her and plead with her for a speedy marriage.  Suppose 
there should come along a strong and healthy man, good looking and athletic, who was 
beginning to pay this woman marked attention. And suppose the man who wrote those 
letters and this woman should suddenly marry. What would you say to that?  What would 
you think?100
The opening statement shows that Osborne intended to try Molineux for two killings; the murder 
of Barnet and the murder of Mrs. Adams, from the outset of the trial.  The opening statement 
appeared to do more to convince the jury that Molineux had murdered Barnet than it did to 
convince them that he murdered Mrs. Adams.
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Weeks chose to reserve his opening statement to the end of the prosecution’s case.  This left 
the jury in a quandry, not knowing why Barnet’s name had been injected into the case, and 
willing to accept Osborne’s thesis: the same man that murdered Barnet in November murdered 
Mrs. Adams in December.
B   THE ADAMS POISONING
Osborne’s organization of the witnesses and the physical evidence was haphazard and 
confusing.  Lay witnesses were put on out-of-order and expert testimony from physicians, 
chemists and handwriting analysts was sandwiched between the lay witnesses in no coherent 
order.  The following re-ordering of the evidence makes his game plan clear.
1. Police Witnesses
Osborne called Officer John A. Palmer, who responded to the scene of the poisoning of Mrs. 
Adams on 28 December.  He  described how he went to the scene of the crime and found Mrs. 
Adams lying dead in her living room.  Palmer then went to Dr. Hitchcock’s house to retrieve the 
Bromo Selzter bottle and its wrappings. Palmer turned the evidence over to Dr. Weston, the 
Coroner.  Palmer took down the names of everyone in the Adams flat at the time and Mrs. 
Adams’ vital statistics.  He had nothing further to do with the case.101
Detective John J. Herlihy testifed that he found out the silver toothpick holder had been 
made by Liebkuchner & Co.   Herlihy checked the company’s sales records on toothpick holders. 
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Ruling out sales to retailers in the Midwest and New England, he discovered that one had been 
sold to Hartdegan’s Jewelers in Newark.  Herlihy went to Newark and interrogated several 
Hartidegan employees.102  On 12 January Herlihy and Det. Arthur Carey went to the Kutnow 
factory where they began searching the company records for letters requesting patent medicine 
samples.  They turned up a letter from “H. Cornish” asking for Kutnow powder which later was 
identified by handwriting experts as in the handwriting of Roland Molineux.103  Herlihy traced 
the letter to Koch’s private letter service at 1620 Broadway.   Herlihy and Carey recovered a 
number of patent medicine samples from the private box rented to “H. Cornish.” 104  Later, the 
two detectives chased down the wholesale stationery company that handed blue paper with a 
crest of three interlaced feathers and got a list of retailers who handled the paper.  This was 
significant because the “H. Cornish” letter to Kutnow Company was written on this scarce, hard-
to-find paper.105
Detective. Arthur A. Carey told the jury that he had a photograph of the package addressed 
to Cornish and went over files and records at the Knickerbocker Athletic Club looking for 
similar handwriting.   Carey then went to Hartdegan’s in Newark and interviewed Emma Miller 
who sold the tooth pick holder.106  Carey also visited Koch  and helped Herlihy inventory the 
“Cornish” box contents.  He went to the Adams flat and retrieved the glass and spoon that Harry 
Cornish had used to mixed the fatal dose of Bromo Seltzer from the Adams’ locked china 
cabinet.107
Captain George McCluskey, the Chief of the Detective Bureau , the officer in charge of both 
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the Adams and Barnet investigations, explained to the jury how the handwriting exhibits were 
taken up by his officers, assembled and delivered to handwriting experts William Kinsley and  
David Carvalho for analysis and comparison.  McCluskey also testified that he collected 
handwriting samples from Cornish, Howard Adams, John Adams, Alvin Harpster and Felix 
Gallagher for the use of the handwriting experts.  McCluskey was unable to get a handwriting 
sample from Molineux, although eventually the handwriting experts obtained a sample from 
him.108  Weeks’ cross-examination brought out the meeting between General Molinuex, the 
defendant and McCluskey on  January 1 or 2, 1899 after the Journal had published a banner 
headline that Roland Molineux was wanted by the police.109
Newark, NJ, police officer Joseph Farrell,   an accomplished athlete, knew Roland 
Molineux.  He also knew Robert Zeller and Mamie Melando   Farrell had been to Molineux’ 
apartment in the Herrman Bros. Paint Co.  several times.   Farrell was called because he saw 
Roland Molineux around 2:00 or 2:30 P.M. on 21 December 21, 1898 walking east on Market 
Street in Newark.  Farrell  said he spoke to Molineux.  Farrell could not state where Molineux 
was going, although Osborne tried to get Farrell to commit to an opinion that Molineux was 
heading in the direction of Hartdegen’s Jewelry Store.110
2.  Incident Witnesses
Osborne called twenty-two lay  incident witnesses to establish his case against Molineux.  
Most of the lay witnesses authenticated various documents, such as John D. Adams,111 George 
W. Hall of Moodus, CT,112Agnes Evans,  a companion to the wife of Dr. James Burns of New 
York,113 Andre Bustanoby, Superintendant of the Knickerbocker Athletic Club,114 and 
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WilliamW. Scheffler, a friend of Molineux.115   Chief Postal Clerk Henry Lockwood was called 
for the purpose of showing the post mark on the “H. Cornish” package was from the New York 
General Post Office.116
Mamie Melando, Harry Cornish and Joseph Koch were the three most important lay 
witnesses in the case  of Mrs. Adams’ death.  Mamie Melando went on first.  After identifying 
herself and acknowledging that she had known Roland Molineux since she was  thirteen. She 
told the jury that she had worked for him at both the C. T. Raynald Co and Morris Herrman & 
Co as a paint mixer and foreman.   District Attorney Osborne showed her one of the letters 
requesting a patent medicine sample on blue stationery with three intertwined feathers forming a 
crest at the top.  Melando said she had seen that kind of paper before in Roland Molineux’ 
apartment in the summer of 1898 and had even taken a few sheets for her own personal use in 
October, 1898. She claimed she lost the sheets after writing a letter to a friend named Wilson.117
She also testified that she went to see Bartow Weeks in January, 1899,  to disclose to him that
she had sheets from Molineux’ apartment identical to the published “H. Cornish” letters that 
appeared in the New York newspapers early in 1899.  Recorder Goff decided to take  her 
examination away from counsel for the parties.  Melando admitted going to see Molineux in his 
Newark apartment in January to show her sympathy for him.118    Recorder Goff asked her if 
Molineux ever sent her letters; she admitted receiving several some years before the trial, but 
claimed she had destroyed them.119
Harry Cornish made his appearance on  December 28.120  After giving a little of his 
background as an athletic director and student of sport,121 Cornish told the jury how he had 
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received an anonymous present on Christmas eve consisting of a sample bottle of Bromo Seltzer 
and a silver holder.  He described throwing away the wrapper at first, until chided by Patrick 
Finneran to save it and try to trace who it was that sent him the present.122  Cornish then  took the 
jury through the chain of events that led up to Mrs. Adams’ death and his own near death on  the 
morning of the 28th.  He told them that. Mrs. Adams   collapsed doubled over in pain in the 
bathroom after drinking the Bromo Selzter Cornish had mixed for her from the poison bottle.123
Cornish explained that he had sipped the Bromo Seltzer and become violently ill but was able to 
. go to get help from the neighborhood drug store.124  Then he stepped down from the stand for 
another witness.  The District Attorney recalled him the same day to explain how Drs. Hitchcock 
and Potter were summoned to treat Mrs. Adams.  Cornish also described how he was able to 
leave the Adams flat, take an elevated train downtown to the Knickerbocker Club, and manage to 
stop off to see John Yocum, a friend and a chemist, to inquire about poisons.125  He had left the 
Adams flat in the charge of John D. McIntyre, an assistant District Attorney and family friend 
and the distraught Mrs. Rodgers.126
Bartow Weeks’ cross-examination strategy was destructive: first he showed that Cornish 
was a divorced man, and therefore his word was not believable.127  Weeks also insinuated that 
Mrs. Rodgers, separated from her husband, might have been a romantic interest of Cornish.128
Weeks’ cross-examination was a traverse of direct examination that did his client no particular 
good.129    The District Attorney never asked Cornish about any bad blood between himself and 
Molineux. At the end of a day-long cross-examination, Cornish told the jury about the money he 
was offered to give an exclusive interview to the New York Journal.  Cornish claimed he visited 
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the Journal offices for the sole purpose of finding out who had given Molineux’ name as his 
assailant.130
Osborne had a witness that corroborated Cornish’s story.  Harry A. King was in Cornish’s 
office on the 24th of December and saw Cornish open the package in his presence.  On the 27th , 
King developed a headache while working out and asked Cornish if he could mix a dose of 
Bromo Seltzer from the “gift” on Cornish’s desk.  King couldn’t get water out of the cooler and 
so lost the opportunity to be the first victim of the poison package131
Florence Rodgers then gave a straightforward account about the Adams-Rodgers family’s 
frequent changes of address in 1897-98 and corroborated Cornish’s version of the poisoning of 
her mother on 28 December.  On cross-examination, she admitted that she had rented a private 
letter box in 1895, 1896 and 1897 when she had not yet separated from her husband.132  The 
importance of this shred of evidence became apparent during Bartow Weeks’ closing argument.  
The next witness, Gustav Kutnow,   one of the owners of the Kutnow Brothers Drug 
Company, identified People’s Exhibit A, a tin sample box of his company’s product.    He told 
the jury that his product was a compound of Carlsbad salts.  He also authenticated Exhibit E, 
which showed that “H Cornish” had requested a sample of Kutnow Powder on 22 December 
1898, shipped the next day to 1620 Broadway, New York City.133  Since the poison intended for 
Cornish was not packaged in a Kutnow Powder free sample, the relevance of this examination to 
the killing of Mrs. Adams is mystifying.  However, Kutnow’s testimony was relevant to showing 
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that Barnet had been killed by a sample of Kutnow Powder from the same firm in July.134
John H. Yocum,  Cornish’ chemist  friend, told the jury that Cornish had come to his office 
on the afternoon of the 28th on his way to the Knickerbocker Athletic Club.  Cornish told him of 
Mrs. Adams’ death and his own illness.  Yocum tried to get him to drink a glass of whiskey 
mixed with milk, but “he threw it off.”135 About 6:00 P.M. on the 28th, Yokum dropped by the 
club to see how his friend was doing.  Cornish asked Yokum to go to the Adams flat and check 
on the inhabitants.136
Knickerbocker Club House Committee Chair Charles C. Hughes recounted the differences 
between Molineux and Cornish over the amateur circus, the baths and the gym.  Hughes also 
recalled that Cornish said Molineux made his money in the liquor business, a highly insulting 
comment to an upper class fellow such as Molineux.137  Alvin Harpster told the jury about his 
affiliation with the Knickerbocker Club and his former work as a bill collector for the Stearns 
Company.  Harpster testified that he had to get a bond to serve as a clerk at the club, and that he 
was a good friend of Cornish.  He also said that he had contacted his former employer about the 
time that he was required to put up bond to be cash clerk.138  There was no mention of Molineux’ 
attempt to get dirt on Harpster from his former employer to get him fired from the 
Knickerbocker.  Rudolph Heiles, a former Knickerbocker Club employee, had already told the 
court that he wrote a letter to Stearns & Co. of Detroit for Molineux asking for an endorsement 
of Harpster’s character for a pretended job application.  Heiles said that Molineux planned to use 
the reply letter to get Harpster discharged if the reference was poor.139  Heiles  got a piece of 
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company stationery from Charles Jacobs of Charles Jacobs & Co. and got Jacobs to sign the 
letter for Heiles.  Stearns & Co. answered the letter and Heiles showed the letter to Molineux: 
Stearns had nothing negative to say about Harpster and Heiles kept it until after Mrs. Adams’ 
death. Then he discarded the letter.140
Osborne called Joseph Koch, who told the jury that Molineux had been in his business on  
December 21, 1898 to ask about box rental prices for a friend and then he went away without 
renting a box.  Another man appeared on the 21st of December and rented a box under the name 
of “H. Cornish.”  Koch stated that Harry Cornish was not the man who rented the box using his 
name.  Koch described the man as about 5'9" or 10" with broad shoulders and a dark brown 
moustache who was  “of the size and general appearance of Mr. Cornish, with one exception, 
that was the man’s moustache  was not curled up.“141  He also said that Molineux was not the 
man who rented the box either.142  Koch identified a number of packages and envelopes received 
by the owner of the “Cornish” mail box.  Koch said he received money for giving an “exclusive” 
story to the New York Journal.143  Koch also revealed that Bartow Weeks had interviewed him in 
January, 1899, and he had told Weeks that he had identified Molineux as the man who made 
inquiries about renting a letter box.144
Emma Miller, the woman who sold the silver toothpick holder to a man with a sandy beard 
on  December 21, 1898,145  told the jury that  Detectives Carey and Herlihy had interrogated her 
at Hartdegen’s in December, 1898.   She said the buyer, who “looked like a gentleman. . .”146
came to the jewelry store about 5:00 P.M.   When Bartow Weeks and Molineux confronted her 
on the 2nd or 3rd of January, she denied that Molineux was the buyer, and she stuck to her story 
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on the stand.147
Osborne then tried to prove that Molineux had access to Prussic acid and mercury, the 
compounds from which Mrs. Adams’ fatal dose of salts had been made.  He called Carl 
Trommer, a sales representative for Roessler & Hesslacer, a supply house that dealt in pigments 
and related chemicals, who testified that he called on Molineux and saw barrels of prussiate of 
potash, the raw material for making prussic acid, in the Herrman Co. laboratory. 148  Molineux’ 
employer, Morris Herrman, contradicted Trommer.  He testified that there was no cyanide of 
mercury in his factory or in Molineux’s laboratory. Herrman said that Molineux was 
experimenting with enamels.149
3.  The Medical Evidence
Doctor Wendell Phillips told the jury he had treated Harry Cornish in December for 
poisoning and also treated “A.B” for poisoning a month before. According to Dr.  Phillips, “AB” 
told him he had just taken a dose of Kutnow powder before becoming violently ill and Phillips 
said:”I believe he said it was that damned Kutnow Powder that had caused the trouble.”150
Doctor Phillips recitation of Barnet’s complaints was hearsay that included a lay opinion on 
causality of Barnet’s fatal illness.151  At that time a hearsay statement relating to pain, suffering 
and the source of illness made to a physician was admissible  in New York.152
Doctor Albert T. Weston testified about the autopsy on Mrs. Adams’ remains on December 
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28, 1898.  Weston stated that Mrs. Adams died from poisoning by hydrocyanic acid.  Doctor 
Weston then told the jury that he had also performed an autopsy on the remains of Henry Barnet 
on February 28 1899 without giving an opinion on the cause of death.153
Doctor Lewis A. Coffin had treated Cornish on December 28, 1898, for symptoms that 
included gas, bloating and acute gastroenteritis.  Coffin admitted he knew little about cyanide of 
mercury poisoning, but nonetheless gave an opinion that Cornish had been poisoned by cyanide 
of mercury.154
Doctor Frank Ferguson assisted Dr. Weston during the autopsy on Mrs. Adams.  He testified 
that Mrs. Adams’ stomach was normal in size but that all of the mucous membranes were 
destroyed, swollen and intensely congested. Ferguson attributed this to bichloride of mercury.  
His own opinion was that Mrs. Adams had died of Prussic Acid poisoning. He responded to 
Osborne’s hypothetical question that in his opinion Mrs. Adams died of cyanide of mercury 
poisoning.155
Doctor E. Styles Potter had treated Mrs. Adams and had pronounced her dead.  In his 
opinion, Mrs. Adams died from cyanide of mercury poisoning.156   Despite the fact that none of 
the five physicians called had any prior experience with cyanide of mercury poisoning, had never 
diagnosed a case or treated a patient suffering from that type of poisoning, the uncontradicted 
evidence from five physicians showed that Mrs. Adams had died from cyanide of mercury 
poisoning.   The cause of death by external and violent means would have been established 
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without toxicological evidence.  However, Osborne left nothing to chance.
4. The Toxicological Evidence
Osborne had selected his expert toxicologists with care.  Doctor Rudolph Witthaus first gave 
evidence showing that Henry C. Barnet died of cyanide of mercury poisoning.  Recalled on 12 
January 1900, Witthaus resumed his direct examination and stated that Mrs. Adams had also died 
from the same poison substance..157  His evidence corroborated the evidence of the five 
physicians.
5.  Molineux’ Former Testimony at the Coroner‘s Hearing
Osborne used Coroner Hart and George H. Gordon, the stenographer who took the record of 
proceedings,  to authenticate the transcript of Molineux’ testimony at the February, 1899, 
Coroner’s hearing.  The portion that related to the Adams case contained Molineux’s  admission 
that he had trouble with Harry Cornish that  led Molineux to resign from the Knickerbocker 
Club.158   First, Cornish had taken no action to rid the club of an athletic member who used foul 
language in the bathing area.159   Second, Molineux complained that Cornish  sabotaged the 
Amateur Circus scheduled for 27 April 1897 by failing to order costumes on time,160  and 
substituting an inferior make of parallel bars for the set requested by Molineux to replace bars of 
the inferior make had already broken under his weight during his gymnastic routine.161
Molineux also told George Ballentine that Cornish was attempting to run the club and had 
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written the “Bernie Wefers” letter disparaging Bartow Weeks.162  Molineux admitted that he 
tried unsuccessfully to get Cornish fired as athletic director “for the good of the club.”163
Finally, Molineux admitted meeting Cornish on the club’s staircase after his failed attempt to get 
Cornish fired. Cornish called Molineux a son of a bitch and gloated that Molineux had failed to 
get him fired.164
To summarize the evidence against Roland Molinuex for the murder of Katherine Adams: 
the medical experts and the toxicologists had given uncontradicted evidence that Katherine 
Adams had died from cyanide of mercury poisoning.  Molineux had a strong dislike for Harry 
Cornish and had unsuccessfully tried to get Cornish fired as athletic director of the 
Knickerbocker Athletic Club.  Molineux was a chemist who worked with dry colors, including 
Prussian Blue, which can be broken down in the laboratory into Prussic acid, which when 
combined with a mercury source such as Queen’s Yellow, could produce cyanide of mercury, the
rare poison that killed Mrs. Adams.  The evidence showed that Molineux had the motive to kill 
Cornish and the opportunity to mix the deadly poison that killed Mrs. Adams by mistake.  The 
handwriting experts had identified the handwriting on the package sent to Cornish as that of 
Molineux.   
However, Emma Miller denied that Molineux was the purchaser of the silver toothpick 
holder that was sent to Cornish along with the fake Bromo Seltzer bottle.  Joseph Koch denied 
Molineux was the person in the white Alpine hat that rented the “H. Cornish” box from him at 
1620 Broadway.  The chain of circumstantial evidence linking Molineux to the Adams homicide 
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was exceedingly fragile.  First, the jury must believe that the unknown man in the white Alpine 
hat that bought the silver toothpick holder at Hartdegen’s was an unknown confederate of 
Molineux.   Second, they would have to believe that Molineux or his confederate had obtained a 
Bromo Selzter bottle from some unknown source and a “look-alike” blue bottle that fit into the 
silver bottle holder bought at Hartdegen’s.  The police failed to trace the blue bottle that 
contained the poisonous mixture.   Third, they must believe that Molineux secretly broke down 
Prussian Blue dry color into prussic acid in his laboratory, although police search of the premises 
turned up no trace of such a reduction.  They must accept the inference that Molineux mixed the 
prussic acid with Queen’s yellow or some other source of mercury to make cyanide of mercury 
crystals.  Third, they would have to accept the prosecution’s view that Molineux and some 
unknown, unidentified confederate mixed the cyanide of mercury crystals with the Bromo 
Seltzer, stuffed the contents into the smaller bottle, packaged the bottle and its holder in a 
Tiffany’s box and mailed it from the General Post Office in downtown Manhattan to Cornish 
using the return address of Koch’s mail box service. The jury could not convict Molineux on this 
thin tissue of circumstantial evidence.  The People’s evidence raised a reasonable doubt about 
the identity of the perpetrator.
B.  THE KILLING OF HENRY C. BARNET
Osborne used the evidence that showed Molineux may have murdered Henry C. Barnet to 
bolster his case against Molineux for killing Mrs. Adams.   Osborne thought that he could prove 
that Molineux had murdered Barnet by cyanide of mercury poisoning,  and if so, then the jury 
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could reason that the two crimes were committed in such a singular and unusual fashion that the 
same person committed both murders.
1.  Evidence of Lay Witnesses
Osborne put on a second parade of lay witnesses to authenticate genuine samples of Barnet’s 
handwriting, such as Robert S. Holt.  William H. Guilfoyle , a Clerk from the New York City 
Health Department, introduced copies of  Barnet’s death certificate and the marriage license and 
return for Roland Molineux and Blanche Chesebrough.165 Joseph Moore, an ex-porter at the 
Knickerbocker Club, told the jury that he was in Barnet’s room the day he took sick.  Moore said 
Barnet told him to fetch a small round box out of the trash basket.  Moore could not find it, so 
Barnet, between spells of vomiting, rummaged through the basket and found it. Moore identified 
the box when Osborne produced it.  Moore said he tasted the powder in the box.166
3.  Proof that Molineux had the Opportunity to Kill Barnet.
Although Kutnow Company book keeper  Elsie Gray authenticated a December letter from 
“H. Cornish” requesting a sample of Kutnow powder, the main reason she was called was to 
identify and authenticate the box of Kutnow Powder that Henry C. Barnet received in October 
and used to settle his upset stomach in late October.167
Charles D. Allen, Molineux’ private secretary at Morris Herrman Co., told the jury that he 
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had written letters to patent medicine purveyors on Molineux’ behalf.  He authenticated several 
of these requests for the jury.  He also told them that Allen, Mamie Melando, Robert Zeller and 
the foremen of the paint rooms were the only people regularly allowed in Molineux’ 
laboratory.168  This proved that Molineux had obtained patent medicines using an alias.
People’s Exhibit I, a diagnostic blank submitted to the Marston Remedy Co. by “H.C. 
Barnet” who gave his address as Box 217, # 257 West 42nd St., New York, was the most 
damning piece of evidence against Molineux. The questionnaire was to be used by company 
physicians to prescribe a remedy for impotence.  It had 54 questions for the sufferer. Questions 
20 and 21 called for the sufferer’s chest and waist measurements, shown as a 37" chest and a 32" 
waist.  The suffered responded to Question 30 by saying he had gonorrhea about 3 years earlier 
which was cured.  Question 55 asked if anyone in the family had consumption or scrofula, the 
suffered wrote in “phithis” in the blank.169
The physical measurements in Exhibit I did not come close to the generous proportions of 
Henry C. Barnet.  They matched those of Roland Molineux .  Molineux’ tailor, Frank Hunt, told 
the jury that  Molineux’ waist was 32 inches and his chest 37 inches, matching the diagnostic 
blank’s description of “Barnet.”170 Joseph O. Goodwin, the Town Clerk of East Hartford, 
Connecticut, authenticated the death certificate of Harriet T. Clark, Molineux’ maternal 
grandmother, that showed her cause of death to have been “Phthisis.”171  Herbert Jackson, the 
undertaker who had buried Barnet, told the jury that Barnet was 5 ft. 8 inches tall.172
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Finally, Edmund H. Barnet, Henry’s brother, testified that he was with his brother during the 
final day of his life.173   Edmund  identified a white box found in his late brother’s effects that 
contained Calthos shipped from the Von Mohl Co. of Cincinnati.  Barnet said he threw the 
contents away after his brother’s death.174
Dr. Vincent Hamill, a physician in the impotence cure business, identified three exhibits that 
implicated Molineux as the person who impersonated “Barnet” to obtain patent medicine 
samples.  The “diagnostic blank”  was the most important of the three.  Doctor Hamill also said 
that two doctors had diagnosed “Barnet’s” impotence using the exhibit.175  Barnet’s brother, 
Edmund, put in evidence showing his late brother was of light complexion and a tinge red in the 
face, 5 ft. 8 inches tall and weighed 185 pounds.176   Barnet’s general physical appearance was 
confirmed by James J. Hudson, a sales associate who worked with Barnet.  Hudson also told the 
story about Barnet’s reception of a package of “Calthos” in the mails in the fall of 1898.177
Although the physical measurements and medical history on the diagnosis blank fit 
Molineux and not Barnet, this did not prove that Molineux killed Barnet.  It did show that 
Molineux had assumed Barnet’s identity to write away for an impotence cure under an assumed 
name to avoid embarassment if his name had been recognized by someone at the patent medicine 
company, since the blank revealed that “Barnet” had a social disease.
Osborne’s case against Molineux for the Barnet killing required proof that Molineux had a 
motive to kill Barnet: sexual jealousy.   Osborne called Rachel Greene, who had been a maid at 
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the apartment of Mrs. Bell when Blanche Chesebrough had been a boarder.  She swore that 
Molineux had lived with Blanche and had passed himself off as “Mr. Chesebrough.”  Her 
evidence was a lie.  Recorder Goff later ordered this testimony stricken from the record, but the 
jury had heard the allegations.178
Nicholas Heckman was Osborne’s prize witness.  He ran a private letter box at 257 W. 42nd
St.  Heckman testified that Molineux came into his shop around 6:00 P.M. on 27 May 1898 to 
rent a  private letter box.  He told Heckman that his name was “H. C. Barnet.” According to 
Heckman, Molineux alias Barnet came into Heckman’s shop about 20 times between May and 
December, 1898, to pick up mail and packages from his letter box.   Heckman remembered 
seeing packages with the trade name “Kutnow Powder” in “Barnet’s” mailbox.179  He also 
remembered “Barnet” receiving Calthos samples as well.  Heckman revealed the he had first 
identified “Barnet” as “Molineux” during the coroner‘s inquest into the death of Katherine 
Adams, and confirmed his identification when he went to Newark with New York World reporter, 
Mr. Buchignani, and confronted Molineux in the Herrman Bros paint factory.180  Heckman 
admitted during cross-examination that he had failed to identify Molineux as the man called 
“Barnet” when he went to the Sinclair House with Capt. McCluskey for the express purpose of 
making a positive identification.  Heckman also admitted he was getting $15 a day from the New 
York World as a special operative at the time.181  While Weeks’ cross-examination demonstrated 
Heckman’s lack of integrity and his motive to falsify an identification in order to get money out 
of the sensationalist newspapers, Osborne’s rehabilitation seemed to off-set the impeachment.  
Heckman stated he was willing to make his identification without being paid for it by the 
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newspapers.  He said his conscience was troubled at the Coroner’s inquest because the evidence 
seemed to point towards Cornish as the perpetrator and he knew Cornish was not “Barnet.”182
1. The Medical Evidence
Dr. Henry B. Douglass, M.D. was Henry C. Barnet’s principal physician in November, 
1898.  Douglass identified the box of Kutnow Powder that had been on a shelf in the toilet in 
Barnet’s room at the Knickerbocker Club when he took ill.  Douglass stoutly defended his initial 
diagnosis of diptheria and his conclusion that diptheria poisoning killed Barnet, not mercury 
poisoning.183  Douglass acknowledged that Barnet had mercury burns on his mouth. He also 
admitted sending the Kutnow Powder out to a chemist for analysis.  Douglass maintained that 
calomel, often used to treat diptheria, could have produced the burns.184  He was recalled on 19 
January and refused to retract his original diagnosis of death by diptheria poisoning after 
Osborne confronted him with the fact that Douglass made no report to the New York City Board 
of Health that Barnet had received a box of Kutnow Powder in the mail that contained cyanide of 
mercury.185
Doctor Andre H. Smith, who also attended Barnet during his last days, disagreed with
Douglass. Smith testified in response to an hypothetical question posted by Osborne  that Barnet 
died of diptheria poisoning.  Smith admitted he had no prior experience with mercurial poisoning 
or any knowledge about cyanide of mercury poisoning.186
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Doctor Henry P. Loomis, a pathologist and Professor of Medicine at Cornell Medical 
College, did the post-mortem examination on Barnet on 8 February 1899 after Barnet’s remains 
had been exhumed.   Loomis was certain the Barnet had not died from diptheria or its 
complications.  
Osborne put the following hypothetical question to Dr. Loomis:
Assuming that on October 28, 1898, H.C. Barnet took a dose of powder which has been 
shown to contain cyanide of mercury and was attended by a physician, assuming that in 
two days he was attended by another physician to whom he stated that on the 28 th he had 
risen with a sore throat and taken the powder because he was in a habit of doing so; 
assuming that he was taken with purging I have described; assuming that mercurial 
stomatitis was found in the mouth with an inflammation which the attending physician 
attributed to diptheria; that on the 7th all evidence of diptheria had disappeared and that on 
the 10th, he died’ that the attending physician gave in his death certificate the cause of 
death to be cardiac failure following diptheria; that an analysis of the organs of the body 
showed evidence of cyanogen in the liver and mercury in the kidneys and brain; that a 
competent pathologist found no evidence of diptheria in a further examination of the body; 
that the attending physician made two cultures of the exudations in the throat and found no 
evidence of the bacillus of diptheria, what in your opinion was the cause of death?187
Loomis  answered that in his opinion, Barnet died from mercury poisoning.  Loomis, like all the 
others, had never seen a case of cyanide of mercury poisoning before.188
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Doctor A. Campbell White was a diagnostician and inspector for the New York City Board 
of health and had seen “two or three thousand cases of diptheria”189 but had never seen as case of 
cyanide of mercury poisoning.  Doctor White testified that Klebs-Loffler baccili is the only 
recognized cause of diptheria.  He responded to Osborne’s hypothetical question that in his 
opinion, Barnet had died of cyanide of mercury poisoning.190
D.  Chemists and Toxicologists
Guy P. Ellison was Osborne’s first expert chemist.  He had tested and examined the contents 
of the box of Kutnow Powder sent to him by Dr. Douglass on 4 November 1898.  Ellison quickly 
used a field test (tasting the substance) to determine that it was some kind of cyanide salt, then 
used standard reagent tests to precipitate out the salt.  His conclusion was the box contained 
cyanide of mercury.191  Elison entertained the jury with an in-court demonstration of his reagent 
test using a pinch of powder from the People’s box of Kutnow Powder.192
Professor Rudolph Witthaus of Cornell College and the University of Vermont was the 
People’s star toxicologist.  Witthaus recited a long list of the poisoning cases that he had 
appeared in as an expert.  On 4 January 1899, Witthaus had received a package of Kutnow 
Powder from Det. Carey of the New York City Police. He identified the exhibit in court, and 
Bartow Weeks raised a number of objections to Witthaus’ testimony about the substance that 
may have killed Barnet.  Osborne made a proffer that the method and means by which Barnet 
was killed was so similar to that used to dispose of Mrs. Adams that proof of one necessarily 
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entailed proof of the other.193  In so doing, he exposed his object in proving that Molineux 
probably killed Barnet by a poison patent medicine sample: to show that Mrs. Adams was the 
victim of a similar crime committed by the accused so bizarre and strange that only one person 
could have been the author of both crimes.
Professor Witthaus then told the jury194 that he was present at Henry C. Barnet’s autopsy 
and removed tissue samples from Barnet’s intestines, liver, brains, stomach heart and kidneys 
and fluid from the chest cavity.  Using destructive testing methods, Witthaus found traces of both 
cyanide and mercury in Barnet’s body parts.195
Doctor Robert Bocock, a specialist in homeopathic remedies, had experience in using 
cyanide of mercury in the treatment of diptheria patents.  He had observed the results of 
prolonged use of cyanide of mercury on diptheria patients.  Bocock testified it would take a 
number of doses of cyanide of mercury to produce the kind of breakdown that took Barnet’s 
life.196
E.  The Handwriting Experts
Osborne used two kinds of handwriting experts,.  The first group were men whose 
livelihood depended on the ability to identify and authenticate the signature of customers, the 
paying tellers at several New York City banks.  In those times, before every bank draft was 
copied on microfilm or microfiche, (or scanned as in today’s systems), drafts were paid on 
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customer’s account on the approval of a paying teller who was the bank’s expert on the 
authenticity of customers’ signatures.    Osborne called Gilbert B. Sayre, a paying teller from the 
National Shoe and Leather Bank of New York.  Sayre had examined all the handwriting samples, 
including some genuine examples of Molineux’s handwriting, for two weeks’ time prior to trial.  
In his opinion, the same person had executed all the samples.197  Osborne called six other paying 
tellers who were also permitted to examine all the handwriting samples and letters placed in 
evidence by the People.  Each of them agreed with Sayre that the same person had written all the 
exemplars.198
The District Attorney’s also had a stable of questioned document examiners.  Osborne had 
lined up the foremost questioned document examiners in the United States to examine the 
disputed handwriting on the “H.C. Barnet”199 and “H. Cornish”200 letters as well as the address 
on the Cornish poison package.    William J. Kinsley, Osborne’s first expert, was one of the 
weakest members of the District Attorney’s herd of experts.  Kinsley was the editor of Penman’s 
Art Journal, a trade magazine for teachers of handwriting and penmanship.  He was a self-
identified authority on disputed handwriting. Kinsley had collected handwriting samples from 
Molineux in the presence of his lawyer and of Mr. Carvalho, the defense questioned document 
expert. Kinsley claimed to have testified as an expert questioned documents examiner 100 to 150 
times before the Molineux trial.201   Kinsley’s direct examination was then interrupted for the 
testimony of John F. MacIntrye on his story of the events of 28 December 1898.  Bartow Weeks 
conducted a voire dire examination of Kinsley that showed, among other things, that he raised 
prize hens on his Long Island estate.202  The Recorder then permitted Kinsley to give an opinion 
that Molineux had been the author of a letter purportedly sent by “H. Cornish” to obtain a patent 
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medicine sample of Bromo Seltzer.203
Albert S. Osborn was the chief expert for the People.  He was the recognized U.S.  authority 
on identification of disputed documents by microscopic examination.204  Osborn’s colleague 
John F. Tyrrell of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, also appeared for the People.205    Both of these 
experts agreed that the same person had written all the letter exhibits and all the numbered 
exhibits.  Since some of the exhibits were known samples of Molineux’ own handwriting, these 
experts were giving an opinion that Molineux had been the person who had crudely lettered the 
address on the package to Cornish containing the poison Bromo Seltzer.  The opinions of the two 
leading experts were confirmed by four other handwriting experts.206
The undisputed evidence showed that Molineux had written letters requesting samples of 
patent medicines for impotence and upset stomachs, including Kutnow Powder,  using the name 
“H. Barnet” and had obtained other patent medicines using the name “H. Cornish.”  All the 
handwriting experts identified Molineux as the person who wrote the address on the package sent 
to Cornish.   This was circumstantial evidence that Molineux had perpetrated the poisoning of 
both Mrs. Adams and Henry Barnet.
However, there were serious flaws in the prosecution’s case against Molineux.  First, Dr. 
Douglass, who signed Barnet’s death certificate did not believe that Barnet died of cyanide of 
mercury poisoning.  Second, there was no direct or circumstantial evidence showing that 
Molineux had mailed the poison Kutnow Powder to Barnet.  Heckman’s evidence showed that 
47
Molineux had a private letter box at his establishment; it did not show that Molineux mailed the 
poison to Barnet.  Molineux told the Coroner during the inquest that Barnet was his friend. He 
admitted introducing Barnet to his future wife, and acknowledged that they might probably have 
seen one another during the period of time after Blanche Chesebrough had refused his first 
proposal and the time that he returned from Europe.207  Molineux said that he had asked his 
fiancé to send Barnet a boquet of flowers when he learned that he was ill.  He also defended 
Blanche’s letter to Barnet as a simple expression of sympathy and not a confession of a secret 
affair between them.208
The People rested. Despite the fact that the defense team included renowned handwriting 
expert David Carvalho, there was no defense. Weeks made the obligatory motion for a directed 
verdict of acquittal which was denied, and both counsel argued their case to the jury.  Weeks 
went first.
F.  FINAL ARGUMENT
1. Defense Counsel
The New York Times209 suggested and the Tribune reported that Bartow Weeks’ summation 
was “ a brilliant and convincing effort.”210  Weeks set a scene in which an innocent young man,
son of a Civil War hero, was wrongfully accused of a heinous crime. He excoriated the District 
Attorney for impugning the good name of Blanche Molineux.211 Weeks attacked Heckman’s and 
Koch’s credibility, arguing that their testimony had been purchased by the sensationalist 
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newspapers that offered them fees for identifying Molineux as the person who rented private 
letter boxes in order to disguise his means and motives.212  Weeks also belittled the handwriting 
experts, bringing up the well-known wrongful conviction of Capt. Dreyfuss based on erroneous 
handwriting expert testimony.213   Weeks’ final peroration invited the jury to weigh the 
credibility of the prosecution;’s witnesses and reminded them that Molinuex’ fate was in their 
hands.214  Weeks’ lengthy closing argument was pretty much an off-the-shelf argument that the 
presumption of innocence lay with the accused until proved guilty and the state’s evidence was 
not credibile on the issue of guilt.
2.  The District Attorney
Osborne’s summation featured a recital of the People’s case in chief and a bitter attack on 
defense counsel’s failure to call witnesses to disprove the People’s case.  Without directly 
commenting on Molineux’ failure to testify, Osborne found fault with the defense’ failure to call 
Mrs. Molineux to refute the charge that she had an affair with Barnet before her marriage. 
Osborne suggested the reason was that Barnet’s attention to Blanche Molineux was the reason he 
was killed.215  Osborne also referred to Molineux’ apartment in Newark as a “den of inquity” that 
explained why Robert Zeller was not put on as a witness for the defendant.  These non-sequiturs 
were Osborne’s stock in trade in a jury argument.  Parroting the law, Osborne told the jury to 
convict Molineux of the Adams killing because he had ample motive to kill Barnet:
You must not regard the death of Barnet as a crime.  You must look upon it merely as 
a transaction, and of itself, it must not be allowed to prejudice your minds against the 
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defendant.  But the man who was responsible for Barnet’s death sent the poison to Cornish.  
That hypothesis was practically agreed upon in the beginning by Mr. Weeks and myself.  
You must remember that Molineuyx was married on November 29, 1898; that Barnet died 
on November 10 of the same year, and that he testified that he had been trying to marry 
Miss Chesebrough since the first of the previous January. She refused him.  These are the 
facts as the defendant told them.  Molineux never married this woman til Barnet’s body 
was cold in the grave, and the marriage was sudden.  For more than a year he had been 
trying to marry this woman.  But another man intervened.  I say that this woman 
represented the concrete form of the motive for killing Barnet.  If the facts were not as I 
stated, nothing would prevent this woman from taking the witness stand here and giving 
the lie to the District Attorney if I have lied.  God knows I do not relish bringing this 
woman’s name into this court, but I say that Mr. Weeks should be heartily ashamed of 
himself for allowing the woman to come to listen to what I am here compelled to say.216
The jury apparently accepted Osborne’s strong of non-sequiturs and his call to convict Molineux 
on the ground that he may also have killed Barnet.  After seven hours’ deliberation, the jury 
returned a verdict of guilty of capital murder.217  The verdict was supported by the District 
Attorney’s proof that Molineux was probably guilty of the killing of Barnet, a crime not charged 
in the indictment.  The District Attorney made creative use of the uncharged misconduct rule that 
permitted proof of other crimes committed by the defendant if those crimes tended to prove some 
intermediate issue other than Molineux’ heinous character.  Weeks’ appeal would be based on 
the argument that proof of the Barnet killing in the Adams case was prejudicial error.
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IV. UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE BEFORE MOLINEUX
By 1899, the rule against proving crimes not charged in the indictment had been recognized 
for nearly 200 years. The common exceptions to the rule had been used by skillful prosecutors 
for about 150 years.  A short history of the development of the uncharged misconduct rule is 
required in order to understand why Osborne’s proof of the Barnet killing was prejudicial error.
A.  CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN ENGLAND 
 There were no rules of evidence in criminal prosecutions prior to the late 17th century.218 An 
English criminal jury trial in the Court of Oyer & Terminer in the time of Henry VIII was an 
altercation between the Crown Counsel, the defendant and the presiding justice.219  The presiding 
justice did not limit the testimony of witnesses, nor did he exclude exhibits offered by the Crown 
Counsel.  The principal part of the trial was the examination of the accused by the court and by 
crown counsel.    The Court of King’s Bench was the venue for serious felony trial, including 
such notable cases as the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh for treason.  King’s Bench extended a 
number of procedural rights to prisoners.   The prisoner was not permitted to have the service of 
a lawyer, but the court usually permitted the accused to be confronted by the accusing witnesses 
in open court.  The prisoner could cross-examine the accusing witnesses.  The presiding Justice 
or Justices would then sum up the evidence to the prisoner who would then make his defense. 
The prisoner could call witnesses on his behalf.  Their evidence, perhaps not given under oath,  
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would be given to the court and jury in open court.  Then the presiding Justice would sum up the 
case to the jury which would retire and give a verdict in open court220   When Lord Coke denied 
Sir Walter Raleigh the right to confront Lord Cobham in open court, he went against English 
tradition.221
The English judicial system also a special criminal court: the Court of Star Chamber, that 
tried cases of criminal libel and other misdemeanors.222   It followed Continental canonical 
methods of proof.  The accused could not refuse to give evidence against himself and was 
required to swear an ex oficio oath before an examining Judge essentially accusing himself of 
committing the crime charged.  The witnesses who would give evidence against the accused 
were examined ex parte before a Judge of the Star Chamber and their depositions were presented 
to the Court.  The defendant could not confront and question his accusers, nor did he have the 
right to counsel   The defendant was presumed guilty and had to explain his innocence to the 
court.223
King’s Bench  permitted the admission of evidence of the prisoner’s bad moral character 
having little to do with the crime charged.  Sir James Stephen cites the perjury prosecution of 
Benjamin Faulconer in 1653 in the Court of King’s Bench as an example of this practice:
He had made statements the effect of which was that the estates of Lord Craven were 
sequestrated.  Upon this he was indicted for perjury by the Craven family in the Upper 
Bench, as the Court of King's Bench was then called.  Many witnesses were called to prove 
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the falsehood of the matter sworn, after which others were called to show that Faulconer 
was a man of bad character.  They testified to his having drunk the devil's health in the 
street at Petersfield; to his having used bad language and been guilty of gross immorality; 
and lastly, to his having been committed on suspicion of felony and having 'a common 
name for a robber on the highway.'  As Faulconer's evidence had been accepted and acted 
upon by Parliament, it is unlikely that he should have been treated at his trial with any 
special harshness.  It would seem, therefore, that at this time it was not considered irregular 
to call witnesses to prove a prisoner of bad character in order to raise a presumption of his 
guilt."224
As a result, relevant prior bad acts of the defendant similar to the crime charged in the indictment 
would ordinarily be proved by testimony in open court.225
The Glorious Revolution of 1688 that deposed James II and instituted a limited monarchy 
also brought criminal law reform.   Parliament passed the Treason Act of 1695 that made 
substantial changes in the procedure for treason trials.   Treason would be tried in the King’s 
common law courts.  The accused would receive a copy of the indictment at least five days 
before trial, and the alleged treasonable act would have to be proved by the testimony of two 
witnesses in open court subject to cross-examination.  Any overt treasonable act not stated in the 
indictment was not capable of proof in court.226  The standards of the Treason Act eventually 
became the rule of fair play in all criminal proceedings including those that were not treason 
felonies directly subject to the Act. The courts came to believe that the accused should not be 
tried for offenses that were not included in the indictment.  This became one leg for the 
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uncharged misconduct rule.
The standard 18th century treatises on Pleas of the Crown by Sir Matthew Hale, John Foster 
and  John Hawkins contained specific provisions for excluding evidence of other similar acts in 
criminal prosecutions that were not stated in the indictment.  Foster, for example, said:
The rule of rejecting all manner of evidence in criminal prosecutions that is foreign to the 
point in issue is founded on sound sense and common justice.  For no man is bound at the 
peril of life or liberty, fortune or reputation, to answer at once and unprepared for every 
action of his life... . .And had not those concerned in state prosecutions out of their zeal for 
the publick service, sometimes stepped over this rule in the case of treasons, it would 
perhaps be needless to have made an express provision against it in this case.  Since the 
common-law grounded on the principles of natural justice hath made the like provision in 
every other.227
The accused could call friends and neighbors to testify that his reputation in the village where he 
lived for good moral behavior.  This would be done after the Crown’s case had been put in and 
the judge had summed up the case against the accused.228   If the accused chose to call character 
witnesses to prove his good character, defense character witnesses were open to cross-
examination on prior bad acts of  the accused to discredit their statement of the defendant’s good 
reputation.229 Since the accused had initiated an inquiry into good character, the courts saw no 
particular harm in permitting the Crown to impeach the accused’s neighbors.230  However, the 
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Crown was forbidden to prove the accused was of bad moral character when the accused made 
no attempt to prove good character.  
B.  RENOVATING THE LAW OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
During the next hundred years, the English courts periodically made exceptions to the rule 
against admitting bad character evidence against the prisoner when the accused did not try to 
prove his good character. These exceptions took the form of allowing specific incidents of prior 
bad conduct into evidence to prove some intermediate issue. In Rex v. Horne Tooke,231 the court 
admitted other criminal acts of the alleged conspirators that furthered their alleged traitorous 
conspiracy, although the evidence of other criminal acts also blackened the character of the 
conspirators.  The Court of Kings Bench allowed witnesses in counterfeiting cases to tell the jury 
about other attempts made by the accused to pass counterfeit money not alleged in the 
indictment.  The rationale given for this exception was the heavy burden on the Crown to prove 
intent to pass a counterfeit.232
In 1791, in Rex v. Pierce,233 a criminal libel case, the identity of the author of an anonymous 
libelous publication was at issue.  Pierce was the author of a very similar libelous piece; the 
Crown was permitted to prove the earlier authorship in order to prove the identity of the author 
of the alleged libel.  Of course, the proof of the prior libel showed that Pierce was a bad fellow.  
The treatise writers began to pick up these cases. Indeed, East offered his own unreported 
violation of the character rule: in an extortion prosecution for writing anonymous threatening 
55
letters, the Crown was permitted to prove the accused had written other threatening letters to 
other persons to establish the identity of the perpetrator.  Once again, the jury was also informed 
that the accused was a person of bad moral character by innuendo.  In a prosecution for 
maintaining a disorderly house, the Crown could offer proof that the accused had maintained a 
disorderly house in another location in the past, to show the continuing nature of the accused’s 
criminal operations.234  Similar exception to permit evidence of the accused’ passing forged 
notes not charged in the indictment to prove the forger knew the notes identified in the 
indictment were forged, and by this means to demonstrate the accused’s criminal intent to pass 
off bad notes as good.235
C.  EXPORTING CHARACTER EVIDENCE TO NORTH AMERICA
The Thirteen Colonies inherited their criminal law and procedure and their rules of evidence 
from the Mother Country.   This included the rudiments of the character evidence rule.  The early 
history of the use of character evidence in the United States was as fragmentary and incoherent 
as its English ancestor was.  Only one reported decision before 1776, Rex v. Doaks, 236 dealt with 
the issue of admissibility of criminal acts not charged in the indictment.  Doaks was charged with 
keeping a bawdy house and the prosecution tried to introduce other lewd and lascivious acts of 
the accused.  The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held the other acts inadmissible.237
By 1800, Federal courts recognized the general rule that the accused had the option to 
defend against a criminal charge on ground of good moral character,238  and its corrollary, the 
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prosecution could not offer evidence of bad character unless the accused chose to put in evidence 
of good character.239   State courts accepted the general rule as well.240  Early U.S. commentators 
agreed that there was a general rule against the prosecution’s use of evidence of the accused’s 
bad character unless the accused made an issue of good character that the prosecution could 
challenge.241
People v. White242 illustrates how the character evidence issue was handled in the early 19th
Century.  White was indicted for possessing counterfeit bank notes with intent to pass them.  The 
People called Moses Strong who testified that he had a conversation with White. Strong asked 
White for the details of the theft of money from the Rutland Bank, which White denied having 
anything to do with.  Defense counsel objected to Strong’s evidence  on the ground that it was 
simply proof of the bad character of the defendant, and White had not put on a character 
evidence defense.  The trial judge overruled the objection and permitted Strong to complete his 
answer, loosely based on the rule of completeness: Strong said that White told him he should 
never have been suspected of robbing the Rutland Bank if he had not been an inmate of the 
Massachusetts State Prison.243  White presented no character evidence witnesses.   The jury 
quickly convicted White of passing counterfeit notes and White’s appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Judicature resulted in a reversal.  Judge Sutherland wrote the opinion for a unanimous court.   
Sutherland stated the only reason that the “State Prison” conversation would be relevant would 
be to prove the accused’s bad moral character.  The general rule forbade the prosecution to prove 
the accused’s bad moral character unless the accused chose to make character an issue, and even 
in that case, the prosecution would be barred from proving specific bad acts of the accused by 
57
testimony of other witnesses to disprove the accused’s bad character. He said:
Here the prisoner had called no witnesses to support his character, nor was it put in 
issue by the prosecution.  The prosecutor, therefore, had no even to impeach his general 
character, much less to prove specific facts against him. . . .  The prisoner, according to the 
witness, had merely declared his innocence of robbing the Rutland Bank — a declaration 
which could have no possible bearing on the issue which they were then trying, and which, 
of course, it was not important or material to explain, by showing what either preceded or 
followed it.244
Judge Sutherland regarded the rule against proof of bad character by specific acts as a form of 
the rule that precluded proof of impeachment by extrinsic collateral facts.  In his view, the prior 
criminal activities of the defendant, unrelated to any issue in the case being tried, were 
irrelevant245
To be sure, the prior criminal acts of the accused could be relevant to the issues in a criminal 
prosecution.246  For example, public officials could be removed from office in quasi-criminal 
proceedings in some states for misconduct247  Early U.S. decisions also permitted the bad 
character for chaste conduct of the victim of an alleged sexual assault to be proved and disproved 
by character witnesses.248  In homicides and assaults, the accused could support a claim of self-
defense by proving that the victim had committed prior violent acts, whether known to the 
accused or not, that would justify resort to force to repel the victim’s aggression.  State and 
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federal courts also permitted impeachment of any witness by proof of bad character for 
truthfulness, and rehabilitation by proof of good character for truthfulness.249  In all these 
instances, the character of the accused or victim was relevant and individual acts of uncharged 
misconduct were admissible to prove the character of the accused or the victim.
In prosecutions where the character of the accused or the victim was not at issue, the courts 
allowed the prosecution to prove specific uncharged criminal misconduct that proved an
intermediate issue in the prosecution as well as the bad moral character of the accused.  By the 
middle 19th century, the  commentators recognized that a criminal plan or design or criminal 
intent could be proved by bad acts committed in the course of the criminal design.250  They also 
recognized that similar bad acts of the accused could be admitted to prove guilty knowledge,251
mens rea or criminal intent, as well.252  However, no one had connected the dots. 
The courts continued to struggle with admission of other acts of misconduct during the 
remainder of the 19th century.   The courts preferred to deal with specific exceptions to the 
general rule without specifying a general theory of admissibility.    By the end of the century, 
U.S. courts routinely admitted specific uncharged misconduct of the accused which were 
collateral to the case in chief and also proved the accused was a person of bad moral character. 
These exceptions to the general rules were made to allow the prosecution to prove an 
intermediate issue such as motive, intent, guilty knowledge, plan or design, nature and extent of 
a conspiracy and identity of the accused.
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1. Motive.
Motive is the answer to the question “why did the accused commit the crime?” It may be a 
covert way of establishing criminal intent.  Courts in the United States sometimes permitted 
proof of a criminal act not charged in the indictment when that act proved the motivation for 
committing the crime charged.253  For example, in the mid 19th century Nevada case of State v. 
McMahon,254  the accused was charged with arson.  He allegedly burned cordwood belonging to 
another party in order to get hired as a watchman by the owner.  The prosecutor introduced 
testimony by P. Henry, one of the co-owners of the wood pile,  showing that eleven other arsons 
had been committed in the same town255 On the other hand, invoking the collateral fact rule, the 
courts would exclude evidence of another, unrelated criminal act committed by the accused 
because it was only relevant to proof of bad character which was excluded on policy grounds.256
A contrary result was reached in Snurr v. State,257  a prosecution for rape upon the accused’s 
daughter.  She testified to other incidents of sexual assault committed on her by her parent. The 
prosecutor offered the evidence of other assaults to prove the defendant’s motive: sexual 
gratification.  The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court on the ground that the other sexual 
assaults were collateral to the indictment and prejudicial to the defendant because the recitation 
of other rapes on his daughter only served to show that he was a man of bad moral character258.
2. Intent.
According to U.S. 19th century criminal law commentator Joel Bishop:
There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind.  In other words, punishment is 
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the sequence of wickedness, without which it cannot be.  And neither in philosophical 
speculation, nor in religious or moral sentiment, would any people in any age allow that a 
man should be deemed guilty unless his mind was so.  It is therefore a principle of our 
legal system, as probably it is of every other, that the essence of the offence is the wrongful 
intent, without which it cannot exist.259
Most crimes require no proof of specific intent, general intent or mens rea is enough.  If the 
accused was able to know what he or she was doing when he or she committed the criminal act, 
then the accused had sufficient intent.  A smaller group of crimes require proof of specific intent.  
This group include such crimes as assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm, possession of 
counterfeit coins or banknotes with intent to pass them as genuine, and the like.  In prosecutions 
where specific intent is an element of the crime, the prosecution must prove that intent by direct 
or circumstantial proof.  The courts first grappled with admission of similar criminal misconduct 
evidence to prove specific intent in counterfeiting and forgery cases. A person could possess 
counterfeit bank notes or forged promissory notes unwittingly without specific intent to pass 
them to others.  The courts permitted the prosecution to prove intent to pass by proof of other 
instances where the accused passed bad currency or notes.  The use of similar criminal acts to 
show specific intent then spread to such prosecutions as criminal non-support,260 an assault with 
intent to obtain sexual gratification,261 and obtaining money under false pretenses.262
2. Guilty Knowledge
Some crimes such as obtaining money or property under false pretenses,263  receiving stolen 
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property,264 require proof of guilty knowledge.  In Bottomly v. United States,265 decided in 1840, 
Judge Story used the smuggling prosecution as a platform to list a number of occasions when 
similar acts may be introduced to prove guilty knowledge or knowing possession, citing to 
English 19th century decisions admitting other instances of passing counterfeit coin or notes to 
show knowledge that the notes passed were counterfeit.266  In Stanley v.  State,267 a prosecution 
of a county clerk for embezzling funds, the Alabama Supreme Court held that evidence of other 
acts of embezzlement not in the indictment were admissible to prove the guilty knowledge of the 
accused that he was stealing county funds.268
State v. Smith 269 was a representative instance of the admission of similar acts to prove 
guilty knowledge.  Smith was indicted for knowingly passing a counterfeit New Jersey bank 
note. At trial, the state introduced evidence that Smith had come to New Haven with Able Starks 
who had been passing counterfeit New Jersey bank notes.  The State asserted the association 
with Starks was proof of Smith’s guilty knowledge that his notes were counterfeit.270  Although 
21st Century judges might differ with the admission of evidence showing a non-accomplice 
passed counterfeit money to prove knowledge, the Connecticut Supreme Court agreed that no 
new trial was warranted and the evidence was properly received.  In Carnel v. State,271 an 1896 
Maryland prosecution for obtaining money on false pretenses, the trial court admitted two letters 
to a Hagerstown, Maryland, bank that contained false statements about the defendant’s financial 
situation to show, among other things, that the defendant had guilty knowledge of the false 
pretenses used in the crime charged in the indictment to get money out of another bank272.
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State v. Jacob 273is representative of a dozen 19th century decisions permitting other, similar 
instances of possession of stolen property to be introduced to prove guilty knowledge.  Jacob was 
charged with knowingly receiving stolen property.  The state called the victim who testified, over 
objection, to other items of stolen property were found in the accused’s possession that were not 
listed in the indictment. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the accused’s conviction. It 
held that the other items of stolen property were properly identified and admitted into evidence 
to show that Jacob knowingly possessed stolen property.  A single stolen item might be an 
accidental, unknowing acquisition, but several stolen items showed Jacob‘s possession was no 
coincidence. 
   It does not seem to us that there was any error in receiving the testimony which is made 
the basis of the second and third grounds of appeal. As appears from the extract made from 
the judge's charge above, this testimony was received solely as a circumstance tending to 
show guilty  knowledge  on the part of the defendants, and the jury were carefully 
instructed to consider it only in that light. As is said in 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, section 
53, note (b): "The general rule undoubtedly is, that a distinct crime, unconnected with that 
laid in the indictment, cannot be given in evidence against a prisoner. It is not proper to 
raise a presumption of guilt on the ground that having committed one crime the depravity it 
exhibits makes it likely that he would commit another. In all criminal cases, however, 
where the felonious intent or guilty  knowledge  is a material part of the  crime,  evidence 
is admissible of  similar acts  of the prisoner at different times, if such  acts  tend to prove 
the existence of such guilty  knowledge  or felonious intent." One of the illustrations there 
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given is this very charge of receiving stolen goods, where the gist of the offence is the 
guilty  knowledge  of the party charged.274
The Court cited three ancient South Carolina cases275 and  Roscoe on Criminal Evidence in 
support of the same proposition.276
3.  Absence of Mistake or Accident.
Bishop had something to say about the defense of mistake of fact.:
“Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offence, a sufficient excuse.”. . 
.   We have seen that to constitute a crime the law requires an evil mind or intent; but, except as 
to some special crimes, there is no defined sort of mental wrong uniformly necessary.  Now, 
though a mistake of fact may and commonly does show the non-existence of the evil mind, it 
does not always or inevitably.277
The accused may claim that an otherwise criminal act was the result of an honest mistake or 
an accident.  This challenges the presumption that the accused acted with mens rea and requires 
the prosecution to prove that the criminal act was not the product of mistake or accident.  The 
English courts recognized that in such cases, the Crown could produce evidence of other similar 
criminal acts by the accused to show that at the time of the act charged in the indictment, the 
accused had the requisite mens rea.278
64
4.  Nature and Extent of Conspiracy
A conspiracy indictment required the allegation and proof of one or more overt acts of the 
conspirators in furtherance of the conspiratorial plan.  Were other overt acts of the conspirators 
not charged in the indictment admissible?   According to Justice Joseph Story, they were.  Story 
decided  Bottomly v. United States279  in 1840.  He held that overt acts of the conspirators 
showing that they had worked a fraudulent scheme against other victims during the life of the 
conspiracy were admissible to prove the conspiracy.  Story said:
. . . . But it appears to [be] clearly admissible upon the general doctrine that in cases of 
conspiracy and fraud, where other acts in furtherance of the same general fraudulent design 
are admissible, first, to establish the fact, that there is such a conspiracy and draud; and 
secondly, to repel the suggestion, that the acts might be fairly attributed to accident, 
mistake, or innocent rashness or negligence.280
The Connecticut Supreme Court also permitted proof of overt acts of conspirators not alleged in 
the indictment in State v. Spalding.281    In Commonwealth v. Eastman,282 the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court validated admission of acts of three conspirators to purchase goods on 
false credit that were not alleged in the conspiracy indictment in order to show their 
comprehension of their actions, on a false analogy to proof of scienter in fraud cases.283  There 
were no other conspiracy cases before mid-century that raised the issue of admissibility of other 
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criminal acts of the conspirators.
5.  Identity of the Accused.
In many instances, the identity of the perpetrator of a crime must be established by 
circumstantial proof.  If a prior crime had been committed in a very unusual manner that 
matched the way in which the crime was committed in the crime charged in the indictment, and 
the identity of the perpetrator were known, then the English courts would admit proof of the 
perpetration of the first crime to prove the identity of the prisoner.  This same issue surfaced in 
an early Ohio murder by poisoning prosecution, Farrar v. State.284  Nancy Farrar, a mentally 
challenged young woman who was a servant in the household of Elisha Forest, was accused of 
murdering Mrs. Forrest and two children by giving them arsenic of lead in their food.  She was 
indicted for the murder of one of the children, James Forrest.   Her counsel set up an insanity 
defense.285 Evidence of the poisoning of the whole family including Mrs. Forrest and her other 
child was admitted without objection, but defense counsel vociferously objected to evidence of 
the poisoning of Mrs. Green, the former employer of Jane Farrar, by the same chemical, arsenic 
of lead.  The Ohio Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case on the ground that the 
mention of the poisoning of Mrs. Green by an unknown and unidentified perpetrator in 
6. Inseparable Crimes.
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By mid-century, defense counsel challenged testimony that revealed criminal acts other than 
the act charged in the indictment that may have represented preparation for the act charged, or 
steps in carrying out that criminal act charged.286 Horn v. State287 was a representative cases.  
The defendant was charged with assaulting storekeeper Isaac Rosenberg with a gun and nearly 
taking his life.  Prosecution witnesses regaled the jury with descriptions of the defendant’s prior 
assault on the storekeeper’s clerk and attempted murder of his wife, all occurring within minutes 
of the attack on Rosenberg.  Defense counsel objected  on the ground that the other assaults were 
not charged in the indictment and simply constituted proof of the accused’s bad character.  The 
trial court overruled the objection and Horn was convicted.  The Alabama Supreme Court agreed 
with the trial court’s decision.  It said:
. . . . Very clearly, we think, the fact that he attempted to shoot the clerk, and shot at and 
severely beat the wife, are so connected with the assault upon Isaac as to bring all these 
things within the res gestae of any one of them, so that each would not only legitimately 
tend to establish the naked existence of the others, but would also have a very material and 
pertinent bearing upon the inquiry as to the intent which actuated the defendant 
throughout, in the way of showing that when he assaulted and shot Isaac Rosenberg his 
purpose was to kill him. There was, upon  these considerations, no error in allowing the 
testimony referred to to go to the jury.288
Other courts, faced with the same situation reached the same result.  The uncharged criminal acts 
of the accused were admissible if the story of the charged criminal act seemed to require the 
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dramatic inclusion of criminal acts leading up to the crime,289 or following after the crime.290
E.  THE EARLY COMMENTATORS
The United States had its own evidentiary commentators in the 19th century.  Their 
published treatises dealt with the proof of uncharged misconduct in criminal prosecutions in one 
way or the other.  The most influential 19th century treatises included Wharton’s Criminal 
Evidence,291 first published in 1846 and updated periodically since that time to the present; 
Greenleaf’s Evidence,292 also published in the 1840's and updated until supplanted by Wigmore’s 
Evidence in 1913, and Underhill’s Criminal Evidence,293 first issued in 1898.
Harvard Professor Simon Greenleaf’s treatise did not synthesize a general rule for admission 
of uncharged misconduct.  In general, he thought that  relevant evidence could be held 
inadmissible on grounds of collateral inconvenience.  Greenleaf included both unfair prejudice 
and confusion of the issues as the kind of collateral inconvenience that would exclude otherwise 
relevant evidence.294   Greenleaf   thought that evidence of the moral character of the accused 
was relevant to guilt or innocence, but  excludable on grounds of unfair prejudice and confusion 
of the issues submitted to the jury.295
Greenleaf recognized that the accused could always inject the issue of character into the case 
by giving evidence of good moral character.296  He devoted several paragraphs to admission of 
other similar crimes or misconduct as evidence of intent or knowledge.  Noting that the 
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precedent was both “uncertain and inharmonious,”297   Greenleaf suggested that the principles 
behind admission of other criminal acts evidence were well-known and accepted.  First he said 
that a person’s guilty knowledge could be inferred from circumstances that would bring the 
matter to the accused’s attention, such as feeding a dog something that caused him to die shortly 
after eating could put the accused on notice that the substance fed the dog was poisonous.298
Second, a person’s criminal intent could likewise be proved circumstantially from other like acts 
of the accused. Greenleaf’s example was the man who was shot at from behind during a hunting 
party. The first shot would possibly have been an accident, but a second shot would argue for 
deliberate conduct, i.e., criminal intent.299   Greenleaf then collected case citations supporting 
admission of uncharged misconduct under the taxonomic system of specific crimes charged. 
Greenleaf collected most of the known English and U.S. cases that permitted proof of other acts 
of forgery or counterfeiting to prove criminal intent to pass bogus instruments.300  He followed 
the same method with other types of crimes requiring proof of specific intent and general intent, 
or guilty knowledge.  Greenleaf took up admissibility of other uncharged misconduct evidence to 
prove plan or design as part of his discussion of proof of habit or routine practice.301
Greenleaf  associated proof of a plan or design with proof of a habit or routine practice 
because habit is established by proof of many repeated, similar acts.302   Greenleaf’s 
classification system, later adopted by Wigmore, was not based on a common rule that screened 
proof of uncharged misconduct.  Instead, Greenleaf admitted that evidence of the predisposition 
of the accused to commit criminal acts was relevant, but forbidden due to excessive prejudice to 
the accused.  He then cited a string of instances that showed that the courts had allowed an 
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exception to the character rule for purposes of proving an intermediate issue, without 
justification or support for the exception. 
Pennsylvania lawyer Francis Wharton  regarded the proof of an accused’s character as a 
collateral issue in criminal prosecutions. Therefore, character evidence is generally irrelevant to 
the issues in a criminal prosecution.303  Wharton then states that proof of a collateral offense is 
irrelevant and highly prejudicial:
A defendant ought not to be convicted of the offense charged against him simply 
because he has been guilty of another offense, Hence, when such evidence is offered 
simply for the purpose of proving his commission of the offense on trial, evidence of his 
participation, either in act or design, in commission or preparation, in other independent 
crimes, cannot be received.304
Wharton noted that the rule is observed strictly when the other offense evidence is offered to 
prove the accused’s guilt. Wharton did recognize a number of exceptions to the general negative 
rule,305 which he illustrated by his own case classification method that differed from that used by 
Greenleaf.  He started with a res gestae exception that corresponded more or less loosely to the 
interwoven crimes exception, citing a number of cases that permitted proof of criminal acts not 
charged in the indictment that led up to, or followed the criminal act charged.306  Then Wharton 
cited a number of cases permitting other criminal acts to be provided to prove scienter, i.e.,. 
guilty knowledge.307 He followed this case-by- case analysis with another directed at proof of 
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mens rea.308  At no time did he connect up these exceptions into any type of general theory of 
admissibility.
Underhill, writing at the end of the century, devoted an entire chapter to the general rules 
relating to character evidence.309  He accurately stated the general rule permitting the accused to 
offer good character evidence in a succinct discussion of the principles of admitting good 
character and bad character evidence.310  In § 82, Underhill explained that bad character could 
not be proved by specific bad acts because the accused was in no position to contradict specific 
facts that were sprung on the accused without prior notice,311 a ground that will later become a 
constitutional objection to uncharged misconduct evidence.
Underhill gave a whole chapter to proof of other criminal acts.312  Following along his 
general theme that the accused should not be forced to defend against charges when not on notice 
that the accused should do so, Underhill says that jurors are prone to convicting an accused on 
proof of other similar crimes on the ground that the accused is guilty of the current offense 
because the accused committed another similar offense.  Underhill says:
To guard against this evil, and at the same time to avoid the delay which would be incident 
to an indefinite multiplication of issues, the general rule (to which, however, some very 
important exceptions may be noted) forbids the introduction of evidence which will show, 
or tend to show, that an accused has committed any crime wholly independent of that 
offense for which he is in trial. To this general rule there are a very few exceptions which 
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have been permitted from absolute necessity, to aid in the detection and punishment of 
crime.313
Underhill started his discussion of the exceptions to the “no criminal acts” rule with the 
intermingled crime exception based on a foundation showing that more than one crime was 
committed by the accused in the course of committing the crime charged as part of a general 
criminal plan.314  Underhill allowed another exception for proof of intent when intent is a 
material issue in the case.315  He also recognized an exception for proof of identity of the 
accused316 and the predisposition of a sex offender to commit sex crimes.317  However, 
Underhill, like the others, stopped short of a general formula for admitting uncharged 
misconduct evidence that would cover all theses cases.  That was the task that the New York 
Court of Appeals felt compelled to attempt in People v. Molineux 318in 1901.
V. THE APPEAL
A.  THE APPELLANT’S COUNSEL
Although Bartow Weeks and Joseph Battle stayed on the Molineux defense team, John G. 
Milburn replaced Weeks  as lead counsel for oral argument.   Milburn was a very highly 
respected Buffalo trial lawyer who was the Chairman of the 1901 Buffalo Pan American 
Exposition.   The exhibition opened in May.  On June 17,1901, Milburn put aside his duties as 
Chairman of the Buffalo Exposition to spend three days arguing the Molineux case to the Court 
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of Appeals, then sitting in Buffalo.  On  September, President William McKinley would be 
carried to Milburn’s house with a fatal gun shot wound inflicted by an anarchist named Leon 
Czolgosz.319  H. Snowden Marshall from Milburn’s firm would be his second chair for oral 
argument.320
B.  THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S TEAM
Assistant District Attorney Osborne had very little to do with the appeal.  The task was 
turned over to Assistant District Attorney Eugene A. Philbin, assisted by David B. Hill (of 
counsel).321  Philbin was an appellate specialist.  The prosecutors were overmatched by the 
heavyweight lawyers on the defense team.
C.  THE MEMBERS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
In 1901, the New York Court of Appeals was at full strength.  The seven members of the 
Court were Democrats Chief Judge Alton W. Parker,322 Associate Judges John Clark Gray,323
Denis O’Brien, 324 Republicans Edward T. Bartlett, Irving S. Vann. Albert Haight, and interim 
associate Judges  Judson S. Landon, Edgar M. Cullen and William E. Werner , all of whom were 
Republicans appointed by Gov.  Theodore Roosevelt.325
Chief Judge Parker was a well-liked former Supreme Court justice , former Chairman of the 
New York Democratic Party Central Committee, elected Chief Judge in 1898 by a 60,000 vote 
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majority in a state that had given the Republicans a 250,000 majority in 1896.   Parker was the 
same kind of Democrat as Grover Cleveland, one of his personal friends.  He did not share the 
“free silver” views of William Jennings Bryan and perceived the role of the federal government 
as limited in a Jacksonian model.326  The three Roosevelt appointees presumably shared 
Theodore Roosevelt’s Progressive views on the active role of the executive in curbing graft and 
corruption among state employees, and in maintaining a strong central government with an Army 
and Navy ready to fight to protect U.S. international interests.  Bartlett, Vann and Haight, the 
older Republicans on the Court were not Progressives. 
Molineux’ appeal came to the court as a capital murder case.  Seven of the nine judges took 
part in the deliberations.327  All seven voted to reverse and remand the case for a new trial: there 
were three opinions: the court opinion written by Republican Judge Werner in which his 
Republican colleagues Bartlett and Vann joined.  Judge O’Brien wrote a concurring opinion as 
did Chief Judge Parker.  Judges Gray and Haight joined in Parker’s concurrence.328  The court’s 
lack of unanimity on the grounds for reversing Molineux’ conviction would have an affect on the 
use of Molineux as precedent in the future.
D. THE ISSUES ON APPEAL
Defense counsel contended that Recorder Goff erred in admitting Barnet’s hearsay statement 
to Dr. Douglas in which Barnet stated he was made sick by the contents of a box of Kutnow 
Powder that he received through the mail.  They also contended that evidence that showed 
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Molineux had murdered  Barnet was inadmissible to prove Molineux’ intent to kill Mrs. Adams.  
They argued that the handwriting experts committed prejudicial error on two grounds: first, they 
erroneously relied on writing samples from in the defendant’s hand because the authenticity of 
the “Barnet” and “Cornish” letters and the address on the Cornish package was not the subject-
matter of the homicide prosecution;  second, the experts used handwriting samples of the 
defendant that were not conceded to be authentic in making their comparisons. They charged that 
Recorder Goff had erroneously admitted Molineux’ testimony before the coroner’s inquest at 
trial.  Finally,  defense counsel objected to Recorder Goff’s charge to the jury.329
E.  THE MINOR ISSUES 
 Judge Werner disposed of the handwriting issues raised by the defendant by construction of 
two New York statutes pertaining to disputed handwriting cases.  At common law, proof of the 
authenticity of handwriting could be had from witnesses who had been present at the writing, by 
witnesses familiar with the handwriting of the alleged author and by comparison of genuine and 
disputed examples of handwriting by the jury without intervention of a witness.330  An 1880 
statute recognized that a comparison of a disputed handwriting sample with a known handwriting 
sample had to depend on preliminary proof that the known sample was authentic.331  In 1884, the 
Court of Appeals held in Park v. Callaghan,332  that an expert witness could compare a genuine 
specimen of the supposed author of a document with disputed documents said to be by the same 
author.  The statute covered only the situation when the disputed instrument is the subject of 
controversy in the action.333  In 1888, the 1880 statute was modified to include the Park holding.  
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Defense counsel made a disingenuous argument that the Recorder erred by introducing 
Molineux’ handwriting samples authenticated by various sources to compare with the address on 
the poison package sent to Cornish.  Judge Werner disposed of the contention that the package 
address was not “the subject of controversy” by noting that the statute referred to a writing in 
dispute, which covered the identification of the author of the poison package address.334 He also 
noted that Molineux’ handwriting samples written for the People’s experts were admissible when 
offered by the People against the defendant.335
Defense counsel contended that the Coroner had not advised Molineux of his right to remain 
silent before he testified at the February Coroner’s hearing.  Judge Werner noted that if Molineux 
was under arrest or formally accused of Mrs. Adams’ murder, he was entitled by statute to be 
warned of his right to remain silent and to have assistance from counsel if examined by a 
magistrate. The Court of Appeals had extended the same protection to persons testifying at a 
Coroner’s inquest.  Judge Werner noted that Harry Cornish had testified earlier in the inquest 
proceedings that he suspected Molineux had sent him the poison package. This was insufficient 
information to charge Molineux with the murder of Mrs. Adams.  Molineux had been subpoenad 
by the Coroner; his testimony was given under compulsion.  He could have refused to answer 
any questions put to him on the grounds that the answer might incriminate him.  Since he did not 
do so, admission of the Coroner’s inquest testimony was proper.336   Werner also brushed aside 
claimed errors in the District Attorney’s summation and in the Recorder’s charge to the jury.337
Judge Werner next addressed the admissibility of Henry Barnet’s hearsay statement to Dr. 
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Douglass that he had become ill after taking the Kutnow powder that he had received in the mail. 
Werner held that the hearsay statement was incompetent and its admissibility was reversible 
error because the entire case against Molineux for the poisoning of Barnet turned on Barnet’s 
statement that he had taken the Kutnow powder before falling ill.  This point requires some 
analysis because Judge Parker concurred in the result only on this ground.  First, Barnet was ill.  
His attending physician, Dr. Douglass, visited his patient and in the course of taking a quick 
medical history, Barnet told him he had fallen ill after taking the Kutnow powder in the sample 
box on his bathroom shelf.  He also told Douglass that he had received it through the mail.338
New York law recognized a hearsay exception for statements made to a physician for purposes 
of treatment, and Dr. Douglass testified that he had to find the source of Barnet’s mercurial 
poisoning shown by mercury burns on the mouth and acute gastroenteritis.339  The legal issue 
was whether or not the physician needed to know how Barnet came by the poison Kutnow 
powder in order to treat him.  If he did, then Barnet’s identification of the source of his Kutnow 
powder was competent, material and admissible as part of his declaration made for purposes of 
medical treatment. If not, the statement was erroneously received.340  The weight of authority in 
those days excluded the hearsay statement of the patient to the doctor identifying the source of 
injury or disease.341  Under a more modern interpretation of the hearsay exception for 
declarations to physicians of physical and mental symptoms, Barnet’s statement that the poison 
was sent to him in the mail would probably not be admissible because Dr. Douglass did not need 
to know where the Kutnow powder came from in order to have it analyzed and prescribe 
treatment for whatever injuries it had caused.342
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F.  UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT
Judge Werner’s summary of the law of uncharged misconduct and its application to the 
Molineux case reads like a treatise.  He started with a statement of the collateral fact rule:
. . .  The general rule of evidence applicable to criminal trial is that the state cannot prove 
against the defendant any crime not alleged in the indictment, either as a foundation for a 
separate punishment, or as aiding the proofs that he is guilty of the crime charged.343
Werner said that the rule was the product of the presumption of innocence and the requirement 
that the accused be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Citing several New York decisions, 
Werner said that the law excludes evidence of other offenses not charged in the indictment with 
few exceptions.  In an oblique way, Werner said that uncharged misconduct evidence was 
generally not relevant.  Taking a long quotation from Coleman v. People,344 a prosecution for 
receiving stolen property, Werner admitted that it would be easier to convict a person of one 
crime if the trier of fact knew that he had committed other, similar acts in the past.345  Quoting 
from another New York prosecution, People v. Shea,346 Werner contrasted the Continental 
method of prosecuting a criminal case in which the offender’s record of prior offenses is 
presented to the tribunal as part of the proof of guilt with what Werner believed was the more 
merciful English view that stressed the presumption of innocence.347  The evil to be avoided in 
U.S. prosecutions, Werner said, was the assumption that the accused was guilty of the crime 
charged because he had committed other similar crimes in the past.348  Werner implicitly 
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acknowledged that admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence depended upon a calculus of 
probative value weighed against the prejudice to the accused.
Judge Werner immediately noted that there were exceptions to the general rule.
The exceptions to the rule cannot be stated with categorical precision.  Generally 
speaking, evidence of other crimes is competent to prove the specific crime charged when 
it tends to establish (1) motive; (2) intent; (3) the absence of mistake or accident; (4) a 
common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to 
each other that proof of one tends to establish the others; (5) the identity of the person 
charged with the commission of the crime on trial.349
Werner accepted these five instances as specific examples of situations that made uncharged 
misconduct evidence relevant to a criminal prosecution.  He then began to apply each of the 
exceptions to the admission of the mass of evidence pointing toward Molineux’ murder of Barnet 
by cyanide of mercury. 
1.  Motive  
Werner noted that “in every criminal trial when proof of motive is an essential ingredient of 
the evidence against a defendant, the motive to be established is the one which induced the 
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commission of the crime charged.”350   The motive for killing Cornish would be hatred of 
Cornish.   The motive for killing Barnet, on the other hand, was “jealosy caused by the latter’s 
intervention in the love affair of the former.”351  Since the motive for murdering Barnet was not 
the same as the motive for murdering Cornish, proof of the killing of Barnet could not be used to 
prove that Molineux killed Mrs. Adams.  Judge Werner cited a plethora of English and U.S. 
authorities including several cases of murder by poisoning.352  In each, he identified the motive 
of the accused slayer and showed how the case permitted proof of uncharged misconduct.  In 
People v. Otto, for example, the accused was charged with murdering his brother’s wife.  Otto 
apparently poisoned the whole family, but two children survived Otto was appointed their 
guardian.  Otto then filed spurious claims against the dead father’s estate. Otto’s attempted to 
defraud the estate was admitted to show his motive for killing his brother and his sister-in law.353
2.  Intent
Turning next to the exception for uncharged misconduct evidence to prove intent, Werner 
noted that motive and intent are often thought of as the same concept.  Werner promptly 
distinguished between the two exceptions:
Motive is the moving power which impels to action for a definite result.  Intent is the 
purpose to use a particular means to effect such result.  When a crime is clearly proven to 
have been committed by a person charged therewith, the question of motive may be of 
little or no importance.  But criminal intent is always essential to the commission of crime.  
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There are cases in which the intent may be inferred from the nature of the act.  There are 
others where willful intent or guilty knowledge must be proved before a conviction can be 
had.354
Most modern commentators would have separated guilty knowledge from intent, following the 
text of Rule 404(b), although Werner’s observation that proof of guilty knowledge is really proof 
of criminal intent is correct.355  The mens rea required to prove Molineux was guilty of 
murdering Mrs. Adams was proof that he intended to kill Harry Cornish.  If the mass of evidence 
showing that Molineux had intent to kill Barnet with the poison Kutnow powder, that intent 
would not be transferred to the killing of Katherine Adams.356 Judge Werner also declared that 
the act of mixing a poison compound of Bromo Seltzer an d cyanide of mercury was sufficient 
proof of general criminal intent to meet the standard for convicting Molineux of the killing of 
Mrs. Adams.357
3.  Absence of mistake or accident
Having disposed of the exceptions for motive and intent (including guilty knowledge), Judge 
Werner dealt with the claim of mistake or accident.  This gave him the chance to comment on the 
famous Australian baby farm homicides, as well as another series murders by poisoning in which 
the accused claimed poison was accidentally administered.358 Anticipating the “doctrine of 
chances” by nearly a century, Judge Werner said:
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There are cases in which the possible or probable defense of accident or mistake may 
be rebutted upon the direct case of the prosecution or in which the doubtful cause of the 
particular death may be established by other previous similar deaths.359
Werner started with Regina v. Gardner,360  the case in which a milk dealer was accused of 
poisoning his first wife.  Gardner sold arsenic as well as milk, and claimed his wife died by 
accidental poisoning, Unfortunately for Gardner, the prosecution was permitted to prove that 
Gardner’s mother and three horses died from arsenic poisoning.361  After going through a quick 
study of two more poisoning cases, Judge Werner was able to present Makin v. Attorney General 
for New South Wales362 the “baby farm” homicides, and the grandmother of the doctrine of 
chances. Makin was charged with murdering an infant named Horace Murray As the authorities 
dug around on Makin’s back yard, they found more and more dead babies buried in the yard.  At 
trial the prosecution introduced the finding of the other dead babies when Makin defended on the 
ground that Murray had died accidentally.363  Judge Werner went on to other homicide cases364
in which the defendant had made a claim of accident or mistake, then concluded that the 
poisoning of Mrs. Adams was no accident:
Was this poison sent by mistake or accident? Are not utter depravity, venomous 
malignity, murderous design, fiendish cunning, indelibly stamped upon every fact and 
circumstance connected with the act?  It would be a travesty upon our jurisprudence to 
hold that, in a case of such appalling and transparent criminality, it could ever be deemed 
necessary or proper to resort to proof of extraneous crimes to anticipate the impossible 
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defense of accident or mistake.  The same irrefutable logic of fact and circumstances that 
establishes felonious intent as clearly negatives the possibility of accident or mistake.365
Judge Werner had ruled out admitting the mass of evidence on the Barnet killing to offset a 
pretense of accident or mistake.
4.  Common plan or Scheme
True to his original design, Judge Werner examined the exception for common plan or 
scheme.  
It sometimes happens that two or more crimes are committed by the same person in 
pursuance of a single design or under circumstances which render it impossible to prove 
one without proving all. To bring a case within this exception  to the general rule. . .. 
there must be evidence of system between the offense on trial and the one sought to be 
introduced.  They must be connected as parts of a general and composite plan or scheme, 
or they must be so related to each other as to show a common motive or intent running 
through both.366
Judge Werner seems to limit the plan or design exception to the modern notion of inseparable or 
interwoven crimes.  Since there was no allegation of a conspiracy he did not consider the proof 
of overt acts of a conspiracy not alleged in the indictment as an example of the plan or design 
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exception.  He also did not consider that an accused could commit a series of unrelated crimes as 
part of a “crime spree” that were not necessarily part of a rationally formed plan to commit a 
crime.
Judge Werner cited a number of decisions in which uncharged criminal conduct was 
admitted to prove a plan.  He cited Hester v. Commonwealth,367 cited one of the Molly Maguire 
cases, to show how the plan or design exception worked without realizing that Hester was the 
genesis of the doctrine that uncharged misconduct committed by conspirators in favor of the 
conspiracy could be admitted against all conspirators without any showing that the conspirators 
were aware of the actions of the conspirators whose uncharged misconduct was proved against 
them.
Judge Werner’s also reviewed People v. Zucker,368 an arson prosecution in which the 
accused moved furniture out of his New York City house and trucked it across the Hudson to 
Newark to get a confederate named Selzter to insure the furniture.  The furniture was burned in 
Newark, then the New York house was burned a few days later. The court approved admission of 
both arsons as evidence of a common plan or design to commit arson.  After reviewing two more 
arson cases in which evidence of a plan or design to commit arson had been admitted,369Judge 
Werner rejected any link between the murder of Barnet and the murder of Mrs. Adams because 
the two crimes lacked a common motive and purpose.
. . . it is impossible to perceive any legal connection between the two cases.  Barnet 
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was said to have been poisoned because he interfered in the defendant’s love affair.  
Cornish was to be poisoned because he had incurred the hatred of the defendant as a result 
of quarrels between them over club matters. . .  Let us suppose that the defendant, having a 
motive for the killing of Barnet, had shot and killed him in November, 1898; and that in 
darkness of night on the 28th day of December, 1898, someone had shot and killed Mrs. 
Adams while she was near to Cornish, . . .  could it be shown that the defendant shot 
Barnet to prove that he shot Mrs. Adams?  The two deaths were caused by the same means, 
at different times, inspired by separate motives and charged against one person.  Is there 
any connection between the two crimes?370
Judge Werner dismissed the evidence that showed the murder of Barnet was accomplished by 
similar means (poison package of patent medicine sent through the mail to the victim) as the 
Adams murder because the link of similarity was based on inadmissible hearsay.  Assuming that 
the link had been established by other means, Judge Werner also dismissed the argument that the 
similarity in the modus operandi of the person who took Barnet’s life and Mrs. Adams ‘ life 
demonstrated a plan or design of poisoning one’s enemies. In Werner’s view,  the crimes were 
similar in the same way that two deaths by shooting, for example, were due to firing of a gun.371
In conclusion, Judge Werner rejected the admission of the facts of the Barnet killing as evidence 




Judge Werner concluded with a tough analysis of the exception for identity of the accused.
Another exception to the general rule is, that when the evidence of an extraneous 
crime tends to identify the person who committed it as the same person who committed the 
crime charged in the indictment, it is admissible.  There are not many reported cases in 
which this exception seems to have been affirmatively applied.  A far larger number of 
causes, while distinctly recognizing its existence, have held it inapplicable to the particular 
facts before the court.  The reason for this is obvious.  In the nature of thing there cannot 
be many cases where evidence of separate and distinct crimes, with no unity or connection 
of motive, intent or plan, will serve to legally identify the person who committed one as 
the same person who is guilty of the other.372
Judge Werner chose People v. Rogers,373 a California homicide prosecution, to show how the 
identity exception worked.  Rogers was accused of murdering Mr. Kimball during a burglary.  
The burglar gained entry by means of a knife and chisel, and the victim was shot with a pistol.  
The People introduced evidence that Rogers had burglarized Connick’s house from which a 
knife and chisel had been taken and a saloon, from which the pistol used on Kimball’s murder 
had been taken. The court held that evidence of the commission of the other two burglaries by 
Rogers tended to show his identity as the perpetrator of the Kimball burglary and killing.374
Judge Werner also used Commonwealth v. Choate375 to demonstrate how the identity 
86
exception worked.  Choate was charged with setting Ackerman’s barn on fire.  The remains of a 
peculiar wooden box containing the residue of a lighted candle was found in the ruins.  A search 
of Choate’s shop turned up a similar box.  A third similar box had been found at a church which 
had been the site of a bungled arson attempt.  Choate wrote a threatening letter that implicated 
him in setting other fires by this unique means.  The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
affirmed Choate’s conviction, finding that proof of other criminal acts committed in a similar, 
unique fashion could be admtted to show the identity of the accused.376  Judge Werner also went 
through several other cases where the identity exception had been employed to admit uncharged 
misconduct when the motive for both crimes was dissimilar.377   Judge Werner determined that 
the perpetrator of Barnet killing and the Adams murder had a different motive, intent and plan 
for each homicide. If the modus opera ndi of the killer in both cases was unique and highly 
similar, the evidence of the Barnet killing could be received in the trial for the Adams killing if 
the identity of the perpetrator of the Barnet killing had been established.  The elements of 
similarity were striking: both victims died from ingesting a sample of patent medicine laced with 
cyanide of mercury, a rare poison.  Harry Cornish, the intended victim in the Adams case, and 
Henry Barnet were men that Molineux had good reason to hate.   The patent medicine samples 
used in each case were solicited by a person who disguised his true identity by renting a private 
letter box in the name of the intended victim. The chain of similarity broke at its weakest link, 
Barnet’s  hearsay statement that he had received his Kutnow powder sample through the mails.  
Since that was inadmissible hearsay, the identity of the person who murdered Barnet had not 
been established by sufficient evidence to infer the guilt of the perpetrator of the Adams killing 
from identification of the killer of Barnet.378    Worse yet, Judge Werner said a little later on in 
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dealing with the Barnet hearsay statement, “the record is barren of evidence which tends to 
connect the defendant with the killing of Barnet.”379
G.  THE CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE O’BRIEN
Judge O’Brien agreed with Judge Werner’s finding that admission of Barnet’s hearsay 
statement to Dr. Douglass was reversible error. He also accepted Judge Werner’s general 
characterization of the uncharged misconduct rule.380   He chose to write his concurring opinion 
because “[T]he only question upon which there is an opportunity for minds to differ is whether 
the events connected with Barnet’s sickness and death are so related to the case at bar so as to 
form an exception to the general rule. . .”381
Judge O’Brien was most concerned about the modus operandi theory of admissibility; that 
the two crimes were so similar that the perpetrator of one necessarily had to be the perpetrator of 
the other.  The Judge said:
I think the evidence relating to Barnet’s sickness and death would not for a moment be 
considered competent but for the fact that it creates a strong impression upon the mind that 
the author of his death must also be the author of Mrs. Adams’ death, since in both cases, 
death was caused by similar means. We may attempt to deceive ourselves with words and 
phrases by arguing that it is admissible to prove intent, or identity, or the absence of 
mistake, or something else in order to bring the case within some exception to the general 
rule; but what is in the mind all the time is the thought, so difficult to suppress, that the 
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vicious and criminal agency that caused the death of Barnet also caused the death of Mrs. 
Adams.  The rule of law that excludes the evidence for such a purpose may be, and 
probably is contrary to the tendency of the human mind, but since the law was intended to 
curb the speculations of the mind and to guard the accused from the result of error in its 
operation, I am for maintaining the law in all its integrity. . . .”382
Judge O’Brien plainly believed that if Molineux had perpetrated the Barnet killing, he should be 
tried for that offense separately, rather than throwing in a mass of Barnet evidence into the trial 
for the death of Mrs. Adams.383  Implicitly, O’Brien rejected the evidence that Molineux may 
have killed Barnet on grounds of excessive prejudice to the accused.
H.  THE CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE PARKER
Chief Judge Parker voted for reversal because of the erroneous admission of Barnet’s 
statement to Dr. Douglass about the source of the Kutnow powder.   He dissented from the 
majority’s conclusion that had the People established from competent sources that Barnet 
received his Kutnow Powder through the mail, evidence of the Barnet killing would nevertheless 
have been inadmissible in the prosecution for the killing of Mrs. Adams.384  Judge Parker stated 
the general bar against uncharged misconduct in much the same way that Judge Werner had 
done.  He took issue, however, with Judge Werner’s use of a list of a very limited number of 
exceptions to the general rule that did not precisely fit the Barnet homicide evidence.  Judge 
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Parker cited most of the same cases that Judge Werner had cited in support of his version of the 
exceptions to rule.  He said:
. .   . . each one of them presents a case in which proof of the facts tending to show the 
commission of another crime by the defendant on trial was admitted for the purpose of 
aiding in establishing the fact that he committed the offense charged. . . . it is said in effect 
that this case is not within the rule as interpreted by those cases.  In other words, that the 
facts of this case do not bring it within the exceptions--so called--created by those cases.  
The argument proceeds upon the assumption that the exceptions are not to be added to; but 
that as large a number had been created when this trial began as should be tolerated, 
instead of treating these decisions as establishing the principle that the facts of another 
crime may be proved by the People whenever their tendency is to prove the commission of 
the crime charged.385
While Judge Parker agreed that the well-recognized exceptions to the uncharged misconduct rule 
were a good starting point, he acknowledged that other circumstances might make such 
uncharged misconduct relevant and admissible.  Parker also argued that the Barnet evidence 
established the identity of the perpetrator of the Adams killing.  First, Mrs. Adams and Barnet 
were victims of a very rare poison compound.  Second, the identity of Molineux as the author of 
the “Barnet” letters by expert evidence identified him as the perpetrator of the Barnet killing . 
Third, both intended victims belonged to the same athletic club.  Fourth, both victims had 
offended Molineux.  Fifth, the perpetrator of both homicides had obtained patent medicine 
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samples using a false name via a private letter box.386  Judge Parker did not mention the amount 
of proof that the People had to amass in order to admit the evidence of the Barnet killing in the 
prosecution for Mrs. Adams’ murder.  The implication from his analysis of the points of 
similarity between the two homicides indicates that he would have required a low degree of 
proof that Molineux committed the Barnet homicide to permit the use of the evidence of that 
killing in the Adams case.387
The evidence in the Barnet case, therefore, tends to identify Molineux as the sender of 
the poison package in the Cornish case, thus supporting the evidence of the lay and expert 
witnesses who testified that the address on the poison package sent to Cornish was in the 
handwriting of Molineux.388
Judge Parker also disagreed that proof that Molineux killed Barnet had to be based on proof of 
all the elements of the offense.  Judge Gray’s brief concurring opinion agreed with that of Judge 
Parker.389
I.  A SYNOPSIS OF THE RULE
Judge Werner’s explanation of the rule barring proof of the bad character of the accused 
became the traditional one employed by the courts.  First, Werner characterized the rule as a 
version of the collateral fact rule: acts collateral to those charged in the indictment are not 
admissible because the acts were not relevant.  Second, he characterized U.S. criminal 
prosecutions as founded on a presumption of innocence and on the hallowed rule that the 
91
accused must be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  Third, he admitted that the character 
traits or predisposition of the accused to commit similar criminal acts was relevant to deciding 
the issue of guilt or innocence, but one foreign to the genius of the Anglo-Saxon peoples.  None 
of these propositions compels the exclusion of evidence proving the defendant had a 
predispositions to act in a manner consistent with the crime charged.    The collateral fact 
objection is an issue of relevance and notice: the notice clause of the 6th Amendment provided 
that the accused was entitled to pre-trial notice of the charges against the accused in order to 
make a meaningful defense against charges of misconduct that were brought up at trial.   Thus, in 
modern times, any act that would enhance the sentencing penalty for a crime charged must be 
included in the indictment.390 Absence of notice can be dealt with by requiring the prosecution to 
give notice of intent to prove uncharged misconduct prior to trial.   Although the criminal 
standard of burden of proof by beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally protected,391
evidence showing the accused was predisposed to commit the crime charged by a pattern of prior 
conduct does not directly nor indirectly attack the presumption of innocence nor lessen the 
requirement of proof of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.  The presumption 
of innocence sets up the requirement to disprove innocence beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Predisposition evidence like any other logically relevant source of proof, is admissible to rebut 
the presumption of innocence.
Judge Werner’s telling admission that proof of a pattern of similar conduct would be helpful 
to the jury and therefore relevant discloses the implicit reason for excluding evidence of patterns 
of misconduct: the filtration function of the rules of evidence. Ultimately a jury would decide on 
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the accused’s guilt or innocence and the court feared that the jury would misuse evidence of 
other acts of uncharged misconduct. None of the opinions stated the kind of misuse that the court 
feared. 
Werner asserted, after reviewing the evidence of the Barnet killing,  that the five known 
exceptions to the general rule against admission of other criminal acts of the accused had been 
exhaustively examined. Since none of the exceptions fit the evidence showing Molineux 
poisoned Barnet, then the evidence of the Barnet killing was inadmissible in the prosecution for 
the murder of Mrs. Adams.392  Judge Parker disagreed, treating the traditional exceptions to the 
bar against uncharged misconduct evidence as examples of the occasions when the courts 
recognize the relevance of uncharged misconduct that proves some issue in the case as well as 
the bad character of the accused.  Parker’s view comes closer to that of Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) than 
does Werner’s view.  It is inclusive, rather than exclusive.  
All the opinions agree that uncharged misconduct of the accused is not generally admissible 
in a criminal prosecution.  All agree that there are times when instances of uncharged misconduct 
evidence is relevant and admissible against the accused.  The common thread between Werner’s 
view of a limited number of exceptions for uncharged misconduct and Parker’s more generous 
inclusionary view is relevance to some issue other than the bad character of the accused. The 
basis for allowing proof of specific acts of uncharged misconduct during trial, then, is the 
existence of some issue other than bad character in the case.  Were the jurists who wrote these 
opinions alive, they might agree that a tight formulation of their synthesis would be something 
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on these lines:
Evidence of the predisposition of the accused to commit crimes of the type charged in the 
indictment is logically relevant to proof of the guilt of the accused. However, due to policy 
considerations such as the constitutional presumption of innocence, such evidence is not 
ordinarily admissible.   The rule is suspended when a material intermediate issue in the case 
exists that may be proved by proof of uncharged misconduct, so that the object of proof is not the 
bad character of the accused.  Historical examples of this suspension include proof of motive to 
commit a crime, proof of criminal intent when general mens rea is insufficient to establish intent, 
(which includes such issues as  proof of specific intent where the elements of the crime require 
such proof, proof of guilty knowledge, where the accused cannot have mens rea unless the 
accused knows some material fact; proof of absence of accident or mistake, which negatives 
intent); proof of a plan or design of criminal activity; proof of overt acts of conspirators not 
charged in the indictment made in furtherance of the conspiracy; and proof of the identity of the 
accused.
Is there evidence that the result in Molineux reflected either public opinion on the original 
guilty verdict or pressure exerted by insiders on the court?  Judge Werner’s papers are held by 
the University of Rochester.  He left no notes or correspondence relating to the Molineux case.393
Judge Cullen was the only member of the court who had any relationship with the Molineux 
family.  He did not take part in the case.  Chief Judge Parker left no papers relating to the 
Molineux decision according to his biographer.  
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VI.  THE SECOND TRIAL
A.  THE PROSECUTORS AND THE DEFENSE TEAM FOR THE SECOND TRIAL
The cast of characters changed dramatically for the second trial.  Bartow Weeks remained as 
defense co-counsel, but the lead counsel was none other than former Republican Governor Frank 
S. Black, assisted by his partner William Olcot.394  Osborne was held over to try the second trial 
when more senior Assistant District Attorneys refused to take the case.
Recorder Goff did not preside at the second trial because the  trial was transferred to the 
Supreme Court.  John A. Lambert, a Republican Justice from Upstate New York, was called in 
as judge.395  The political balance tilted in favor of General Molineux and his son. Recorder 
Goff’s legendary animosity towards defense counsel was no longer an issue in the case.
The second trial started on October 10, 1902.  Six jurors were picked on the first day, four 
more on the second day.  Jury selection was interrupted by Osborne’s motion in limine to get a 
ruling on the admissibility of the H.C. Barnet letters. Osborne argued that the Barnet letters were 
still admissible as exemplars for his handwriting experts, and intended to refer to them in his 
opening statement. Governor Black opposed admission on any basis. He argued that the Court of 
Appeals decision precluded any reference to H. C. Barnet on retrial.  Justice Lambert quickly 
reigned in both counsel and decided that he would not rule on the admissibility of the Barnet 
letters until they were offered at trial.396
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Osborne’s opening statement was restrained, unlike the florid and argumentative opening 
statement in the 1899 trial.  Justice Lambert stopped Osborne from suggesting in his opening 
statement that the defense counsel had the duty to produce Mae Melando and Robert Zeller as 
witnesses before Governor Black could object. Lambert cut off the District Attorney’s allusion to 
Harry Cornish’s innocent administration of the poison Bromo Selzter to Katharine Adams. The 
Judge also stopped Osborne from suggesting or implying conclusions during his opening 
statement, a perfectly correct ruling that should have been made during the first trial’s opening 
statement 397
B.  THE PROSECUTION’S CASE IN CHIEF
The People’s case in chief opened, as it had in the first trial, with Dr. Hitchcock’s testimony. 
His evidence in the second trial was much the same as his testimony in 1899.398 On the second 
day of trial, Osborne put on 13 witnesses, largely due to the lack of defense objections that had 
marked the 1899 trial. The testimony of Mss Elsie Grey, the clerk at the Kutnow company, was 
also read into evidence since she had died after the end of the first trial. Harry Cornish, as 
expected, denied renting a private letter box in 1898, and denied writing all the letters signed”H. 
Cornish.” Governor Black’s cross-examination of Cornish uncovered Cornish’s divorce on 
grounds of adultery committed with “Mrs. Small,” that was excluded during the first trial.  
Cornish also contradicted his direct testimony by reluctantly conceding that he had rented a letter 
box jointly with Mrs. Adams.  Although these points may have affected the jury’s appraisal of 
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Cornish’s credibility, his evidence was consistent with the first trial.  The other witnesses who 
replicated their earlier testimony included the two detectives Cleary and Herlihy, and John 
Yocum, Cornish’s chemist friend who saw him within minutes of the Adams poisoning.  Their 
evidence was much as before, except that any references to Henry C. Barnet were rigorously 
excluded.399
On October 22, Osborne put on Rudy Heiles, star witness for the prosecution in the 1899 
trial.  Heiles replayed his earlier testimony in which he repeated Molineux’ admission that 
Cornish and Harpster were “dirty, low, dirty villains.”400  Heiles also told the jury about his 
conversation with Molineux when Molineux revealed that Cornish had accused him of keeping a 
disorderly house in Newark. Then Osborne’s case started to fall apart.  Doctor Potter testified 
again and gave his opinion that Mrs. Adams had been poisoned by mercury.  Governor Black’s 
cross-examination brought out the fact that Potter had lost his notes on the Adams case and was 
not able to testify to important details brought out in the first trial.  He also admitted receiving 
$1,960 from the State of New York as an expert witness in the case.   Letter box company owner 
Joseph Koch stuck to his original story that Molineux had talked to him about renting a letter 
box, but had never done so.  Koch obliged defense counsel by identifying Harry Cornish as the 
man who actually rented the letter box and received free samples of Von Mohl’s remedy for 
impotence.401
On October 23, Osborne presented the transcript of Molineux’ testimony before the Coroner 
in February, 1899.  Justice Lambert kept out any reference to H. C. Barnet in the transcript 
testimony.  John Adams took the stand followed the transcript.  Adams once again repeated the 
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story about his ability to identify Molineux as the writer of the address on Cornish’s poisoned 
package. Adams authenticated Molineux’ letter on blue stationery with a three feathered crest 
requesting a free sample of patent medicine.402
Governor Black conceded that Mrs. Adams had died by poisoning by cyanide of mercury, 
which had the effect of wiping out the evocative value of the testimony of Prof. Witthaus on the 
cause of her death.403  After Whitthaus finished his expert evidence, Osborne called Nicholas 
Heckmann with the intent to have Heckmann testify that Molineux had hired a letter box from 
him under the name of “H. C. Barnet.”  Justice Lambert sustained defense objections to his 
testimony as irrelevant and precluded by the Court of Appeals ruling.404
On Friday, the 24th , Osborne attempted to wrestle an identification of the accused out of 
Miss Miller, the former stenographer at Hartdegen’s Jewwelry Store in Newark.  She stuck to her 
original testimony  and again insisted that the man with the red beard who bought the toothpick 
holder from her was not Molineux.  On cross-examination, Governor Black asked Molineux to 
stand up: she said that Molineux was not the man who bought the silver from her.405  Osborne 
produced Eugene Ehrhardt, who said he wrapped the tooth pick holder for the purchaser at 
Hartdegen’s on the 21st of December.  He estimated that he wrapped the goods around 2:00 
P.M.406
The trial resumed on October 28 with District Attorney Jerome’s accusation that Bartow 
Weeks had used undue influence via the Newark Police Department to keep Archibald Arnold, 
Mamie Melando, Robert Zeller  and  Detective Farrell from obeying the request of the District
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Attorney to voluntarily attend the Molineux trial and give their evidence.407
Osborne concluded the prosecution’s case in chief on October 29.  He presented two 
handwriting experts who gave their opinion that Roland Molineux had written the address on the 
poison package sent to Cornish. He moved the court to permit the testimony of Detective Farrell 
and Mamie Melando from the 1899 trial to be read into the record as former testimony of 
unavailable witnesses, but Justice Lambert denied the motion.408  The People rested.  On 30 
October, Governor Black made the expected motion for directed verdict of acquittal, which 
Justice Lambert refused to grant.409
C.  THE DEFENSE CASE
On Friday, November 1, 1902, Roland Molineux took the oath and began to give his version 
of the story.  Molineux kept his smile on throughout five hours of often painful direct and cross-
examination, politely correcting District Attorney Osborne on dates and times when Osborne’s 
questions were not on point.  The New York Times reporter covering the trial described Molineux 
demeanor in detail:
The extreme affability of the defendant was no less conspicuous than upon the occasion of 
the Coroner’s inquest. . . . He was always courteous. W hen asked as to unpleasant facts 
and circumstances. . . .he always hesitated about answering.  He acted as though it were 
revolting to his sensibilities to repeat such incidents.
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Molineux’s smile was a feature of his testimony.   . .  It was not a smile of amusement, 
it was a smile of courtesy. . .  He seemed to smile at just the right places. . . . there was 
often a sneer in his voice.410
Molineux told the jury that his father had sent him to the far West when he was 15 because 
he had been named a co-respondent in a divorce suit.411  This was a solid piece of anticipatory 
impeachment by Governor Black.  Following that admission, Molineux plunged into an accurate 
description of his quarrels with Harry Cornish over the 1897 Amateur Circus apparatus and the 
misbehavior of some of the athletic members of the club. Molineux then explained to the jury 
that he denounced Cornish’s letter to Bernie Wefers attacking Bartow Weeks to Mr. Ballentine, 
the club owner, but got no satisfaction for Cornish’s misbehavior. Molineux described his 
meeting with Cornish on the stairs of the Knickerbocker and his resignation.  Again, he 
professed to the jury that he had gotten over his animosity towards Cornish long before his 
marriage to Blanche Chesebrough.412
Molineux denied buying the silver toothpick holder at Hartdegen’s Jewelry Store.  He 
denied ever going to Koch’s private letter service on Broadway. Then he told the jury that he was 
mistaken about his whereabouts on 23 December, the day that the poison package had been 
mailed to Cornish from the General Post Office: he had spent the morning at Newark but had 
gone into the City to spend the afternoon with Prof. Vulte and Prof. Chandler at Columbia 
College looking over the campus. Molineux denied mailing the poison package to Cornish and 
denied writing the address on the poison package. He recalled having only one sheet of blue 
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stationery with three intertwined feathers embossed on it. He denied killing Mrs. Adams and 
having any knowledge of the facts surrounding her death.413
Osborne began his cross-examination with a plunge into Molineux’s role as co-respondent 
in the divorce suit of Kindberg v. Kindberg and claimed that Molineux had colluded with 
Kindberg to obtain a divorce on grounds of the adultery of Mrs. Kindberg with Molineux.  
Osborne then tried to get Molineux to explain how cyanide of mercury could be made by a 
chemist. Molineux used the questions to give a lecture in chemistry to the jury on the 
manufacturing process for dry colors.  Osborne then moved to the subject of the missing New 
Jersey witnesses, asking Molineux about the depth of his relationship with Zeller and Mamie 
Melando. He then shifted to Molineux’s relationship with Barnet, but stopped short of plunging 
into the Barnet poisoning case.414
Osborne did impeach Molineux on the issue of the blue paper: he confronted Molineux with 
his statement during the Coroner’s Inquest denying that he had ever owned any such blue paper, 
and his direct examination response that he had at least one sheet of the blue paper.  Then he 
moved to the subject of the missing New Jersey witnesses.  Osborne used Melando’s and 
Farrell’s testimony from the former trial to cross-examine Molineux, putting some of their 
evidence before the jury by way of his questions, over defense objections.415
Osborne tried to get Molineux to admit that his own handwriting samples were remarkably 
similar to the handwriting on some of the Cornish and Barnet exhibits. Molineux refused to take 
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the bait. Molinuex admitted he had an account at Plum & Co. and that he had purchased 
stationery there. Picking up the diagnosis blank that had been excluded by Justice Lambert, 
Osborne took the questions from the blank and put them to Molineux.  He then handed the 
diagnosis blank to Molineux and asked him if he had written it.  Justice Lambert sustained 
Governor Black’s objection to admitting the blank in evidence.416  Osborne pled exhaustion after 
five hours of cross-examination and Molineux was allowed to stand down from the witness 
box.417
The defense team then summoned its own team of hand-writing experts to refute the 
prosecution’s claim that Molineux had written the address on the Cornish poison package. The 
three experts all concluded that Molineux had not written the address on the Cornish poison 
package.  Each explained away the conclusions of the prosecution’s experts.418  The District 
Attorney took the morning of November 6 to cross-examine David Carvalho, the star of the 
defense expert team.  Osborne tried to get the diagnosis blank before the jury while cross-
examining Carvalho.  His insidious technique involved tendering the diagnosis blank to Carvalho 
and asking him if it was written by the same hand that had written the “Cornish” letters. Justice 
Lambert again sustained defense objections to admission of the blank.419
Molineux’ defense team came up with a surprise witness, Mrs. Anna Stevenson of 
Brooklyn, who gave her evidence on November 6.  She happened to be in downtown Manhattan 
on the afternoon of  December 23, 1898 near the General Post Office when a man carrying a 
package brushed by her on a street corner.  He appeared to be very agitated. While the middle-
102
aged housewife looked on, he pulled a package out of his pocket addressed to “Harry Cornish” 
then vanished into the crowd.  Governor Black asked Molineux to stand up: Mrs. Stevenson told 
the jury that Molineux was not the man she saw that day.  Osborne asked Harry Cornish to stand 
up-- a mistake.  Mrs. Stevnson told the jury that “He looks very much like the man.”420 Mrs. 
Stevenson told Osborne that she had not come forward during the first trial because she had an 
attack of nervous prostration during the trial. She admitted she was ill from the same condition 
several months before she encountered the man with the package.421  The defense team then 
called pharmacist  Louis Jacobson who had a drug store across the street from the Adelaide 
apartments. He testified that Harry Cornish and Mrs. Rodgers were frequent customers, and he 
recalled one time when one of them drank a glass of Bromo Seltzer.422  Martin Huff, a traveling 
salesman, took the stand. He had been in Hartdegen’s Jewelry Store in Newark just before 
Christmas 1898, when a man pushed his way past him to get service. Huff stated that the man 
had asked for a bottle holder for a Bromo Selzter bottle to match the articles on a lady’s dresser. 
Huff told the jury that Molineux was not the man who had tried to get a bottle holder that day.423
Professor Herman Vulte of Columbia College was the next defense witnes . He testified on  
November 7.  Vulte told the jury that he had invited Molineux to visit him at the Columbia 
Campus on Morningside Heights on the afternoon of 23 December 1898, which corroborated 
Molineux’ testimony.  Professor Vulte knew that they met on 23 December because they met on 
the last school day before the Christmas holiday.  Molineux stayed until around 4:30 that 
afternoon.424  Henry C. Terry testified that prosecution witness Joseph Koch had told him during 
the Coroner’s inquest in February, 1899, that he had never seen Molineux before the inquest.425
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Several law clerks testified that they were able to buy cyanide of mercury from local drug stores 
readily, contradicting the prosecution’s contention that the chemical was difficult to buy.426  The 
defense rested after a law clerk testified to the tabulated number of alleged similarities between 
Molineux’ genuine handwriting samples and the poison package and other disputed writings.
C.  THE PROSECUTION’S REBUTTAL
Assistant District Attorney Osborne produced a number of rebuttal witnesses. First, he put 
on Detective Farrell who repeated his testimony in the 1899 trial that he had seen Molineux on 
the street in Newark on December 21, walking away from the direction of Hartdegen’s. Then  
Osborne put on a witness who testified that Ass’t District Attorney McIntyre had advised Mrs. 
Rodgers to rent a private letter box in 1894.   The rest of the rebuttal was an attempt to show the 
jury that Harry Cornish could not have sent the poison package to himself.  John Yocum swore 
that he and Cornish were in the officers of James Sullivan on Park Place until 4:20 P.M. on the 
23rd.   Cornish was recalled to tell the jury that he went with Yocum to Sullivan’s office as 
described by Yocum.  Cornish denied ever owning a brown overcoat and denied buying Bromo 
Selzter from Jacobson’s Drug Store. Osborne’s last witness was the police officer husband of 
Mrs. Stevenson, who stated he put no stock in his wife’s story about the man with the package.  
With that last witness, the prosecution rested and both sides prepared for final argument on 
Monday, November 10, 1902, the fourth anniversary of  Henry C. Barnet’s death.
According to contemporary accounts, Governor Black argued that Harry Cornish, not 
Molineux, was the man behind the poison package scheme to get rid of Mrs. Adams.  Governor 
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Black suggested that Cornish had a motive to eliminate his cousin in order to have his way with 
her daughter.  Osborne countered with an elegant account of Cornish’s lack of motive to murder 
his cousin and his alibi on December 23.427  The exhausted prosecutor concluded the final 
argument the next morning,  and Justice Lambert charged the jury on the morning of  November 
11.
D.  THE VERDICT
The jury deliberated for 13 minutes when they returned with a unanimous verdict of “not 
guilty.”  Although Justice Lambert had warned the spectators against making a demonstration 
when the verdict was received, the New York Times described the scene as resembling “a 
football rush” as the spectators congratulated General Molineux and his son, and their hard-
working lawyers.428  Although Osborne had lost his case, the jurors filed by to congratulate him 
on a stellar presentation of the facts.  He gathered up his exhibits and left the court room to the 
rejoicing crowd of Molineux supporters.429
The twelve jurors talked freely about their decision to the press.   Foreman Edward Young 
revealed that the jurors immediately agreed on an all-or-nothing vote for first degree murder, 
eliminating any of the lesser included offenses that Justice Lambert had given them in the 
charge.  He took one preliminary straw vote which turned out to be unanimously “not guilty.” 
Juror J. Noah Slee said that eleven out of twelve would have voted to acquit Molineux at the end 
of the prosecution’s case without hearing Molineux’ alibi.  The twelfth man had not heard the 
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question, and when he understood it, he agreed with the others.  Juror John J. Redsner said that 
the “prosecution had failed to connect the defendant with the cyanide of mercury or with the 
purchase of the silver holder.”  Juror Frank Harrison Gould admitted that he had concluded “it 
would have been a terrible thing to condemn that young man to death” two or three days into the 
trial and therefore he planned to vote for acquittal.430
E.  AFTERMATH: THE FALL OUT FROM THE TRIALS
The General and his son went home to 117 Fort Green Place, Brooklyn, in the family 
carriage, receiving cheers from bystanders at the Criminal Court Building and on street corners 
in Brooklyn.  One very important person had been absent during the entire trial; Blanche 
Molineux.  Just before the trial commenced, General Molineux had paid for Blanche’s rooms at 
the Murray Hill Hotel.  She stayed in her apartment during the trial and did not spend a minute in 
the court room with her husband during the trial.  Governor Black sent his partner Olcott, to the 
Murray Hill to pick up Blanche Molineux and take her to Brooklyn to the Molineux family 
residence. Olcutt had the presence of mind to buy a boquet of American Beauty roses for 
Blanche, who would in turn deliver them to her husband in Brooklyn at their reunion.431  What 
Olcutt did not know was that Blanche Molineux had come to a decision to leave her husband, no 
matter what the outcome of the case would be.432
When Olcutt’s carriage pulled up outside the Molineux mansion, Blanche stepped out, 
completely forgetting her bouquet of flowers, and went in, dodging the attempts of reporters to 
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get her reaction to the verdict.  Instead of greeting her husband, she went upstairs to the room she 
had occupied for years while a virtual prisoner of her in-laws. She wrote a letter explaining her 
decision to leave Molineux and obtain a South Dakota “quickie’ divorce, packed her personal 
effects and went to bed while her husband greeted well-wishers in the main parlor and read over 
cards and telegrams congratulating him.433   The next morning, Blanche Molineux called a cab 
and left her in-laws mansion for the Murray Hill Hotel.434
Meanwhle, the editorial pages of the New York Times were flooded with letters of support 
for Molineux. L. B. Pritchard condemned the ex parte grand jury system for wrongfully indicting 
Molineux a second time for a crime he did not commit.   “Grand Army” denied it was the 
strength of the Grand Army of the Republic’s political influence that led to Molineux’ acquittal.  
The writer noted that the GAR could use its influence only to affect the Court of Appeals’ 
decision, the trial judge and the jury, but detected no evidence of undue influence on the part of 
the GAR.435
Blanche Molineux left New York for South Dakota on the 15th.  General Molinuex had 
continued to pay her expenses after she moved out.  He released a public statement to the press 
concerning his daughter-in-law on the 16th: 
“She left no word,” he said, “ and that is the last we have seen or heard of her. . . .” As to 
the report that Mrs. Roland Molineux has gone to South Dakota for the purpose of getting 
a divorce, the General said: “I know that the idea of a divorce did not come from any 
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member of my family or household.  I expect to obtain more particulars tomorrow, which I 
may or may not communicate to the public.”436
Blanche Molineux’ filed a South Dakota divorce petition within a few weeks, then married her 
lawyer, Wallace D. Scott.437  Forty years later Blanche Wallace wrote an incomplete memoir that 
formed the basis for an outstanding true crime story written by Jane Pejsa in 1983.  Roland 
Molineux went on to write several short stories and a play based on his experiences in the death 
house at Sing Sing.  In 1913 he married Margaret Connell who had helped him with his two 
plays.  She survived him as did their daughter Margaret.438  Molineux began to show symptoms 
of syphillis dementia within a few years of his second marriage, and he was committed to a 
hospital for the insane in 1915.  Roland Molineux, died in the Kings Park, Long Island, Insane 
Asylum, in 1917.439
VII.  MOLYNEUX’ INFLUENCE ON THE LAW OF UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT
A.  UNCHARGED CRIMINAL MISCONDUCT440
Although the term “uncharged  misconduct” would not be coined until the 1970's to describe 
the kind of evidence that was made admissible by Molineux, the case changed the perspective of 
the courts on admissibility of other criminal acts of the accused.  Nearly all the commentators441
except Prof. Wigmore,442  accepted Judge Werner’s formation of the rule as defining its limits: 
henceforth the rule would be formulated as a general prohibition against proof of other bad acts 
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of the accused unless the other bad act fit one of Judge Werner’s pigeon-holes.  There was much 
room for debate about adding another exception to the general rule.  Some courts recognized an 
exception for evidence of flight from authorities as consciousness of guilt.443 Other courts  added 
a special exception to permit proof of other sexual offenses by persons charged with sex 
offenses.444  The courts were divided on the quantum of proof necessary to bring an act of 
alleged uncharged misconduct before the jury.  Most states held that the trial judge had to find 
that uncharged misconduct was established by clear and convincing evidence before the jury 
could hear it,445 while Texas insisted that uncharged misconduct had to be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt.446
B.  THE UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION & MOLINEUX
The American Law Institute accepted a challenge to write an evidence code in the waning 
days of the Great Depression.  Edmund M. Morgan and John M. Maguire of Harvard University 
Law School were trhe official reporters for the group of very distinguished men who were 
responsible for the code.  Professor Wigmore was a special consultant to the group.447
Chapter Five of the Evidence Code related to the admissibility of character evidence.  Rule 
411 was the group’s first formulation of the uncharged misconduct rule.
Evidence that a person committed a crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion is 
inadmissible as tending to prove that he committed a crime or civil wrong on another 
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occasion if, but only if, the evidence is relevant solely as tending to prove his disposition to 
commit such a crime or civil wrong or to commit crimes or civil wrongs generally.448
This draft rule was a resurrection of Judge Alton Parker’s rejected formula in People v. 
Molineux.  The commentary, prepared by Maguire, contradicted the 40 year history of the rule as 
expressed and used by nearly all U.S. jurisdictions.  Maguire based his new evidence rule on two 
Harvard Law Review articles by Prof. Julius Stone, purporting to trace the history of the rule 
from English precedent to contemporary U.S. practice.449  Stone had criticized Judge Werner’s 
opinion and advocated rejection of his opinion as a “spurious rule” in favor of Judge Parker’s 
opinion that to Stone, embodied the correct rule that uncharged misconduct evidence could be 
admitted to prove any issue other than the accused’s bad character.450  Morgan accepted Stone’s 
view and composed the rule to reflect the inclusionary view point.
The 1942 final edition of the Model Code of Evidence kept the same basic inclusionary 
formulation of the uncharged misconduct rule.  The final edition rule was renumbered 311 and 
referred back to Rule 306, the general rule on admissibility of character evidence.  The 
commentary was unchanged except for the reference to Rule 306.451
Professor Morgan’s introductory comments to the 1942 edition of the Model Code reflect 
the attempt to revise the uncharged misconduct rule to make it an inclusionary rather than 
exclusionary rule had his blessings.452
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C.  UNIFORM RULE 55 
 
The Model Code of Evidence was never adopted by any jurisdiction.  After World War II, 
the American Law Institute passed the Model Code of Evidence to the Committee on Scope and 
Programs of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws as part of the 
Committee’s general inquiry into the law of evidence. In 1953, the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws issued a somewhat revised edition of the Model Code as 
the Uniform Rules of Evidence.  The 1953 Uniform Rules were adopted by Kansas and were the 
basis for the 1965 California Evidence Code.453  Model Rule 411 became Unifom Rule 55.
Uniform Rule 55 was essentially the same as Model Rule 411.454  It followed the 
inclusionary theory that uncharged misconduct evidence is admissible unless all that it tends to 
prove is the bad character of the accused.  This formula encountered some difficulty in the 1960's 
when California was considering adoption of the Uniform Rules as a California Evidence Code. 
The California Advisory Committee had rejected the general approach to character evidence 
taken by the 1942 Model Rules and the 1953 Uniform Rules that favored admissibility of 
character evidence.   Section 2053 of the California Code of Civil Procedure and relevant case 
law held that character evidence was inadmissible in civil actions to prove action in conformity 
therewith.455  The 1965 California Evidence Code had a single section that dealt with 
admissibility of character evidence in criminal prosecutions and of instances of uncharged 
misconduct:
§ 1101.   Evidence of character  to prove conduct
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(a) Except as provided in this section and in Sections 1102, 1103, 1108, and  1109,  
evidence  of a person's  character  or a trait of his or her  character   (whether in the form of 
an opinion,  evidence  of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct) 
is inadmissible when offered to prove  his or her conduct on a specified occasion.
(b) Nothing in this section prohibits the admission of evidence that a person 
committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act when relevant to prove some fact (such as 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or 
accident ) other than his or her disposition  to commit such an act.456
The Advisory Committee did not address the issue of proof of uncharged misconduct evidence in 
its commentary. The Committee ruled out admissibility of character evidence to prove action in 
conformity therewith in civil cases because it  thought that character evidence was a poor sort of 
circumstantial evidence of a person’s actions of  admitted low probative value.  As a result, 
Uniform Rule 55 was scheduled for overhaul along with all other character evidence rules.
D.  RULE 404(B): AN ATTEMPT TO BOTTLE MOLINEUX
The story of the torturous path that the Federal Rules of Evidence followed from 1969 to 
1975 is well known to most readers.  Rule 404 was one of the least controversial rules.  Its 
legislative history from 1969 to 1975 shows that the rule went through only two evolutions.  The 
original draft of Rule 404 contained two parts.  Part (a) related to admissibility of character 
evidence in criminal prosecutions. It was not based on Model Rule 406, although it addressed 
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some of the same topics.457  Part (b) addressed admissibility of other crimes or wrongs with no 
limit to criminal prosecutions.  It was not based on the inclusionary formula of Model Rule 
411.458  Both sections reflected the changes made by the California Evidence Code to the 1953 
Uniform Rules.
In 1972, the Supreme Court sent its proposed Rules of Evidence to Congress for study.  The 
1972 draft contained a slightly different version of Rule 404(b):
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts.-- Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith.  This subdivision does not exclude the evidence when offered for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.459
The Advisory Committee’s commentary on this version of the uncharged misconduct rule is 
much less favorable to admissibility of uncharged misconduct.  It acknowledges that such 
evidence may be admissible to prove some other issue than the bad character of an actor.460
Rule 404(b) was not the focus of public commentary during the lengthy process of public 
hearings before the House Judiciary Committee and the Senate Judiciary Committee.  Professor 
Edward Cleary, the reporter for the Advisory Committee mentioned the rule briefly in his 1973 
extended written remarks that were introduced before the Special Subcommittee of the  House 
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Judiciary Committee on Reform of Criminal Laws.461  Alvin K. Hellersatein of the Association 
of the Bar of the City of New York complained about the change from the March 1971 draft to 
the 1973 draft on 8 February 1973.462  On 22 February, Judge Henry J. Friendly, Chief Judge of 
the U.s. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit had a prescient comment on the proposed rule:
Rule 404(b)--Character evidence.  Does this adopt the “federal rule” allowing evidence of 
other crimes except when offered only to show the defendant is a bad man, or the rule 
requiring that these crimes show some particular trait relevant to the charge?  The rule 
seems to walk both sides of the street.  It will provide a bountiful source of appeals and 
possible reversals on a subject where the federal law is now reasonably clear.463
Judge Friendly implied that the inclusionary formula of the uncharged misconduct rule was the 
then-current federal rule.  He doubted that Rule 404(b) restated that rule.  The change that 
bothered Judge Friendly showed up on the Committee Print issued 28 June, 1973.464  William S. 
Cohen also preferred the March, 1971, formulation, although he thought the changed wording 
was unimportant.465  When the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted by Congress, the 1971 
version of the text of Rule 404(b) was adopted as the rule.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts.  Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to 
prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, 
be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.466
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The official commentary and the notes from the House and Senate Judiciary Committees do little 
to explain the potential impact of the rule.467
Since 1975, Rule 404(b) has been the most contested Federal Rule of Evidence.  It has been 
cited in 5,603 Federal trial and appellate decisions since adoption.468  No other rule comes close 
to this rule as a breeder of issues for appeals.  Part of the problem is exacerbated by the right of a 
person convicted of a federal felony to take an appeal and the necessity that the practicing bar 
faces in finding some plausible grounds for an appeal.  If the purpose of Rule 404(b) is to clarify 
and simplify the application of the uncharged misconduct rule, it has failed. If the purpose of the 
rule was to raise the consciousness of the criminal defense bar to the substantial negative effect 
of admitting uncharged misconduct evidence to prove an intermediate issue other than guilt, the 
rule appears to be a howling success.
VIII.  CONCLUSION
Judge Friendly was the only commentator who suggested that there were any major 
problems with Rule 404(b).  The problems with the rule on uncharged misconduct are not 
problems that can be solved by tweaking the current formula to improve its efficiency.  The 
problem is systemic and structural: back in 1901, Judge Werner said that the uncharged 
misconduct rule was an exception to the general rule that forbade proof of the bad character of 
the defendant in a criminal prosecution when the defendant had not made an issue out of his or 
her good character.  The Molineux opinion started the bench and bar off on a pathway that was 
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bound to end in confusion and endless complications.  Judge Werner tried to confine the 
potential damage to a simple check-list of specific exceptions to the character evidence rule 
substantiated by case law that permitted uncharged misconduct to be admitted to prove an 
intermediate issue, accepting the innuendo of the bad character of the accused as a necessary 
consequence of the obligation to prove malice, intent, plan or design, or similar exceptions.  This 
attempt was bound to fail because the necessity to prove some other issue not included in 
Werner’s list challenged the ingenuity of prosecutors and flexibility of judges.  The common-law 
growth of the number of recognized exceptions to the uncharged misconduct rule from 1901 to 
1975 shows that the rule was well on its way to being the counterpart of the hearsay rule.  Like 
the hearsay rule, the first clause of the rule was a categorical denial of admissibility followed an 
ever increasing number of exceptions deemed necessary to prove a case, and not terribly 
prejudicial to the rights of the accused to a fair trial.  No one seems to have thought that this was 
absurd.  No one seems to think that 26 years’ experience with the Federal Rules of Evidence that 
froze the uncharged misconduct rule into a form that invited testing its limits, a rule that was 
cited in more than 5,000 cases, was absurd.
One of the definitions of insanity is to repeatedly try the same actions over and over again 
with the expectation that the results will be different the next time.  Rule 404(b) and its 
companion character evidence rules are unworkable, absurd and do not reflect the actual practice 
in Federal criminal prosecutions.  Only lawyers would tolerate such a mess.  Of course, the best 
defenders of the status quo will quickly point out that competent trial lawyers and competent 
judges thoroughly understand the present rules, and any attempt to revise the character evidence 
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rules would be fraught with unanticipated concerns about prejudice, violation of the presumption 
of innocence and burden of proof rules, etc.
The plain truth is that bad character evidence in the form of prior bad acts of the accused are 
generally admissible, unless the probative value of the prior bad acts of the accused is 
substantially outweighed by “unfair prejudice” and the usual issues of judicial economy. Once 
prior bad acts of the accused are introduced in evidence and handed over to the jury to use, the 
realistic prosecutor, defense counsel and trial judge know that the jury will use that bad character 
evidence to reason that the accused is a person of bad character or predisposition, and ought to be 
convicted of the present offense because of the prior history of the accused.  The usual limiting 
instruction certainly makes the cold-type record look better to a reviewing court, but the efficacy 
of such an instruction has been questioned by professors and judges for decades.  It is another 
example of repeating the same act and expecting different results.
It’s time to admit that in the real world of the criminal prosecutions, the prosecutor will be 
able to prove relevant specific instances of the accused’s uncharged misconduct by employing 
the “magic words” vocabulary of Rule 404(b) that frame some intermediate issue in the case, 
unless the trial judge believes that the probative value of other uncharged misconduct is 
substantially outweighed by prejudice to the accused, waste of time or confusion of the jury.  By 
dispensing with the magic words approach, the rule becomes honest rather than dishonest, sane 
rather than perpetuating insanity.  Evidence that shows the accused committed other uncharged 
misconduct is normally admissible unless the evidence is irrelevant, or in the discretion of the 
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trial judge, the uncharged misconduct evidence has low probative value, high prejudice, or would 
tend to confuse the jury waste time or confuse the issues in the case. That is precisely the kind of 
synthetic rule that Judge Friendly believed to be the current federal standard in 1973.  
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on the patient’s ability to breath.  It also produces myocarditis (infection of the membrane 
surrounding the heart that can lead to circulatory collapse and heart failure.  Malini K. Sing, 
M.D. and Phillip Z. Saba, M.D., Diptheria, EMedicine, http://www.e.medicine.com/emerg/topic
138.htm. 28 Sep. 2002.
39.  The ancient term for c. diptheria baccili. Id.
40.  Carey, 76; Testimony of Dr. H. Beaman Douglass, Samuel Klaus, ed., THE MOLINEUX 
CASE, 326 (1929). According to the testimony of Dr. Douglass, Barnet told him that he had taken 
Kutnow Powder the morning he became ill.  Id. at 326.
41.  Testimony of Guy Ellison,  Klaus, 296 . See also N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1900, at 2.
42.  Carey, 91.
43.  Id.
44.  Dr. Douglass continued to insist that Barnet died from complications of diptheria at the 
Coroner’s Inquest and at Molineux’ trial.  See Samuel Klaus, THE MOLINEUX TRIAL at 211.
45.  Id. at 71-72.
46. Id. at 74.
47.   N.Y. TIMES, 14 Nov. 1897 at 3.
48.  See N.Y. Journal 1897  
49.  Testimony of Roland B. Molinuex at the inquest into the death of Mrs. Katherine Adams 
held 10 February 1899, Klaus at 346.
50. Letter of Roland Molineux to “My Dear Adams” dated Dec. 24, 1897, reprinted in N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 7, 1899 at 2.
51.  Testimony of C.C. Hughes, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1900, at 2.
52.  Testimony of Roland Molineux at Coroner’s Inquest, 10 Feb. 1899, Klaus, 355.
53.  Klaus, 10.
54.   Id.
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55.  N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1898, at 1.  See also Carey at (fac-simili of package address).
56.  Id.
57.  Id.
58.  Carey,  72-73.
59.  Testimony of Dr. E. F. Hitchcock, New York Times, Dec. 6 1899 at 2.
60.  Carey, 70.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63.  Testimony of Dr. Albert T. Weston, New York Times, Jan. 3, 1900 at 2.
64.  Carey, 74.
65.  Id. a 79.
66.  Carey, 70-71.
67.  Id. at 72.
68.  Id. at 76-77.
69.  Prussic acid or hydrocyanic acid (HCN) is an organic compound naturally occurring in 
sorghum plants exposed to early frosts.  It is a major cause of toxic death of livestock in the 
Midwest.  See, e.g., University of Nebraska Farm Extension web-page http:// www.ianr.unl.edu/ 
Pubs/range/g775.htm, 10 Sep 2002.  According to the on line Oxford University Press, A 
DICTIONARY OF SCIENCE,  hydrogen cyanide (hydrocyanic acid; prussic acid) is:
A colourless liquid or gas, HCN, with a characteristic odour of almonds; r.d. 0.699 (liquid at 
22°C); m.p. -14°C; b.p. 26°C. It is an extremely poisonous substance formed by the action of 
acids on metal cyanides. Industrially, it is made by catalytic oxidation of ammonia and methane 
with air and is used in producing acrylate plastics. Hydrogen cyanide is a weak acid (Ka = 2.1 x 
10-9 mol dm-3). With organic carbonyl compounds it forms cyanohydrins.  Xrefer, http://www. 
xrefer.com/entry/489049, 10 Sep. 2002.
70.  The effect of hydrocyanic poisoning on human victims is well documented.  According to 
L.S. Goodman, L.S., and A. Gilman eds,  The Pharmacological Basis of Therapeutics, 904 (5th 
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ed. 1975) SYMPTOMS OF ... POISONING APPEAR WITHIN ... SECONDS TO MIN AFTER 
INGESTION OR BREATHING VAPORS ... THEY CONSIST OF GIDDINESS, 
HYPERPNEA, HEADACHE, PALPITATION CYANOSIS, & UNCONSCIOUSNESS. 
ASPHYXIAL CONVULSIONS MAY PRECEDE DEATH.  According to R.E.Gosselin, R.P. 
Smith, & H.C. Hodge, 3 CLINICAL TOXICOLOGY OF COMMERCIAL PRODUCTS, III-126 ( 5th ed., 
1984) the symptomatology includes:
1. Massive doses may produce, without warning, sudden loss of consciousness and prompt death 
from respiratory arrest. With smaller but still lethal doses, the illness may be prolonged for 1 or 
more hours. 2. Upon ingestion, a bitter, acrid, burning taste is sometimes noted, followed by a 
feeling of constriction or numbness in the throat. Salivation, nausea and vomiting are not unusual 
... 3. Anxiety, confusion, vertigo, giddiness, and often a sensation of stiffness in the lower jaw. 4. 
Hyperpnea and dyspnea. Respirations become very rapid and then slow and irregular. Inspiration 
is characteristically short while expiration is greatly prolonged. 5. The odor of bitter almonds 
may be noted on the breath or vomitus ... 6. In the early phases of poisoning, an increase in 
vasoconstrictor tone causes a rise in blood pressure and reflex slowing of the heart rate. 
Thereafter the pulse becomes rapid, weak, and sometimes irregular ... A bright pink coloration of 
the skin due to high concentrations of oxyhemoglobin in the venous return may be confused with 
that of carbon monoxide poisoning.  7. Unconsciousness, followed promptly by violent 
convulsions, epileptiform or tonic, sometimes localized but usually generalized. Opisthotonos 
and trismus may develop. Involuntary micturition and defecation occur. 8. Paralysis follows the 
convulsive stage. The skin is covered with sweat. The eyeballs protrude, and the pupils are 
dilated and unreactive. The mouth is covered with foam, which is sometimes bloodstained ... The 
skin color may be brick red. Cyanosis is not prominent in spite of weak and irregular gasping. In 
the unconscious patient, bradycardia and the absence of cyanosis may be key diagnostic signs. 9. 
Death from respiratory arrest. As long as the heart beat continues, prompt and vigorous treatment 
offers some promise of survival. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, AMBIENT WATER 
QUALITY CRITERIA DOC: CYANIDES, C-17 (1980 EPA 440/5-80-037) states that:  Two signs 
associated with cyanide poisoning in man: ... (1) the failure to utilize molecular oxygen in 
peripheral tissues results in abnormally high concn of oxyhemoglobin in the venous return, 
which accounts for a flush or brick-red skin; And (2) attempts to compensate for the inhibition of 
oxidative metabolism leads to increased demands on glycolysis, which accounts for a metabolic 
(lactic) acidosis. 
71.  N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1898 at 1.
72.  Id. at 77-78.
73.  Carey at 81-82.  Farrell told the same story at Molineux’ trial. See Klaus, 213.
74.  Klaus, 6.  The New York World headline for 30 December 1898 announced that H.C. Barnet 
had been killed by poisoning six weeks earler after taking some patent medicine sent through the 
mail.  The World headline for 1 January stated “Evidence Grows that Degenerate Was Poisoner--
Had Lost Friends, Position, Home, and Been Divorced.”  
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75.  Id. at 7.
76.  Carey at 84.
77.  Id. at 78-79.
78.  On  January 29, 1899, Heckmann went to the Sinclair House with a World reporter to  
identify Roland Molineux as “Barnet” but Heckman did not get a good look at Molineux and was 
unable to make a positive identification.  The New York World stringer then took Heckman to 
Newark to see if Heckman could identify Molineux as “Barnet.” Heckman made the 
identification and collected his initial fee. Klaus, 302-05 (Testimony of Nicholas W. Heckman).
79.  Id. at 9.
80.  Id. at 289-91 (Testimony of Joseph J. Koch).
81. N.Y. TIMES, 10 Feb. 1899, at 3.
82.  Id., 11 Feb. 1899, at 2.
83.  The full transcript of Molineux’ statement to Coroner Hart is printed in Klaus, 338-58.
84.  N.Y. TIMES, 11 Feb. 1899, at 1.
85.  Klaus, 16.
86.  Id. at 17.
87.  Klaus at 17.
88.  Id.
89.  Id. at 19.
90.  Id. at 20.
91.  Pejsa, 175.
92.  N.Y. TIMES, 6 Jul. 1899 at 2.
93.    The list of witnesses endorsed on the back of the indictment is very revealing: Osborne 
called handwriting experts David Carvalho (retained by the defendant); W. J. Kinsley ( a leading 
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prosecution witness) , and Dr. Percifor (mis-spelled “Percival”) Frazer (a Philadelphia 
questioned documents examiner with 20 years’ experience).  He called Prof. Rudolph Witthaus, 
a chemist, Dr. Hitchcock who attended Mrs. Adams and Dr. Weston, the Manhattan Medical 
examiner. His lay witnesses included Harry Cornish, Police Detective McCafferty, and Frederick 
A. Baker. The indictment did not include a count naming Molineux as the murderer of Henry C. 
Barnet.  N.Y. TIMES, 21 Jul. 1899 at 12.
94.  Weeks moved to inspect the grand jury minutes for procedural errors, citing the statement of 
David Carvalho, a handwriting expert, that he had not been asked to identify Molineux as the 
person who wrote the “Cornish” and “Barnet” letters and addressed the poison package, even 
though he was a “defense witness.”  Judge Blanchard of the Court of General Sessions denied 
the motion. N.Y. TIMES, 26 July 1899 at 4  ;2 Aug. 1899 at 2.






101.  Klaus, 178-79.
102.  Id. at 179-80.
103.  Id. at 181.
104.  Id.
105.  Id. at 181-82.
106.  Id. at 198.
107.  Id.
108. Id. at 198-199.
109.  Id. at 199-200.
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110.  Id. at 213-14.
111.   Adams authenticated a letter from Roland Molineux to the Chair of the House Committee 
outlining Molneux’ complaints against Harry Cornish for ungentlemanly behavior, produced 
from the club’s files. Id. at 143-45
112.  Hall worked for Dr. Fowler’s patent medicine company.  He authenticated a letter taken 
from the company’s files purchased from a Detroit firm written by Molineux soliciting remedies 
for impotence. Id. at 87-88.
113.  Evans authenticated a letter and envlope addressed to Dr. Burns from the defendant asking 
for a remedy for impotence. Id. at 190-92.
114.   Bustanaboy authenticated purchase orders and other club correspondence in Molineux’ 
handwriting.  Id. at 197.  He was recalled to authenticate additional purchase orders in Molineux’ 
hand several days later.  See id. at 284.
115.  Scheffler  authenticated letter from Molineux to his wife declining to come to tea and 
informing them he was getting married.  Id. at 220-21.
116. Id. at 185-86.
117.  Id. at 89.  The Exhibit were Peoples’ Exhibit D, E and G.  Exhibit D was the spurious 
request for a reference for Alvin Harpster initiated by Molineux but signed “H. Cornish;” E and 
G were patent medicine requests from “H Cornish” 1620 Broadway.
118. N. Y. TIMES, 12 Dec. 1899, at 2.
119.  Id. The New York Tribune gives a different version of this story: according to the Tribune,
Melando denied every getting any letters from Molineux, but she had obtained a sample of his 
handwriting on a company order blank that she took with her to Mr. Weeks’ office.  The order 
was to buy Mamie a new dress on the company’s expense account.  N. Y. TRIBUNE, 12 Dec. 
1899, at 3.
120.  N. Y. TIMES, 29 Dec. 1899, at 1.
121.  Molienux Trial, 148.  Cornish also authenticated six examples of his own handwriting as 
basis for later exeprt opinion (Exhibits 20-25) and denied writing to patent medicine companies 
for samples on blue paper with a crest.
122.  Id. at 150.
123.  Id. at 151-52.
126
124.  Id. at 152.
125.  Id. at 156.
126.  Id. at 157-58.
127.  N. Y. TIMES, 30 Dec. 1899, at 1.
128.  Klaus, 160.  Weeks asked Cornish if he was the reason that Mr. and Mrs. Rodgers had 
separated.  The Prosecution’s objection was sustained, but the insinuation was put before the 
jury. Since the question was patently improper, Weeks would have violated today’s standards of 
professional conduct by deliberately insinuating inadmissible evidence into the trial.  See Model 
Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3.
129.  See Klaus, 161-69.  Weeks even put Cornish through an in-court demonstration with two 
water tumblers showing how he mixed the inadvertently fatal dose of Bromo Seltzer for Mrs. 
Adams.  According to the New York Times , Weeks asked Cornish if he had run from the Adams 
apartment in his pajames.  Cornish insisted he was fully dressed.  What that controversy could 
have done for Molineux is absolutely lost on the author.  N. Y. TIMES, 3 Jan. 1900, at 2.
130.  Klaus, at 168-69.  Cornish also admitted owning a white alpine had with a black band, but 
denied wearing it any any time in 1898.  Cornish was recalled several days later to answer a 
question about the composition of the potion mixed in the water tumbler. Id. at 169-72.
131.  Id. at 169-72.
132.  Id. at 261.  Henry W. Wotherspoon, Jr., who was present at the time, corroborated King’s 
story.   Id. at 193-94. George A. Salmon,   Id. at 192,  and Cornish’s assistant, Patrick Fineran 
also witnessed the arrival of the package on Christmas eve and its opening.  Fineran 
authenticated the writing on the package wrapper.  Id. at 171-173.
133.   Id. at 241.  Howard A. Adams, Mrs. Rodgers’ brother, worked for his cousin Louis 
Cornish in New York City.  At the time of his mother’s death, he was laid up with a broken leg 
in Connecticut. He recited the family relationship with Harry Cornish, who was a first cousin to 
Adams, his sister and to Louis Cornish.  He said his mother never drank.  He confirmed his 
sister’s story about the peregrinations of the Adams family from 1897 until the events of the 28th
of December.  Id. at 221-23.
134.  Id.
135.  Id. at 183.
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136.  Id. at 184.   Yokum added his own personal knowledge that cyanide of mercury can be 
readily manufactured by boiling Prussian blue which breaks down into its components, and 
adding to the mix a source of mercury such as Queen’s yellow.
137.  Id. at  209-10.
138.  Id. at 196-97.
139.  Id. at 70-72.
140.  Id. at 73.
141.  Klaus, 295.
142.  Id. at 288-89.
143.  The Journal gave Koch $500 for his story and the World offered Koch an additional $250 
for his identification of the man in which white Alpine hat.  Id. at 299. 
144.  Id. at 301.
145.  By the time of the trial Ms. Miller had left her stenography and sales job at Hartdegen’s 
Jewelry Store and was working as a stenographer for Fidelity & Casualty Ins. Co.  Id. at 244.
146.  Id. at 245.
147.  Id. at 250, 252.   The New York Times reported Miller’s testimony in detail on 11 January 
1900.  Miller told Osborne that she was not sure she could recognize the buyer if she saw him 
again.  She admitted getting $100 from a New York newspaper for her personal story in 
February, 1899.  N. Y. TIMES, 11 Jan. 1900 at. 2.
148.  Id. at 263-66.
149.   Herrman authenticated photos of his plant and also admitted that Robert Zeller was his 
employee and would come into New York City to get the payroll, but had not made the trip in 
the seven months prior to trial.  Osbborne had charged that Weeks had somehow found a way to 
keep Zeller from being served with summons as a witness in the case by keeping him on the west 
bank of the Hudson.  Id. at 230-32.
150.  Id. at 131-34.
151.  It would take a very conservative view of Fed R. Evid 803(4) (statement made for purposes 
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of medical treatment) to exclude Barnet’s statement.  Barnet’s disclosure that he became ill after 
taking the Kutnow Powder for an upset stomach was pertinent to both diagnosis and treatment.  
Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirpatrick, EVIDENCE § 8.41.  Modern case law supports 
admissibility of  statements made to physicians about the cause of illness See, e.g., O'Gee v. 
Dobbs Houses, Inc., 570 F.2d 1084, 1089 (2d Cir. 1978) (rule 803(4)  permits admission of 
plaintiff’s symptoms given to her physician about her condition and its origin so long as it was 
relied upon) ;  Britt v. Corperacion Peruana de Vapores, 506 F.2d 927, 930-31  (5th Cir. 
1975).(cause of back injury). 
152.   See, e.g., Davidson v.  Cornell 30 N.E. 573, 576 (1892) where the court said:
It was, however, held in Hagenlocher v. C. I. & B. R. R. Co. (99 N. Y. 136), that the evidence of 
a non-medical witness that the plaintiff (who had received an injury) manifested pain by 
screaming, was held competent because it was apparently involuntary and corroborated by what 
appeared to be her condition. “The rule of admissibility of statements made to physicians by 
persons who have been physically injured, or are suffering from disease, is not an unqualified 
one. They must relate to present and not past pain and suffering. ( Towle v. Blake, 48 N. H. 92.) 
And it has been held that their declarations, after controversy had arisen, made at a medical 
examination then had for the purpose of preparing evidence, and not for medical treatment, were 
incompetent. ( Grand Rapids & Ind. R. R. Co. v. Huntley, 38 Mich. 537; Jones v. Prest., etc., of 
Portland, 50 N. W. R. 731.) In Matteson v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co. (35 N. Y. 487), it was held that 
expressions of pain and suffering made by the injured person to physicians when they were 
examining him were competent evidence notwithstanding the examination was made by them 
with a view to testifying as to the result of it in a suit then pending. The same was said in Kent v. 
Town of Lincoln (32 Vt. 591). It may be seen that when attended by a physician for the purpose 
of treatment there is a strong inducement for the patient to speak truly of his pains and sufferings 
while it may be otherwise when medically examined for the  purpose of creating evidence in his 
own behalf. It is, therefore, that the weight of judicial authority is to the effect that the statements 
expressive of their present condition are permitted to be given as evidence only when made to a 
physician for the purposes of treatment by him. ( Barber v. Merriam, 11 Allen, 322; Fay v. 
Harlan, 128 Mass. 244; Roche v. Brooklyn City, etc., R. R. Co., 105 N. Y. 294.) 
153. Klaus, at 176-177.
154.  Id. at 139-43.
155.  Id. at 330.
156.  Id. at 331-33.
157.  Id. at 273.  The New York Times report of the evidence is better than the official transcript:
After Recorder Goff admitted the glass and spoon into evidence, Witthaus gave his quantative 
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analysis of the contents of the glass and spoon.  He found both mercury and cyanide of mercury. 
(38.28 grains 74% mercury and 93.37% mercuric cyanide).  “‘From these results, can there be 
any doubt that there was cyanide of mercury in the glass’ asked Mr. Osborne.
“None whatever” was the reply.’  N.Y. TIMES, 13 Jan. 1900 at 4.
158.  Klaus at 339.  The New York Times reprinted Molineux’ testimony at the coroner’s inquest. 
The Tribune paid little attention to Molineux’ evidence.
159.  Id. at 333-34.  “Athletic members” were usually not from the same social strata as regular 
members.  They paid no dues and were chosen because they added skill and strength to club 
teams.
160.  Klaus at 343-45.  Molineux also talked to Mr. Ballantine the owner of the building and the 
patron of the club about Cornish. Molineux admitted saying the Cornish could do more harm to 
the club in a minute than Molineux could do good in a year.
161.  Id. at 346.
162.  Id. at 347.
163.  Id.  at 348.  
164.   Molineux said he was inclined to strike Cornish, which would have been the manly thing 
to do according to the peculiar bushido of upper class white men in the 1890's.  Instead he 
checked his temper.  Osborne insinuated that Molineux was a coward, but Molineux shrugged 
off Osborne’s leading questions.   Id. at 355
165.  Id. at 210.
166.  Id. at 215-17.
167.   Id. at 188-90.
168.   Id. at  222-25.
169.  Exibit I appears at id. 200-01.
170.  Id. at 218-19.
171.   Id. at 274-75.  Goodwin volunteered that he knew Mrs. Molineux and her mother 
personally.  “Phthisis” means a wasting disease in general, and was often applied to cases of 
tuberculosis, the meaning that it has in the case of Molinuex’ grandmother’s death.  World Book 
Medical Encyclopedia,http://www.rush.edu/worldbook/articles/016000a/016000165.html, 4 Dec. 
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2002
172.  Id. at 282.
173.  Id. at 112.
174.  Id. at 315-16.
175.  Id. at 312.
176.  Id. at 312-14.
177.  Id. at 315.
178.   Id. at 277-79.  According to Green, Molineux lived with Blanche at 251 W. 75th St,  Mrs. 
Bell’s apartment from November, 1897 to May, 1898.
179.  Id. at 302-03.
180.  Id. at 303-04.
181.  N. Y. TRIBUNE, 18 Jan. 1900, at 4.
182.  Klaus, 308-11.
183.  Id. at  203. 
184.  Id. at 204.
185.  Id. at 322-24.
186.  Id. at 326-27.
187.  N. Y. TRIBUNE, 23 Dec. 1899, at 4.
188.  Id. at 327-28.
189.  Id. at 329.
190.  Id.
191.  Id. at 206.
192.  Id. at 207-08.
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193.  Id. at 266-67.  Osborne’s representation was as follows:
Well, there are two reasons [for admission] and there is one of them which I will now urge upon 
the Court at present. The first one, and the simple one, is that we start with Barnet’s death, and 
we show that there were certain symptoms of cyanide of mercury produced on Barnet; or, rather, 
we show that he had certain symptoms.  We did not know what produced them at the time.  None  
of the doctors knew; because if they had known, Barnet now would not be in his grave.  But 
evidently they did not know what the symptoms were. . .  Now, it has been proved here by 
doctors that Cornish had identically the same symptoms that Barnet had.  It is proved here that a 
part of the substance that Cornish took, Mrs. Adams took.  Now, then, if I show that Barnet had 
taken cyanide of mercury, I prove that Mrs. Adams took cyanide of mercury. Just exactly on the 
principles that Dr. Witthaus, in the case of Buchanan, that I remember so well, proved that a part 
of the contents taken from Mrs. Adams body--Mrs. Buchanan’s body, was tried on a frog, and 
produced symptoms of poisoning in this frog.  Now, he did that for the purpose of showing what 
effect it had upon the animal or reptile. And now in many cases before the courts, the courts have 
allowed evidence of a similar character.”  Id.
194. He was in the estimation of the N. Y. TIMES, a very terrible witness whose mumblings were 
next to inaudible.  The Times reporter said that:
Dr. Witthaus’ testimony was, to the lay mind, the most uninteresting testimony of the whole trial.  
He talked of rare chemicals and infinitesimal tests in technical phrases of great length, and he 
kept this up for hours at such a rate that it was impossible for the official stenographer to follow 
him at times. . . At times, Dr. Witthaus’s enunciations was of such a character that his words 
could not be distinguished at a distance of ten feet.  He talked without opening his mouth and a 
great volume of sound that he emits is lost in his long drooping moustache. N. Y. TIMES, 12 jan. 
1900, at 4.
195.  Klaus, 268-69.
196.   Id.  at 318-20.  
197.  Id. at 217-18.
198.  See, e.g., testimony of Herbert K. Twitchell, paying teller Chase Nat’l Bank, id. at 227; 
David C. Decker, paying teller Union National Bank,  id. at 227-28;   Alfred Graham, paying 
teller Bank of North America, id. at 235; Augustus F. Martin, paying teller Essex County Nat’l 
Bank of Newark, id. at 239-40); John C. Emory, paying teller Seaboard Natl Bank, id. at 257; 
Charles H. Wessels, paying teller Chemical National Bank, id. at 257
199.  Osborne used a very complicated system for numbering his handwriting exhibits.  The 
“Barnet series” consisted of Exhibit B, an order for Dr. Rudolphe’s specific for impotence, 
received on 1 Jun. 1989, B<2>, the envelope in which B was enclosed, C a letter to Marston 
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Remedy C. dated 31 May 1898, F a letter to Cameron & Co dated 1 Jun. 1898 asking for “Book” 
and Exhibit J the envelope in which F was received, H a letter to Marston & Co received 6 Jun. 
1898 requesting a marriage manual, K the envelope in which it was mailed; Exhibit I was the 
“diagnsis blank” sent by Marston to “H. Barnet” at the private letter box address and returned to 
Martson & Co. on 5 or 6 Jun. 1898 with the blanks filled in by “Barnet.”  Exhibit M was a letter 
to Von Mohl & Co. on 1 Jun. 1898, N was the envelope for M; O was a letter to Sterling remedy 
Co received 7 Jun. 1898, asking for “Book.” P was a letter to G. B. Wright, Marshall Michigan, 
asking for a prescription and R was its envelope.   Osborne had a second series of documents in 
handwriting marked 58, 61, 62 and 63 in his” prime series.” These four documents were letters 
found in Box 217 at Heckman’s private letter service by the police in 1899.  Three came from 
the Von Mohl Co., the fourth from Dr. Fowler of Moodus, CT. People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286, 
291 (N.Y. 1901)
200.  Osborne’s Exhibit A was the address on the poison package sent to Cornish on 23 Dec. 
1898; Exhibit D was a letter signed “H. Cornish” addressed to Frederick Stearns & Co. Detroit, 
MI received 24 Dec. 1898, feigning that Alvin Harpster had applied for a position as a bill 
collector and requesting a reference, Exhibit E was a letter sent to Kutnow Bros. requesting a 
sample of Kutnow Powder dated 22 Dec. 1898; Exhibit G was a letter signed by “H. Cornish” 
and send to the Von Mohl Co. requesting 5 days trial of their impotence remedy, Calthos, 
(undated).   Exhibits D, E and G were written on blue paper with a crest of three interlaced 
feathers.  Turning to Osborne’s prime series,  Exhibit 2 in the prime series was a genuine letter 
written by Roland Molineux on the same typoe of blue paper with a tri-feathered crest.
201.  Id. at 83-84.
202.  N.Y. TIMES, 8 Dec. 1899 at 1;  N.Y. TRIBUNE, 8 Dec. 1899 at 4.
203.  Klaus,  87;  N. Y. TIMES , 8 Dec. 1899 at 2.
204.   In 1910,  Osborn published QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS, a treatise that has the stature of 
Wigmore on Evidence among graphologists.  In fact, Dean Wigmore recognized the importance 
of QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS and wrote the introduction to the original edition.  See Albert S. 
Osborn, QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS, vii-viii  (2d ed. 1929).  Osborne’s treatise still forms the 
basic structure of modern works on graphology.  See, e.g. Hanna F. Sulner, DISPUTED 
DOCUMENTS (1966).
205.  Osborn started an informal exchange of technical information with other questioned 
document examiners in 1913.  These informal annual meetings of specialists grew into the 
American Society of Questioned Document Examiners.  Osborneand Tyrrell  were founding 
members.  Osborne was the first president of the Society, Tyrrell was its first treasurer. American 
Society of Questioned Document Examiners webpage, http://www.asqde.org/about_history.htm.
10 Oct. 2002.
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206.  See testimony of Edward B. Hay (U.S. Treasury Department expert)  Molineux Trial at 
234-36; Persifor Fraser, id. at 236-39; Herman J. White, id. at  273; William L. Hagen (opposed 
Carvalho in Garfield’s case), id. at 320-21.
207.  Klaus, 353-54, 355-56, 
208.  Id. at 351-52/
209.  “The speech of Mr. Weeks was generally regarded as very strong.”  N.Y. TIMES, 8 Feb. 
1900, at 12.
210.  N.Y. TRIBUNE, 8 Feb. 1900, at 4.
211.  N.Y. TIMES, 8 Feb. 1900, at 12.
212.  Id.
213.  “There is absolutely nothing,” Mr. Weeks contended, ‘to connect the defendant with the 
poison package except this expert evidence.  And you have read how a great Republic was torn 
asunder and how a man spent five years on Devil’s Island because of a mistake made by 
handwriting experts’.”  N.Y. TRIBUNE, 7 Feb. 1900, at 4.
214.  Id.
215. 
Then Mr. Osborne passed on to the question of motive as it applied to the Barnet case he 
asserted that relations which existed between the defendant and Miss Chesebrough before 
married were severed, and that the woman moving to another house, received the visits of 
Barnet. This supplanting in the affections of Miss Chesebrough, the prosecuting officer 
contended, supplied adequate motive for a wish on the part of Molineux to take Barnet’s life. 
And, he added, if he could supply the motive in the case of Barnet, it would apply with equal 
force in the case of Cornish, although he did not explain why the two motives should be 
naturally coincident.”  N.Y. TRIBUNE, 10 Feb. 1900, at 4.
216.  Id.
217.   N.Y. TIMES, 11 Feb. 1900, at 1.
218. 1  Sir James F. Stephen, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND, 368, 371 (1883).
219.  Id. at 219, 325-26.
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220.   Stephen noted that:” Nevertheless, after making every allowance on these points, it must 
be remarked that from the year 1640 downwards, the whole spirit and temper of the criminal 
courts. . . appears to have been radically changed from what it had been in the preceding century 
down to what it is in our own days. In every case the accused had witnesses against him 
produced face to face, in some cases, the prisoner was questioned, bit the prisoner refused to 
answer. The prisoner was allowed to cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses of his own, 
but whether they were examined under oath I am unable to say.” Stephen notes that these 
changes in criminal trial procedure occurred without legislative intervention. Id. at 358
221.   Raleigh’s accusers consisted of Cobham and a pilot who allegedly overheard Raleigh and 
another threaten to cut King James' throat before he assumed the throne.  Lord Coke cut off 
Raleigh’s demand to be confronted by Cobham and the pilot.  Raleigh claimed the right of the 
accused to be confronted with his accusers in open court based on stat 1 Edw. VI, c. 12; § 22 and 
5 &6 Edw. VI, c. 11.§ . 11) which guaranteed such a right founded on common law.  Coke said 
the law had been abrogated. Id. at 333.
222.  Id. at 341.
223.  Id. at. 341.  For an excellent discussion of the difference in evidentiary barriers between the 
Continental and the Anglo-American criminal justice systems, see Mirjan Damaška, Evidentiary 
Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 131 U. 
PA.  L. REV. 506 (1973).
224.  Id. at 368
225.  Julius Stone concedes that a general exclusionary rule barring evidence of other uncharged 
misconduct did not exist in the 18th century. See Julius Stone, Exclusion of Similar Fact 
Evidence: England, 46 HARV. L. REV.  954, 958 (1933).
226.  7 Will. III, ch. 3 (1695).
227.  John Foster, CROWN LAW 2 46 (1762).
228.  Id..
229. See, e.g., Rex v. Davidson, 31 St. Tr. 99 (1809); Rex v. O’Connor, 27 St. Tr. 31 (1798); 
Rex v. Turner, 6 St. Tr. 565 (1664).
230.   2 Joseph Chitty, A PRACTICAL TREATISES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW, 621 (right to cross-
examine prosecution witnesses), 624( rules for defense witnesses same as those for prosecution), 
627 (use of defense character witnesses) London , 1816; Garland Publ. Co. ed. New York, 1978).
231. 25 St. Tr. 1, 27 (1794).
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232. See, e.g.,  Rex v. Ball, 170 Eng. Rep. 973 (K.B. 1808).
233.  170 Eng. Rep. 95 (1791).
234.  Rex v. Neville, 170 En g. Rep. 102 (1791).
235.  Rex v. Wiley, 168 Eng. Rep. 589 (1804); Rex v. Hough, 168 Eng. Rep. 714 (1800).
236..  Quincy, 91 (Mass. 1763).
237.  Id.
238.   See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rodes, 31 Ky. 595 (1833) (clerk of court removed for making 
out fraudulent marriage licenses and bribery; reputational evidence of clerk’s good moral 
character admitted, but deemed not decisive).
239.  The earliest reported decision on character evidence, United States v. Carrigo, Fed. Cas. 
No. 14,735. 25 F. Cas. 310 (C.C. D.C. 1802) is a two line summary holding states the general 
rule in accurate modern form:
THE COURT refused to permit the attorney for the United States to bring evidence of the 
general  bad character of the prisoner,  unless the  prisoner  should first being evidence in 
support of his general character.
240.   See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sackett, 22 Pick. (39 Mass.) 394,395 (1839) (defendant put 
character at issue, prosecution could prove it was not good); People v. White, 22 Wend. 167,177 
(N.Y. Supr. 1839)(approving trial judge’s comment to jury that a doubtful case should be turned 
in favor of the prisoner by proof of good character or virtuous life, but that the present case 
wanted both); State v. Lipsey, 14 N.C. 485,490-91 (1832)(error to instruct jury that defendant’s 
character was not to be considered unless there was a doubt defendant killed the victim).
241. See, e.g., State v. Merrill, 13 N.C. 269, 277-78 (1829) (error to permit proof of accused’s 
bad temper when accused did not put character at issue).   The early treatise writers summed up 
the law of good and bad character much as their English predecessors had.  For example, Prof. 
Greenleaf, originally writing in 1842 said:
The prosecution in a criminal case is not allowed to resort to the accused’s bad character as a 
basis of inference to his guilt; the reason being that such evidence is too likely to move the jury 
to condemnation irrespective of his actual guilt of the offence charged.  But the accused himself 
may always invoke his good character as tending to disprove his commission of the offence, no 
matter what the grade of the offence, and no matter how strong the evidence against him.  
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Moreover, if the accused has offered his good character, the prosecution may in reply introduce 
his bad character; not so much by way of exception to the rule above mentioned as in order to 
prevent the accused from imposing upon the tribunal by false evidence of good character. 1 
Simon Greenleaf, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 14b(1) (16th ed. 1899)
242.  14 Wend, 111 (N.Y. Supr. 1835).
243.  Id. 
244.  Id. at 114.
245.   Sutherland began his opinion by a citation to 1 Chitty on Criminal Law relating to 
impeaching the accused’s statement to the examining magistrate from inconsistent statements 
made at other times and places.  He ends the paragraph alluding to impeaching declarations with 
the conclusion that anything that the accused said that would amount to a confession would be 
competent to prove in any manner.  He then put the issue as whether the prosecutor could have 
proved that White had been in the State Prison in Massachusetts either by a record of conviction 
or by oral testimony of a witness.  Id. at 113.
246.  Greenleaf recognized that the character of a person charged with keeping a house of ill-
fame could be proved by the prosecution.  He cited Coldwell v. State, 17 Conn, 467, 472 (18 ) to 
support the proposition without reference to any English precedent.  Id. at § 14d. Greenleaf made 
an exception to character evidence that appeared to be one-sided: in cases involving the character 
for violent conduct of the victim of a homicide, Greenleaf noted that the defendant could 
introduce evidence of prior violent acts of the victim to justify a self-defense plea, but said 
nothing at all about attacking the character of the defendant for violent conduct. Id. at § 14b(4).
247.  See, e.g., State v. Bell, 2 Mart. 683, 702-04 (La. 1824)
248.  See, e.g., State v. De Wolf, 8 Conn. 93, 100-01 (1830) (victim’s good character for chastity 
may always be proved in a rape prosecution)
249.  See, e.g., Conway v.  State, 21 N.E. 285,  287 (1889) (state can impeach own witness’s 
character for truthfulness); State v. Woodworth, 21 N.W. 490, 491-92 (1884) (defendant may be 
impeached on bad character for truthfulness, not on general bad character); Commonwealth v. 
Hourigan, 12 S.W. 550; 552 (1889); Smith v. State, 58 Miss. 867, 874 (1881); State v. Shields,13 
Mo. 236, 238 (1850) (general character admissible to discredit witness’ testimony).
250.  See, e.g., Cornwell v. State, 8 Tenn. 147, 151-53 (1827) (acts of conspirators admissible to 
prove nature & extent of conspiracy).   Greenleaf cited State v. Smith, 44 Conn. 357 (18 ) as 
authority for admissibility of a prior bad act to justify an arrest. 1 Greenleaf § 14j.
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251.  See, e.g., State v. Williams, 2 Rich. 418, 420-21 (S.C. 1846) Knowingly passing a raised 
bank note); State v. Houston, Bailey, 300, 301-02 (S.C. 1829) (same); State v. Petty, Harper, 59, 
61 (S.C.  1824)(passing a forged note).
252.  Greenleaf has a long discussion of the problems associated with admitting other similar ba 
acts of the accused to show knowledge or criminal intent. First, he noted that; “(1)A person’s 
knowledge. . .  may be inferred from the occurrence of some circumstances that woulod naturally 
have brought the matter in question to his attention. . . . (2) In most crimes an element of the 
crime is the criminal intent, i.e.,the state of mind accompanying the act. . . .”
. . . [T]he limitations of this use are
 He identified “five sources of difficulty”asociated with the admission of such acts:
“(1) the elements of knowledge and of intent are both present in some crimes” (citing to forgery 
or uttering false representations). . . .
“(2) in applying the second principle, there is room for much difference of opinion was to the 
similarity to be required in the other acts before they are properly admissible;”
“(3) the difference between the second and third principles has not always been observed;”
(4) the problem for each sort of offence should be solved according to the particular nature of 
that offence;. . . 
(5) the fundamental rule that the character of a defendant may not be attacked by evidence of his 
past crimes or other misconduct. . .Id. at §14q.
253.  See, e.g., People v. Pool,  27 Cal. 572, 575 (1865) (evidence of robbery admitted to show 
motive for murder)
254.  30 P. 1000 (Nev. 1883)
255. Id. at 1003.
256.  See, e.g., State v.  18 Ohio 221, 222-24 (1849) (prior act of larceny of horse inadmissible to 
prove any relevant issue except bad character in later larceny of money).
257.  4 Oh. C. C. 393 (Oh. C.C. Fifth cir. 1890).
258.  Id. at 394.
259.  Joel P. Bishop, 1 NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW UPON A NEW SYSTEM OF 
LEGAL EXPOSITIONS, § 287  (8th ed. 1892).
260.  See, e.g., State v. Ransell,  41 Conn. 433, 442 (Conn. 1874).
138
261. See, e.g., State v. Acheson, 39 A. 570, 572 (Me. 1898) (evidence of three later instances 
where defendant assaulted minor victim for purposes of sexual gratification admissible to show 
intent).
262.  See, e.g., State v. Myers, 82  Mo. 558, 563-64 (1884).
263.  One’s fraudulent intent implies that he knows the pretense to be false; consequently an 
indictment omitting the word “knowingly” is, in England, held to be insufficient though it 
pursues the exact words of the Statute of 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, § 53, whereon it is drawn.  2 
Bishop § 471.
264.  As foundation for the criminal intent, without which there can be no crime, and by the 
statutory terms, the receiver must know the goods to have been stolen.  And this knowledge must 
exist at the very instant of receiving. 2 Bishop § 1138
265.  F. Cas. No. No. 1,688, 3 F. Cas. 968 (Cir Ct. D. Mass. 1840).
266.  And in all cases, where the guilt of the party depends upon the intent, purpose, or design, 
with which the act is done, or upon his guilty knowledge thereof, I understand it to be a general 
rule, that collateral facts may be examined into, in which he bore a part, for the purpose of 
establishing such guilty intent, design, purpose, or knowledge.  Thus, in a prosecution for 
uttering a bank note, or bill of exchange, or promissory note, with knowledge of its being forged, 
proof, that the prisoner had uttered other forged notes or bills, whether of the same or of a 
different kind, or that he had other forged notes or bills in his possession, is clearly admissible as 
showing, that he knew the note or bill in question to be forged. So the law is laid down in Mr. 
Phillips and Mr. Amos's excellent treatise on Evidence, in the last edition. The same doctrine is 
applied in the same work to a prosecution for uttering counterfeit money, where the fact of 
having in his possession other counterfeit money, or having uttered other counterfeit money, is 
proper proof against the prisoner to show his guilty knowledge.  I have looked into the 
authorities; and they fully support the statement of the learned writers.  King v. Wylie, 1 Bos. & 
P. [N.R.] 92, is very strong to the purpose; as are also Rex v. Ball, 1 Russ. & R. 132, and Rex v. 
Balls, 1 Moody, Crown Cas. 470, and Rex v. Hough, 1 Russ. & R. 120.  Many other cases may 
be easily put, involving the same considerations.  Thus, upon an indictment for receiving stolen 
goods, evidence is admissible that the prisoner had received, at various other times, different 
parcels of goods, which had been stolen from the same persons, in proof of the guilty knowledge 
of the prisoner.  Id. at 971.
267.  7 So. 273 (Ala. 1889).
268.  Id. at 275.
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269.  5 Day 175 (Conn. 1811).
270.  Id. at. 178.
271.   36 A. 117 (Md.. 1898).
272.    The court also admitted the other letters containing false claims of bank deposits at the 
Peoples Bank of Hagerstown to show the defendant’s plan, design or scheme to defraud other 
banks with bogus credit letters.  Id. at 36 A. 118-19.
273.   8 S.E. 698 (S.C. 1889).
274.  Id. at 8 S.E. 700.
275.   State v. Petty, Harper 59 (S.C. 1824); State v. Houston,  Bailey 300 (S.C. 1829) and State 
v. Williams, 2 Rich. 418 (S.C. 1846) previously cited at n.  supra.
276.  Id. . 
277.   Bishop, §§ 3010-02.
278.  Since the English cases recognizing this reason for offering uncharged misconduct post-
date 1776, the strength of these English decisions ‘ influence on U.S. case law was the 
Anglophiliac  attitude of some appellate courts in the mid to late 19th century.  State v. Myers 
cited six 19th century Egnlish decisions in support of admission of similar acts to prove mens rea: 
Rex v. Dossett, 2 Cox C. C. 243 (18   ) (charge of arson of a hayrick by firing a gun into the hay: 
evidence showing the accused had been standing next to a burning hay rick the day before 
holoding a gun admitted to prove mens rea over claim of accident);  Rex v. Voke, 1 Rus. & Ry. 
531 (18   ) (assault with intent to do bodily harm by shooting; defense; accident: evidence 
showing the accused had taken a shot at th victim earler the same day admitted to show mens
rea); Regina. v. Richardson, 2 F. & F. 343 (18   ) (charge embezzlement; defense accidental 
mistake in making an account: other false accounts made before and after the account in the 
indictment admitted to show lack of mistake).  Rex v. Hogg, 4 Car. & P. 364; 19 E.C.L. 420 
(Charge: poisoning a horse with sufuric accident; defense mistake: another instance when the 
accused administered poion to a horse in its feed admitted to show lack of accident) and Rex v. 
Winkworth, 4 Car. & P. 444; 19 E.C.L. 465(charge: extortion: the accused, part of a mob, 
attacked the victim’s house. The accused advised the owner to give the mob money to make 
them go away, which he did; other instances of the same extortion of money by means of 
threatened mob violence introduced to show that the accused did not give the advice as a friend); 
and Regina v. Garner, 3 Fost. & Fin. 681 (183 ) (charge: murder of accused’s mother by poison; 
defense; mistake: evidence that the accused’s former wife died from poisoning admitted to 
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negative mistake).  The Missouri court got these English decisions from 1 Greenleaf, Evidence 
§14q  53 and in 3 Russell, Crimes §§ 285, 288 and in  Ros. Cr. Ev., 86, 89.  State v. Myers at 82 
Mo. 565.
279.   3 F. Cas 968 (C.Ct. Mass. 1840).
280.  Id.  at 971.
281. 19 Conn. 233, 237 (1848).
282.  1 Cush. (55 Mass.) 189 (1848).
283.   Id. at 216-17.
284.  2 Ohio St. 54 (1853).
285.  Id. at. 61-62.
286.  The first case that recognized and dealt with the inseparable criminal act issue was Reece v. 
State,  7 Ga. 373 (1849).  The defendant was indicted for murder of Ellen Pratt. In the course of 
pursuing Pratt, Reese assaulted her father.  The court allowed evidence of the attack on Pratt’s 
father to be admitted   The court said:
     The evidence relating to the homicide describes one entire transaction. The witnesses state 
what was done by the defendant, at the time of the killing. The defendant went to the house of 
Gurganus, the father of the deceased, with whom the deceased was living, and made use of 
insulting and abusive language to the deceased. Gurganus, the father, went out to the 
defendant at the gate, and said to him, "What are you coming here interrupting us for, we 
interrupt nobody?" So soon as this remark was made, the defendant knocked Gurganus down 
with his gun, whereupon the deceased, who was standing in the piazza, ran out to her father, 
when the defendant raised his gun and shot her dead.
   The assault upon Gurganus, by the defendant, was a part of the transaction, and shows that he 
came to the house with an evil and hostile intention, against the inmates of that house; and there 
was no error by the Court below, in permitting the witnesses to state all that was done by the 
defendant, at the time of the killing, as being connected with, and a part of the entire transaction,
either exculpatory or as evidence of his innate depravity and malicious intention. After a careful 
examination of this entire record, we can find no legal ground to disturb the judgment of the 
Court below.  Id., at 375.
287.102 Ala. 144, 15 So. 278 (1893).
288. Id. at 183.
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289. See, e.g., Mason v. State, 42 Ala. 532, 537-38 (1868); People v. Bidleman, 38 P. 502, 504 
(Cal. 1894);  Killins v. State, 9 So. 711, 722 (Fla. 1891); Turner v. State, 1 N.E. 869 (Ind. 1885); 
State v. Gainor,  50 N.W. 947, 950 (1892);  State v. Folwell, 14 Kan. 105, 108 (1874); State v. 
Desroches,  19 So. 250 (La. 1896); Commonwealth v. Sturtivant,117 Mass. 122, 126 (1875);  
People v. Foley, 31 N.W. 94, 97 (Mich. 1886);  State v. Williamson, 17 S.W. 172 (Mo. 1891);  
State v. Testerman,  68 Mo. 408, 411, 413-14 (1878)1.  People v. Pallister, 33 N.E. 741, 744 
(NY, 1893); Brown v. Commonwealth, 76 Pa. 319, 327 (1874); Mask v.  State, 31 S.W. 408, 411 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1895); State v. Valwell,  29 A. 1018 (Vt. 1894 ).
.
290.  See, e.g., Killins v. State. 9 So. 711 (1891).  The court said:
The two first errors assigned are, that the court erred in permitting the witnesses William Ray 
and Nancy Powell to testify as to the fact that the defendant, after slaying Margaret Welton, 
chased, shot at and threatened to kill, and tried to kill Nancy Powell.  We do not think the court 
below erred in admitting this testimony.  The proof is, that immediately after the defendant shot 
Margaret Welton, her mother, Nancy Powell, ran out of the tent  Id. at 723.
291.  Francis Wharton, EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL ISSUES (1846).  According to the Encyclopedia 
Britannia Wharton was a renaissance man.  Wharton, a Philadelphia native born in 1820, 
graduated at 19 from Yale College and was admitted to the Pennsylvania bar in 1843.  He edited 
the North American and the United States Gazette while conducting a busy practice. In mid-life 
he switched careers and became professor of history and literature at Kenyon College, until he 
was ordained an Episcopal priest in 1863.  Wharton was a teacher at the Protestant Episcopal 
Seminary at Cambridge, Massachusetts and also lectured on law at Boston University, In 1886 
he took a job as a State Department Solicitor and lectured ion criminal law at Columbia Law 
School, the predecessor of George Washington University School of Law.  Wharton published 
treatises on more than a dozen legal topics including criminal law, evidence and criminal 
evidence.  He died in 1889. See the Memoir (Philadelphia, 1891) by his daughter, Mrs Viele, and 
several friends; and J. B. Moore's " Brief Sketch of the Life of Francis Wharton," prefaced to the 
first volume of the Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence. 
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http://23.1911encyclopedia.org/W/WH/ WHARTON_FRANCIS.  htm 28 October 2002.
292.  Simon Greenleaf, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (1842).  Greenleaf had been a 
Harvard law professor. He dedicated his first edition to Joseph Story, who was the first Dane 
Professor of Law at Harvard.  The treatise was kept in print long after his death and remained a 
reliable source for cases on evidentiary issues until Wigmore revised it into his own multi-
volume set.
293.  H. C. Underhill, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE (1898).  Underhill was a 
Brooklyn lawyer.
294. Greenleaf § 14a.
295.  Id.
296.  Id.  § 14b.




301.  Id. at § 14m-14n.
302.  Id. at § 14n. 
303.   Such questions, “Is it not true that you have served a term in the penitentiary?” or “have 
you not been arrested for felony?” – where not propounded in good faith, or asked concerning 
facts that in themselves are irrelevant, constitute reversible error, entitling the accused to a new 
trial.  And this is true, even though such questions are objected to at the time on the ground of 
irrelevancy, and the answer excluded by the court.  The reason is, the irrelevant facts have been 
placed before the jury by innuendo, the sinister influence remains, nor is it destroyed by the 
exclusion.. Wharton, § 29.
304.  Id. at § 30.
305.  Id. at § 31.
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306.  Id. at  § 33.
307.  Id. at §  35.
308.  Id. at 36.
309.  Underhill, Chapter VII.
310.  Id. §§ 77-81.  Underhill noted that “Good character should be permitted to operate as a 
positive, appropriate and substantial defense. No distinction should be made, in application and 
effect between evidence to prove facts and evidence to prove character.”  Id. at § 79. In § 80 he 
notes that good character is not conclusive on the issue of guilt, “Unless the evidence of guilt is 
so convincing that it precludes a reasonable doubt, an acquittal will be justified if the evidence of 
good character, considered in connection with all the other evidence, raises a reasonable doubt.” 
Id Good and bad character may be proved by reputation alone, Specific acts are not allowed. Id.
at § 81.
311.  Id. at § 82.
312.  Chapter VIII.
313.  Underhill § 87.
314.   If several crimes are intermixed, or blended with one another, or connected so that they 
form an indivisible criminal transaction, and a complete account of any one of them can not be 
given without showing the others, any or all of them are admissible against a defendant on trial 
for any offense which is itself a detail of the whole criminal scheme.  Id. § 88.
315.  Another exception to the rule occurs when the intention of the act is material. . . . 
[E]vidence of similar and independent crimes (but not of those which are dissimilar) is often 
relevant to show the presence of some specific intent. Id. § 89.
316.  “Where a crime has been committed by some peculiar, extraordinary and novel means, or 
in a peculiar or extraordinary manner, evidence of a similar crime committed by the accused, by 
the same means, or in the same manner, has been received.”  Id. § 91.
317.  “. . .  Under an indictment for adultery or incest evidence of the commission of similar 
crimes by the same parties prior to the offense received.  In all such cases the mutual relations 
and the disposition of the parties towards one another are relevant upon the question, did they 
have illicit intercourse?”  Id. at § 92.
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318. 61 N.E. 286 (NY 1901).
319.  This acocunt of Milburn’s career is taken from From History of Buffalo website: 
http://ah.bfn.org/h/milb/index.html(20 Dec. 2002) American Exposition: World's Fair as 
Historical Metaphor" as found in "High Hopes: The Rise and Decline of Buffalo, New York," by 
Mark Goldman. Albany: State University of New York Press,  1983;http://www.publicbookshelf. 
com/public_html/The Great Republic By the Master Historians vol IV/president gc.html (21 Dec 
2002).  The Pan American Exposition lost more than $6,000,000.  Milburn went to Washington 
in 1902 to get a Congressional bailout for the Exposition Committee’s debts since its bonds were 
worthless.  However, Congress refused to act and the Committee defaulted on its bonds.  
Milburn then accepted a position with the New York City firm of Carter & Ledyard.  A great 
trial and appellate lawyer, Milburn represented Standard Oil Co. before the U.S. Supreme Court 
in the Standard Oil anti-trust case.  Milburn was equally well-knon for his oral argument in 
Molinuex.  See Joseph S. Auerbach, THE BAR OF OTHER DAYS 271-73 (1940).
320.  People v. Molinuex, 61 N.E. 286 (1901).
321.  Molineux, 61 N.E. 688.
322.  Alton W. Parker was the Democratic presidential candidate in 1904. He was elected to the 
Court in 1897 by 60,000 votes although the State had voted Republican in the 1896 presidential 
election.  Judge Parker was a Conservative Democrat. He was a school teacher who graduated 
from Albany law School in 1873 and after a short career as a trial lawyer was elected Ulster 
County Surrogate. FRANCES BERGAN, THE HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS
1847-1932, 224 (1985).
323.  Elected in 1888 to replace Judge Rapallo, the first Italian-American to sit on the Court of 
Appeals. Id. at 124 (1985).
324.  Id.   O’Brien was a native of Ogdensburg , a former mayor of Watertown, and a member of 
the bar since 1861.  He was Attorney General under Gov. Tilden in 1884-86. He was elected to 
the Court in 1889. See also Marquis Pub. Co., ed., 1 WHO WAS WHO IN AMERICA, 1896-1942 
904 (1942) (hereafter “Who Was Who”). 
325.  Id at 225.  Judge Cullen, a Democrat and a Brooklyn native, graduated from Columbia just 
before the Civil War and served as the Colonel of the 96th  New York.  For a history of the unit 
see Frederick A. Dyer, A COMPENDIUM OF THE WAR OF THE REBELLION 1442 (Des Moines, IA. 
1908).  See After the war Cullen was admitted to the bar and became a Kings County assistant 
district attorney.  Governor Samuel J. Tilden appointed him a Brigadier General of Militia in 
1872 .  He had been elected to the Supreme Court in 1879 and was appointed as an interim judge 
of the Court of Appeals in 1900.  Cullen was a fellow-member of the Military Order of the Loyal 
Legion and probably a sure vote to reverse Gen. Molineux’s son’s conviction. Who Was Who
145
283.    Judge Werner, a Buffalo native, and a Republican, had been on the bench since 1889, first 
as a county judge in Rochester, and then a Supreme Court judge for the seventh district. Who 
Was Who 1322.  Judge Landon did not sit on the Molineux appeal and did not stand for election 
in 1902. He was a grauate of Union College and was a lecturer at Albany Law School on 
constitutional law.    Who Was Who 701.
326.  This account of Judge Parker’s political career is taken from James G. Rogers, AMERICAN 
BAR LEADERS, 140-44 (1932)
327. Judge Cullen and Judge Landis took no part in the decision.
328.  People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 272,  61 N.E. 286 (1901).
329.  Id. at 168 N.Y. 64-65.
330.  Id. at 61 N.E. 304-05.
331. Section 1. Comparison of a disputed writing, with any writing proved to the satisfaction of 
the court to be genuine, shall be permitted to be made by witneses in all trials and proceedings, 
and such writings and the evidence of witnesses respecting the same may be submitted to the 
court and jury as evidence of the genuineness, or otherwise, of the writings in dispute.  Laws, N. 
Y. 1880, ch 36, § 1.
332.  95 N.Y. 73 (1884).
333.  Id. at .
334.  Molineux, 61 N.E. 306-07.
335.  Id. at 307.
336.  Id. at 309.
337.  Id. at 310.
338.  Did you tell anybody connected with the Health Board that Barnet had received through the 
mails a package of Kutnow powder containing cyanide of mercury?  I did not.  Now Barnet had 
told you that he received this package anonymously through mails hadn’t he?  Mr. Barnet told 
me that he had received a box of Kutnow powder through the mail, purporting to be.  It was not a 
reception of the box, but that I had to account for a certain amount of mercurical stomatits, and 
for that reason I sent the box to be analyzed.  Molineux Trial, 322.
339.  Id. 
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340.  See, e.g.,  People v. Hawkins, 17 N.E. 371 (1888) (insanity defense to homicide: 
defendant’s statement of past symptoms when seen by expert physician do not prove condition at 
time referred to in statement).  There is an excellent summary of 19th century law on 
admissibility of hearsay declarations to physicians in Davdson v. Cornell, 30 N.E. 753, 576 
(1892).  Only statements referring to present pain and suffering were admissible; those relating 
to past pain and suffering were not.
341.  See, e.g., The West Chicago Street R.R. Co. v. Carr, 48 N.E. 992, (Ill. 1897) which 
contains an excellent summary of the law taken from a number jurisdictions, including New 
York.
342. A hearsay statement about the source of disease or injury is admissible only when it is 
pertinent to treatment.  See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 34 M.J. 831 (C.M.R. 1992)  (Statement 
of wife that husband battered her admissible because necessary to proper psychological treatment 
of injuries).  However, some Federal courts have admitted statements of medical history showing 
causality when not necessary to treatment, when the statement amounted to admissions of 
contributory fault.  See, e.g., Onujiogu v.  United States of America, 817 F.2d 3, 5 (1st Cir. 1987) 
(statement madse by plaintiff’s adult mother that plaintiff pulled hot water over on self admitted 
as declaration made for medical treatment)
343.  Id. at 293.
344.  55 N.Y. 81 (1873).
345.  A person cannot be convicted of one offence upon proof that he committed another, 
however persuasive in a moral point of view such evidence may be. It would be easier to believe 
a person guilty of one crime if it was known that he had committed another of a similar 
character, or, indeed, of any character; but the injustice of such a rule  in courts of justice is 
apparent. It would lead to convictions, upon the particular charge made, by proof of other acts in 
no way connected with it, and  to uniting evidence of several offences to produce conviction for 
a single one.  There are, however, some exceptions to this rule when guilty knowledge is an 
ingredient of the crime; and the question is, whether this evidence falls  within any recognized 
exception. Id. at 90-91.
346.   41 N.E. 405 (1895).
347.    Shea was a murder psoecution.  Shea was accxused of shooting another man who tried to 
keep him from voting in a local election in Troy.  Shea was a “repeater,” a person used by the 
local machine politicians to cast multiple ballots in several different precincts.  The altercation 
was the result of discovery that Shea had already voted.   The District Attorney brought in other 
instances of Shea’s “repeater” conduct to prove motive for the murder of the man who identified 
him.   The Court of Appeals said: “ Fifth. The counsel for the defendant challenge the 
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correctness of the rulings of the trial court in admitting evidence of the repeating in the presence 
and under the supervision and direction of defendant at the different polls as stated in the point 
last discussed.  Proper exceptions were taken to the decisions of the court in that regard and the 
question has been argued before us at great length.  The objection taken is that the evidence was 
immaterial and had no proper or legitimate bearing upon the issues joined for trial, and that it  
simply tended to show the defendant guilty of some other, separate and different crime from that 
for which he was indicted and then on trial and to greatly prejudice him in his defense.  The 
impropriety of giving evidence showing that the accused had been guilty of other crimes merely 
for the purpose  of thereby inferring his guilt of the crime for which he is on trial may be said
to have been assumed and consistently maintained by the English courts ever since the common 
law has itself been in existence.  Two antagonistic methods for the judicial investigation of crime 
and the conduct of criminal trials have   existed for many years.  One of these methods favors 
this kind of evidence in order that the tribunal which is engaged in the trial of the accused may 
have
the benefit of the light to be derived from a record of his whole past life, his tendencies, his 
nature, his associates, his practices, and, in fine, all the facts which go to make up the life of a 
human being.  This is the method which is pursued in France, and it is claimed that entire justice 
is more apt to be done where such course is pursued than where it is omitted.  The common
law of England, however, has adopted another and, so far as the party accused is concerned, a 
much more merciful doctrine.  By that law the criminal is  to be presumed innocent until his guilt 
is made to appear, beyond a reasonable doubt, to a jury of 12 men.  In order to prove his guilt it 
is not permitted to show his former character or to prove his guilt of other crimes, merely for the 
purpose of raising a presumption that he who would commit them would be more apt to commit 
the crime in question.   Id. at 99.  The Court of Appeals affirmed Shea’s conviction, holding that 
the evidence of his repeater conduct went to prove criminal intent.  Id. at 103.
348. Molineux, 61 N.E. 294.
349.  Molineux, 61 N.E. 294.  Werner cited Wharton on Criminal Evidence  § 48 and Underhill 
on Evidence § 58 in support of his prior and later discussion of the uncharged misconduct rule.  
Underhill was the latest published authority on the subject and Werner’s exhaustive treatment 
shows little influence from this source.  However, Wharton later re-wrote his entire section on 
unchcharged misconduct to use Molinueux as the archtype of his own presentation of the rule 
and its exceptions.
350.  Id. 
351.  Id. at 295.
352.  Id.  Judge Werner cited People v. Harris, 136 N.Y. 443 (18 ) and People v. Otto 4 N.,Y. 
Crim Rep. 149 (18   ).
353.  Id.
148
354.  Id. at 296.
355.  See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Use of Evidence of an Accused’s Uncharged 
Misconduct to Prove Mens Rea: The Doctrines Which Threaten to Engulf the Character 
Evidence Prohibition, 51 OH. ST. L. J., 577 (1990).
356.  Id.  
357.  Id.
358.  Id. at 297.
359. Id.
360.  3 Fost. U& Finl. 681 (18 ).
361.  ID.
362. 1 Cox Cr. Cas.  630 (1893). 
363.  Molineux, 61 N.E. 298.
364. Regina v. Geering, 18 L.  Mag. Cas. 215 (18 ); Regina v. Cxottonb, 12 Cox. Crim. Cas. 400 
(18 ); Regina v. Roden, 12 Cox Crim. Cas.  630 (18 ); Regina v. Higgins, 15 Cox Cr. Cas. 403 
(18  )
365.  Id. at 298-99.
366.  Id. at 299.
367. 85 Pa. 139 (1878).  Justice Woodward said: 
When the offer was made to prove the existence of the Ancient Order of Hibernians, and its 
objects and operation, the court expressed the opinion that  it was "on the very outer verge of any 
evidence" that had been given in the trials in which the character of the organization had been 
involved. It was admitted, however, so far as it related to facts existing in October 1868, but 
specific acts of others than those charged with complicity in the murder of Rea, committed either 
before or after that time, were excluded.  Was this testimony irrelevant? It was not designed to be 
used to establish the commission of any independent crime. Nor was its object to affect general 
character, or to repel inferences from adversary facts. Its purpose was to explain the relations 
existing between the conspirators, the reason, motive and  opportunity for their combined action, 
and the nature of the tie that bound them together.  Id. at 156
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368.  4 N.Y.S. 736, 737 (1897).
369.  Molineux, 61 N.E. 300.  The cases were People v. Murphy, 135 N.Y. 450 (1892 )(arson 
prosecution: two threatening letters identified by handwriting experts as in defendant’s hand 
admitted to show plan or design of arson) and Kramer v. Commonwealth, 87 Pa. 301 (1878) 
(defendant lived in hotel that had been object of arson on 23 May; on 25 May he was discovered 
trying to start another fire in the hotel; second attempt held admissible to prove plan).
370.  Id. at 301.
371.  Id.
372.  Id. at 302.
373.  71 Cal. 565 (1887).
374.  Id. at 565-68.
375.  105 Mass. 451 (1870).
376.   The jury were carefully instructed in regard to the use to be made of this box and block, to 
wit, that if the jury should be satisfied that the defendant made them, the evidence was not to be 
used to show that he made the box used at  the alleged fire, but only to show that he possessed 
the requisite skill, materials, tools and opportunity to have made it, and that this is its sole use,
unless the jury should find, in the one, such marks as show that one hand must have made both  
Id. at 457.
377.  Molineux, 61 N.E. 303.  Werner cited Hope v. People, 83 N.Y. 418 (1881) ( robbery 
prosecution for taking the keys to a bank vault.  Held: No error to admit evidence that defendant 
committed a bank burglary using the stolen key to identify him as one of the gang that 
perpetrated the robbery) and Rex v. Clewes, 4 Car. & Payne 221 (18   ) (murder prosecution: 
proof that accused murdered the man who had earlier killed a victim for hire admissible to show 
the identity of the person who paid for the murder).
378.  Id.  Judge Werner noted that the “Barnet” correspondance dealt with remedies for 
impotence and although  “Cornish” had written to Kutnow Bros. for a free sample, that occurred 
after Barnet’s death and there was no evidence showing that “Barnet” had ever written for a 
sample of Kutnow Powder.
379.  Id. at 303-04.
380.  Id. at 310.
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381.  Id.
382.    It is so difficult for the human mind to discard false theories that assume the disguise of 
truth, and so easy to substitute suspicions and speculations for evidence of facts that proof of the 
general bad character of the accused, or of participation in other crimes, which is practicallt the 
same thing, would no doubt be of great aid to the People in procuring a conviction. . . . but the 
law, for obvious reasons, does not permit it.  Id. at 311.
383.   If the defendant procured or caused the death of Barnet, he is liable to be indicted and tried 
for that offense, but it is contrary to the plainest principles of justice to require him, when 
accused of poisoning Mrs. Adams, to clear himself from all suspicion of participation in another 
cime of the same character. Id.
384.  Id. at 312.
385.  Id.  at 313.
386.  Id. at 315-16.
387.  Id. at 316.
388.  Id. at 315.
389.  Id. at 316-17.
390.   See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey,  530 U.S. 466 (2000) (held: hate-crime penalty 
enhancement unconstitutional because a separate crime that should have been charged in 
indictment);  Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999) (held: any fact other than prior 
conviction that would enhance penalty must be charged in indictment).
391.  See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,(1970) (4th Amendment requires that proof beyond 
reasonable doubt  standard apply to juvenilee adjudications); 
392.  Molineux, 61 N.E.  303.
393.  E-mail from Reference Librarian, University of Rochester dtd December, 2002.
394. Pejsa at 227.
395.  N. Y. Times, 11 Oct. 1902 at 16.
396.  Id., 18 Oct, 1902 at 16
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397.  Id., 21 Oct. 1902 at 1.
398.  Id., 22 Oct. 1902 at 1.
399.  Id.
400. Id., 23 Oct. 1902 at 1.
401.  Id.
402.  N. Y. Times, 24 Oct. 1902 at 6.
403.  Id.
404.  Id.
405.  N. Y. Times, 25 Oct. 1902 at 3.
406.  Id.  Governor Black’s cross-examination insinuated that Erhardt had come to new York 
City to help out the prosecution because the District Attorney promised to meet some young 
women; Osborne’s re-direct brought out the story that Arnold, Molineux’ friend, had told the 
witness to keep quiet about wrapping the toothpick holder shortly after Molineux was charged.
407.  N.Y. Times, 29 Oct. 1902 at 1.
408.  N.Y. Times, 30 Oct. 1902 at 2.  Justice Lambert agreed that the District Attorney’s position 
had some merit, but the California Supreme Court had construed its former testimony statute, 
adapted from the New York statute, to exclude the use of former testimony in a like proceeding. 
Lambert said he would give the benefit of the doubt to the accused.
409.  N.Y. Times, 2 Nov 1902 at 1.
410.  Id.
411.  Id. at 2.
412.  Id.
413.  Id.
414.  Q Who besides you lived at the Knickerbocker Athletic Club?
A Henry C. Barnet, Cornish, Mr. Adams, Heiles and perhaps others
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Q Where was Barnet’s room with reference to yours?
A They were on the same floor.
Q How long did you and Barnet live on the same floor?
A All the time I was there.
Q Did you keep up your acquantance with Barnet up to the time of his death?
A I did.
Q When did you last see him?
A In September, 1898.
Q Did anyone else see you two together at that time?
A No one that I know of.
Q Was your marriage sudden?
A I was engaged in September and married Nov. 20, 1898. Id.
415. Q Outside of testimony at the former trial, did you ever hear Mamie Melando state 
that she saw sixsheets of this paper in your desk?
A I did not.
* * * * *
Q Outside of evidence at the previous trial, don’t you remember Farrell comting to 





418.  N.Y. Times, 5 Nov. 1902 at 16.  Dr. Marshall D. Ewell, Warren A. Drake of Chicago and 
David N. Carvalho constituted the defense writing experts.
419.  N. Y. Times, 7 Nov. 1902 at 2.
420.  N. Y. Times, 7 Nov. 1902 at 1.
421.  Id.
422.  N. Y. Times 7 Nov. 1902 at 2.
423.  Id.




427.  N.Y. Times, 11 Nov. 1902 at 1.
428.  N.Y. Times, 12 Nov. 1902 at 1-2.
429.  Id.
430.  Id.
431.  Id. at 2.
432.  Pejsa, 10-11.
433. Id. at 11.
434.   Mrs. Roland B. Molineux left the family home yesterday morning and drove over to the 
Murray Hill Hotel where she has staid for seveal weeks past.  She gave up her room there, and 
returned to the Fort Greene Place house, where she will remain with her husband.  All 
disagreements between young Mrs. Molineux and her mother-in-law, it is said, have been settled. 
N.Y. Times, 13 Nov. 1902 at 16.
435.  N.Y. Times, 16 Nov. 1902 at 11.
436.  N.Y. Times, 18 Nov. 1902 at 1.
437.  Id.
438.  Id. See also ARTHUR A. CAREY, MEMOIRS OF A MURDER MAN, 94 (1930).
439.  Cheseborough Family History Site: http://www.chesebro.net/lana2/wga46.html (2 Sept. 
2002).
440.  The term comes from Edward J. Iminwkelried,   
441.  See, e.g., Francis Wharton, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL ISSUES, 
§31 (O. N. Hilton rev. 1912); William P. Richardson, OUTLINE OF EVIDENCE §§ 135-44 (1925).
442.  The uncharged misconduct rule did not fit Wigmore’s complex scheme of proof of fact.  
First, Wigmore broke up traditional character evidence and placed that portion which directly 
related to proof of character qua character under the heading of Prospectant Evidence: Evidence 
of the Doing of a Human Act.  He explained how reputational character evidence, as well as 
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specific acts showing a character trait help to explain future action by the actor in conformity 
with the proved character trait.  Wigmore put the uncharged misconduct rule in the classification 
of Evidence of Knowledge , Belief or Consciousness under Topic III, Evidence of Mental 
Capacity.  He did so because the relevance of uncharged misconduct evidence is not to prove a 
character trait of the actor, but to prove the mental state of an actor when that mental state was 
relevant to a claim or defense.  See John H. Wigmore, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN 
SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 51-80 (prospectant evidence & character), 
91-97 (other acts to prove knowledge, intent, etc.) (3rd ed. 1923); A POCKET CODE OF THE RULES 
OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT LAW, Rule 30 at 38-40 (prospectant evidence); Rules 59 through 68 
(1910).
443.  See, e.g., Rowan v. United States,   277 F. 777, 778 (7th Cir. 1921);  Campbell v. United 
States,   221 F. 186, 190 (9th  Cir. 1915); Crenshaw v. State, 87 So. 328, 330 (Ala. 1921);   
Locklear v. State, 87 So. 708, 711  (Ala. App.), certiorari dismissed, 87 So. 712 (Ala. 1920); 
Burnett v. State,  268 P. 611, 614 (Ariz. 1928 );  People v. Sotelo, 283 P. 388, 389 (Cal. App. 
1929);  Willingham v. State, 149 S.E. 887, 890 (Ga. 1929); State v. Sullivan, 199 P. 647, 659 
(Idaho, 1921); People v. Schwartz, 131 N.E. 806, 807 (Ill. 1921); State v, Bige, 193 N.W. 17, 20 
(Iowa,1923); State v. Scott,  114 A. 159, 161 (Me.1921);   State v. Lambert,  71 A. 1092, 1093 
(Me. 1908), Commonwealth v. Goldberg, 98 N.E. 692, 693 ( Mass. 1912).   See also 
Gassenheimer v. United States,   26 App. D.C. 432, 444-45 (D.C. App. 1906) (defendant tried to 
bribe juror after first trial: admissible to show consciousness of guilt);   People v. Spaulding, 
N.E. 196, 202 (Ill. 1923) (killing accomplice admissible to show consciousness of guilt).
444. See, e.g., Thomas J. Reed, Reading Gaol Revisited: Admission of Uncharged Misconduct 
Evidence in Sex Offender Cases, 21 AM. J. CRIM. LAW 127 (1993).
445.  For jurisdictions that required proof of uncharged misconduct by clear and convincing 
evidence prior to adopting the Uniform Rules of Evidence, see, e.g., People v. Albertson, 145 
P.2d. 7, 21-22 (Cal. 1933) (positive & substantial); People v. Botham, 629 P.2d 589, 602-03 
(Colo. 1981)  Benson v. State, 395 A.2d 361, 364 (Del. 1978); Cross v. State, 386 A.2d 757, 764  
(Md. 1978) State v. Billstrom, 149 N.W.2d 281, 285 (1967);  State v. Hyde, 136 S.W. 316, 331  
(Mo.,1911); Tucker v. State,   412 P.2d 970;  972 (1966);  Wrather v. State,  169 S.W.2d 854, 
859 (1942). 
446.  See, e.g., Ernster v. State, 308 S.W. 2d 33, 34 (1957)..
447.  American Law Inst., CODE OF EVIDENCE TENTATIVE DRAFT NO. 2, frontispiece (19 Mar. 
1941).  The group of advisors included Prof. Wilber H. Cherry, University of Minnesota, Prof. 
Laurence H. Eldredge, University of Pennsylvania, Prof. William G. Hale, University of 
Southern California, Judge Augustus N. Hand and Judge Learned Hand, U.S. Court of Appeals 
2nd Circuit,  Prof. Mason Ladd, University of Iowa, Judge Henry T. Lummus, Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court, Prof. Charles T. McCormick, University of Texas, and Charles E. 
Wyzanski, Jr. of Boson, MA.
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448.  Id. at 119.
449.  Maguire’s comment read:
The law is often assumed to be otherwise than as stated in this Rule.  Nothing is more common 
than to find the unqualified assertion that ifa party is charged with having committed a specified 
crime or civil wrong, no evidence of the commission by him of another crime or wrong is 
receivable against him.  That is true where the series of inferences on which the relevance of the 
evidence depends is from the commission of the other wrong to a disposition to commit such a 
wrong or to commit crimes or torts generally, thence to the commission of the particular wrong.  
The cases are legion, however, which admit such evidence when offered to prove motive, intent, 
preparation ,plan or identity.  A careful examination of the prtinent cases in England and in the 
United States will reveal that the great majhroity of them reflect the doctrine expressed in this 
Rule.  See Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 954 (1933) 
Engfland; 51 id. 988 (1938) America.  Id.
450.  Id. at. 1023-30.  Stone’s preference for Judge Parker’s view of the uncharged misconduct 
rule rests on his belief that the points of similarity between the two killings was sufficient to 
show that Molineux perpetrated the Barnet homicide. Id. at 1028.
451.  American Law Inst., MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, 196-97 (1942).
452.  The rule as to the exclusion of evidence of other crimes and wrongs when offered to prove 
the commission of a specified crime or wrong is by 311 put on a sound sensible basis which has 
support in innumerable cases thouh rarely clearly articulated.  Such evidence is made 
inadmissible only where it is relevant solely as tending to prove a disposition to commit such a 
crime or wrong or to commit crimes or wrongs generally.  If it is relevant for any other purpose, 
it is admissible. The courts at common law will not admit evidence of a person’s criminal or 
tortious character as tending to prove his conduct on a specified occasion; a fortiori they will not 
admit specific instances of his conduct on other occasions as tending to prove such character.  
Rule 306 does, with certain exceptions, admit evidence of televant traits of character in civil 
ctions as tending to prove conduct, but it does not permit such character to be proved by 
evidence of specific instances.  This might well be enough without a specific rule.  But out of 
abundance of caution in this instance, the Code specifically excludes evidence of a person’s 
commission of other crimes or torts as tending to prove the commission of the crime or tort 
charged when the only series of inferences by which the commission of the crime or tort has any 
probative value is from that commission to a disposition to    Id., Foreword by Prof. Edmund M. 
Morgan, 33-34.
453. James F. Bailey, III and Oscar M. Trelles, II, 1 THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES AND RELATED DOCUMENTS, 913 (prefatory note to 1973 ed. Unif. R. 
Evid. (1980) (hereafter “Bailey & Trelles”).
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454.  Rule 55 read as follows:
Rule 55.  Other Crimes or Civil Wrongs.  Subject to Rule 47 evidence that a person committed a 
crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion, is inadmissible to prove his disposition to commit 
crime or civil wrong as the basis for an inference that he committed another crime or civil wrong 
on another specified occasion but, subject to Rules 45 and 48, such evidence is admissible when 
relevant to prove some other material fact including absence of mistake or accident, motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge or identity. Nat’l Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Rules of Evidence (1953) in 1 Bailey & Trelles, 193 (document 
2).
455.  See, e.g.,Deevy v. Tassi, 21 Cal.2d 109, 130 P.2d 389 (1942) (assault;  evidence  of 
defendant's bad  character  for peace and quiet held inadmissible);   Vance v. Richardson, 110 
Cal. 414, 42 Pac. 909 (1895) (assault;  evidence  of defendant's good  character  for peace and 
quiet held inadmissible);   Van Horn v. Van Horn, 5 Cal. App. 719, 91 Pac. 260 (1907) (divorce 
for adultery;  evidence  of defendant's and the nonparty-corespondent's good  character  held 
inadmissible).
456.  Cal. Evid. Code § 1101 (1965).
457. As originally drafted in 1971, Rule 404(a) was as follows:
(a) Character Evidence Generally.  Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of his character is 
not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewit on a particular 
occasion, except:
(1) Charater of Accused.  Evidence of his character or a trait of character offered by an 
accused, and similar evidence offered by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of Victim.  Evidence of the character or a trait of character of the victim of 
the crime offered by an accused, and similar evidence offered by the prosecution to rebut the 
same;
(3) Character of Witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, offered to attack or 
support his credibility. 2 Bailey & Trelles, 55 (1971 edition of proposed Federal Rules of 
Evidence).
458.   The text read:
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs or Acts.  Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 
admissible to prove the charatrer of a person in order to show that he acted in confirmity 
therewith.  It may, however, be admissible for other purposes such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, kniwledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.  2 
Id., 56.
459.  Communications from the Chief Justice of the United States transmitting The Proposed 
Rules of Evidence of the United States Courts and magistates, Amendments and Further 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and Amendments to the Federal Rules of 
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Criminal Procedure Which Have Been adopted by the Supreme Court, Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  
2072 and 2075 and 18 U.S.C. 3401, 3771 and 3771 Together with the Report of the Judicial 
Conference of the United States Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 331 (1978) in 2 BAILEY & TRELLES, 7
(pages numbered as in original document).
460.  The official commentary says that:
Subdivision (b) deals with a specialized but important application of the general rule excluding 
circumstantial use of character evidence.  Consistently with that rule, evidence of othr crimes, 
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove charfacter as a basis for suggesting the inference that 
conduct on a particular occasion was in conformity with it.  However, the evidence may be 
offered for another purpose, such as proof of motive, opportunity, and so on, which does not 
require that the evidence be excluded. No mechanical solution is offered.  The determination 
must be made whether the danger of undue prejudice outweighs the probative value of the 
evidene in view of the availabilty of other means of proof and other factors appropriate for 
making decisions of this kind under Rule 403.  Slough and Knightly, Other Vices, Other Crimes, 
41 Iowa L. Rev. 325 (1956).
461.   Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the 
Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 93rd Cong. 1st. Sess. , 93 in 3 
BAILEY & TRELLES.
462.  Id. at 122-23.  Hellerstein thought that the change from “This subdivision does not exclude 
the evidence when offered” to “It may, however, be admissible for” somehow changed the sense 
of the rule
463. Id. at 263.
464.  H.R. 5463, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess.as amended by the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice 
House Committee on the Judiciary,  Id. at 145.
465.  Id. at 269
466.  Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) (1975).
467.  The Official Commentary and accompanying comments from the committees reads as 
follows:
     Subdivision (b) deals with a specialized but important application of the general rule 
excluding circumstantial use of  character evidence.  Consistently  with that rule,  evidence  of 
other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissibleto prove character as a basis for suggesting the 
inference that conduct on a particular occasion was in conformity with it. However, the evidence 
may be offered for another purpose, such as proof of motive, opportunity, and so on, which does 
not fall within the prohibition. In this situation the rule does not  require that the evidence be 
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excluded. No mechanical solution is offered. The determination must be made whether the 
danger of undue prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence in view of the 
availability of other means of proof and other factors appropriate for making decisions of this 
kind under Rule 403. Slough and Knightly, Other Vices, Other Crimes, 41 Iowa L.Rev. 325 
(1956). 
    Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, House Report No. 93-650.  The second sentence of Rule 
404(b) as submitted to the Congress began with the words "This subdivision does not exclude the 
evidence when offered". The Committee amended this language to read "It may, however, be 
admissible", the words used in the 1971 Advisory Committee draft, on the ground that this 
formulation properly placed greater emphasis on admissibility than did the final Court version.
Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, Senate Report No. 93-1277.  This rule provides that 
evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove character but may be 
admissible for other specified purposes such as proof of motive.
   Although your committee sees no necessity in amending the rule itself, it anticipates that the 
use of the discretionary word "may" with respect to the admissibility of evidence of crimes, 
wrongs, or acts is not intended to conferany arbitrary discretion on the trial judge. Rather, it is 
anticipated that with respect to permissible uses for such evidence, the trial judge may exclude it
only on the basis of those considerations set forth in Rule 403, i.e. prejudice, confusion or waste 
of time.
468.  LEXIS Shepard’s citator search 23 Feb. 2003.
